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DEONTOLOGICAL ORIGINALISM: MORAL TRUTH,
LIBERTY, AND, CONSTITUTIONAL "DUE
PROCESS"
PART I - ORIGINALISM AND DEONTOLOGY
PETER BRANDON BAYER*
This article offers what has been needed but lacking in modern legal
commentary: thorough, meticulous and timely proof that, pursuant to
principles of Originalism, the Constitution-the highest law of the United
States-mandates that any governmental act is unconstitutional if it is
immoral.
Specifically, this article returns fundamental constitutional
jurisprudence to where it rightly was until roughly a century ago; and,
where, recently, it has been returning in the form of Supreme Court
substantive due process precedents based on admittedly ill-defined
principles of human dignity. The overarching concept, which I call
Deontological Originalism, asserts that both the Founders of this Nation
and the Reconstruction Congress properly believed in natural rights
derived from principles of natural law. Accordingly, they sought to enforce
through the Constitution, the natural rights philosophy set forth in the
Declaration of Independence. Most importantly, natural law and resultant
natural rights are deontological, that is, they enforce a priori, immutable
moral precepts that descend not from human imagining but from the natural
order of existence, what the Declaration denotes as, "Nature and Nature's
God." That is why, under the Constitution, any and all immoral
governmental conduct is unconstitutional regardless of bureau or actor-
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great patience. The author thanks as well his uncomplaining colleagues lan Bartrum, Tom
McAffee, Ruben Garcia, and Thomas Main, for their thoughtful comments when discussing
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legislative, judicial, executive or administrative-and regardless of level-
federal, state or local.
Unlike articles that aver similar ideas, this writing presents
Deontological Originalism as a metatheory, meaning, it expounds at once
essentially all fundamentals, and their respective proofs, as indeed any
work defining and defending a theory of Originalism should do.
Metatheory accounts for this commentary's length; but, frankly, it is time
that one law review article presented a meta-theoretical perspective given
the exasperated skepticism and postmodernist complacency most often
greeting serious assertions that the Constitution enforces natural law and,
therefore, the bench and bar must become "natural lawyers" when
addressing constitutional rights. After thirty years of perhaps sporadic
writings addressing many of the relevant aspects, I offer Deontological
Originalism, a venture proceeding from the utility of Originalism, to the
meaning of Deontology, to the intent of the Founders and of the
Reconstruction Congress, to the deontological principles of Enlightenment
philosopher Immanuel Kant, to modem due process dignity theory
enforcing Deontological Originalism through Kantian morality,
culminating in the Supreme Court's bravura rulings requiring that
Government accord same-sex marriage the full and equal legal status
accorded opposite-sex marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION TO DEONTOLOGICAL ORIGINALISM --
A. A Spiritual's Lesson about Liberty --
One of the most lyrical among American folksongs is the plaintive yet
inspiring All My Trials. Part-spiritual, part-lullaby, part-political
manifesto, the song intrepidly declares, "All my trials, Lord, soon will be
over. I had a little book that was given to me. And, every page spelled
Liberty."'
1. Peter, Paul and Mary, All My Trials Lyrics, METROLYRICS.COM,
http://www.metrolyrics.com/all-my-trials-lyrics-peter-paul-mary.html (accessed, March
14, 2017) (emphasis added). Traced as far back as "the antebellum South," thereafter
reposing quietly for decades in the West Indies, All My Trials enjoyed a much-deserved
resurgence during America's folk music revival of the 1950s and 1960s. "This spiritual-
lullaby probably originated in the antebellum South, from where it was transported to the
West Indies. It appears to have died out in this country, only to be discovered in the
Bahamas. From there it was reintroduced to us, eventually becoming one of the standards
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All My Trials is understood primarily as a religious "message of hope
that however bad the trial [a person] was facing there was a promise of
liberty and freedom in the afterlife." 2 Nonetheless, I have felt since I first
heard it over fifty-five years ago that All My Trials holds an equally strong
"message of hope" for life. Whatever the cryptic "little book" actually
might be, that its "every page spelled Liberty" evokes a compelling lesson:
nothing is more important than the amalgam of rights and principles which
combined become Liberty, for it is Liberty which, the lyrics promise, will
free the book's holder from "all [her] trials."
Because poetry may be subject to numerous, coextensive
interpretations, 3 considering its pre-Civil War origin along with its spiritual
of the [post-World War Il-Civil Rights Era] popular folk song movement." The Joan Baez
Songbook, (Maynard Solomon 1964), SECONDHANDSONGS.COM,
https://secondhandsongs.com/work/122929 (accessed, Mar. 14, 2017).
All My Trials became a favorite among that movement's most popular folksingers.
"By the 1950s the song had become popular in the American south and in the early 1960s
it was a staple of the folk revival. Among the artists to have recorded the song are Harry
Belafonte, Pete Seeger, Joan Baez, and Peter, Paul and Mary." SONGFACTS,
http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php?id=8605 (accessed, March 14, 2017). Even the
hugely flamboyant rock-and-roll icon Elvis Presley, as part of his 1970s concerts, included
portions of All My Trials, "in the medley 'An American Trilogy' ... together with 'Dixie'
and 'The Battle Hymn of the Republic."' Id.
2. All My Trials, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All My Trials (accessed,
March 14, 2017). All My Trials, "is based on a Bahamian lullaby that tells the story of a
mother on her death bed, comforting her children, 'Hush little baby, don't you cry. /You
know your mama's bound to die."' Id. Most of the lyrics concern death and the Afterlife
which evinces that All My Trials' primary message is that Liberty arises from mortal death
that frees the soul. For example, stanzas include, "There is a tree in Paradise, the pilgrims
call it the Tree of Life," and a lyric commonly found in spirituals, "The river of Jordan is
muddy and cold; it chills the body, but not the soul." Miriam Berg, All My Trials, FOLKSONG
COLLECTOR, http://folksongcollector.com/alltrial.html (accessed, July 29, 2017).
3. E.g., Booth Oil Site Admin. Grp. v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 194 F.R.D. 76, 81
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) ("the Requests [for Admissions] at issue do not relate to material which,
like a line of lyrical poetry, may be subject to multiple interpretations."). As one scholar
explained,
[Noted Yale literature scholars Cleanth] Brooks and [Robert Penn] Warren taught
that the poem's language and structure, not its historical context, had a special claim on the
student's attention. ... [Concurrently,] Brooks insisted that the poem must be "considered
as a whole" and with a concentrated focus on its "structure" or "total pattern" and the
relationships among its parts. Brooks on poetry ... favored the practiced reader's direct
encounter and conversation with the texts in the canon, attuned to both internal structures
and relations and to the ways the texts echo and engage one another across generations and
centuries.
William E. Forbath, Lincoln, The Declaration, and the "Grisly, Undying Corpse ofStates'
Rights": History, Memory, and Imagination in the Constitution of a Southern Liberal, 92
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premise, "I had a little book that was given to me" suggests that Liberty
could be a gift of natural rights from, as the Declaration of Independence
tells us, "God and Nature's God."4 Thus, the "little book" might be the
enslaved race's hope of deliverance through death and, while alive,
liberty-liberation-through the Declaration, the Constitution of the
United States (amended to prohibit slavery), or both. Accordingly, among
its many connotations, All My Trials may tell us that because God's will is
to be done "on earth as it is in heaven,"' life "on earth" is not principled
unless its "every page"-everything we do individually and collectively--
"spell[s] Liberty." 6 Indeed, All My Trials' implicit meaning that liberty
links life and soul is captured in the adage that, "Life without liberty is like
a body without spirit."'
GEO. L.J. 709, 718 (2004) (Symposium on Charles L. Black, Jr.) (quoting, Cleanth Brooks,
The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry 192 (1947)).
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, par. 1 (U.S. 1776); see also, infra notes 479-
510 and accompanying text discussing the Declaration and natural law.
As is common among folksongs, All My Trials, is known to have alternate lyrics.
For example, "I've got a little book with pages three, And every page spells liberty, ... "
Harry Belafonte, All My Trials, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Harry-belafonte-all-my-trials-
lyrics. (accessed, March 14, 2017). While it likely refers to some religious text, a "book
with pages three" could simultaneously infer a page for each of America's founding
documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and, the Bill of Rights, thus
again offering as one among many concurrent meanings that liberty frees us in life as it does
in death.
5. Matthew 6:10.
6. This lay expression through song matches the conclusions of some of our most
insightful and provocative thinkers. For instance, the noted constitutional scholar Laurence
Tribe stated unequivocally, "Nothing is more devastating than a life without liberty."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 3 (New York City: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1992) (quoted in, Glenn Cohen, Are All Abortions Equal? Should
There Be Exceptions to the Criminalization ofAbortion For Rape And Incest?, 43 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 87, 90 (2015)). Similarly, Professor John C. Fletcher observed, "With liberty as
its hallmark, we once believed (and I think we still do) that life without liberty is not worth
living. Thus to argue that the problem with Americans is that we put too high a value on
self-determination, and should look for other values instead to live by, is to argue against
our basic political system itself." John C. Fletcher, Standard ofCare: The Law ofAmerican
Bioethics. By George J. Annas. New York- Oxford University Press. 1993, 10 J.
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH L. & POL. 589, 597 (1994) (footnote omitted).
7. Alicia Brown, Striking a Balance: The Conflict Between Safety and Due Process
Rights -- The Practical Implications of Zadvydas v. Davis, 22 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDGES
429, 429 (2002) (quoting, Kahlil Gibran, QUOTELAND.COM,
http://www.quoteland.com/author.asp?AUTHORID=79 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002)).
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B. Deontological Originalism, and Why that Theory Is Needed --
While properly not a religious document, for life worth living, the
Constitution likewise prescribes that nothing surpasses liberty. Indeed,
among its many provisions, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, ensuring that no office of American government
may intrude upon "life, liberty or property" without "due process of law,"
set forth this Nation's primary, overarching law against which neither
inferior law, nor any governmental action, at any governmental level, can
contend.' The supremacy of liberty is America's core moral promise and
legal commitment to all those-citizens, invitees and even to some extent
"illegal aliens" 9 -who come within the jurisdiction of the United States.
More than territory, more than human and natural resources, more than
might and power, more than symbols such as flags and banners, it is the
promise of "liberty and justice for all""o that both defines America and
fulfills the original hope and intent of this Nation's founders, those who
authored our formative documents The Declaration of Independence and
The Constitution.
Accordingly, regarding the meaning of liberty under the Constitution,
this article seeks to reaffirm that despite prominent postmodern skepticism
and cynicism:
8. The forthcoming See, infra Part 11 will demonstrate , Section 4d, notes 937-1008
and accompanying text demonstrating that all constitutional civil rights express in the text
and implied from the text, including separation of powers and Federalism, emanate from
the Due Process Clauses as liberty interests. See, Bayer infra note 23.
9. While certainly not without limits, the Judiciary rightly has recognized that their
status as "illegal aliens" does not per se deprive such persons of constitutional liberty at
least, "when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country." U.S. v. Verdugo-Urqudez, 494 U.S. 259, 271
(1990) (citing cases); Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. United States of Am.. 893 F.3d
153, 168 (3d Cir. 2018);
Castro v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir. 2016). Perhaps
the most celebrated holding is Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) which answered "no" to
its stated issue, "whether, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public
education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens." Id at 205. See generally, Amanda Frost, Independence and Immigration,
89 S. CAL. L. REv. 485 (2016) (discussing how the natural rights precepts of the Declaration
of Independence can and should inform the constitutional rights of "noncitizens); D. McNair
Nichols, Jr., Guns and Alienage: Correcting a Dangerous Contradiction, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 2089 (2016) (note).
10. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE, 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2003).
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-- (1) Liberty is a principle of morality manifested as the amalgam of
natural rights that emanate not from human imagining, but from natural
law.
-- (2) Because it arises from natural law, morality is neither a matter
of human opinion nor of human preferences. Rather, morality is
deontological, that is, a priori, immutable, part of the natural order of
existence, discerned through impartial reason, applicable at all times in all
situations to all persons of any and every social order, and binding no
matter how terrible the consequences of moral compliance may be. The
belief in deontological morality is called in philosophy, Deontology.
-- (3) Deontological morality was both understood and accepted by
this Nation's founders who incorporated into the Declaration of
Independence the theory that government is legitimate only if it comports
with the deontological morality of natural rights, which, reduced to a single
encompassing idea, is liberty.
-- (4) The Founders in 1787-1791" and the Reconstruction Congress
that achieved ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the
Constitution to effectuate as supreme law, the Declaration's moral
principles of natural rights liberty emanating from natural law.
11. For simplicity's sake, I use the term "Founders" and "Framers" essentially
interchangeably. Often, Founders refers to those who drafted the Declaration of
Independence and otherwise effected the American Revolution. Framers, by contrast,
usually identifies those who drafted the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights of 1791,
and, possibly the post-Civil War Amendments. Because of the inextricable linkage, as
demonstrated herein, between the Declaration and the Constitution as initially ratified, as
amended in 1791, and, as amended in 1866-1868, it is fair to use Founders and Framers
synonymously. For example, applying the proposition that "[Elarly congressional
enactments provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's
meaning," Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997), over a century ago the Supreme Court
noted, "The act of 1797, which ordained legacy taxes, was adopted at a time when the
founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in
public affairs, thus giving a practical construction to the Constitution which they had helped
to establish." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900).
A quarter-century later, the Court reiterated the interrelationship between America's
"founders" and the Constitution's "framers," "This Court has repeatedly laid down the
principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in
public affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provisions." Myers
v. U.S. 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (over turned in part on other grounds) (recognized by Free
Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010)). See
also, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003); U.S. v. Yancy, 621 F.3d 681, 684
(7th Cir. 2010); State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.2d 86, 90 n. 29 (Alaska 2016);
Carter v. Lehi City, 269 P.3d 141, 155 n. 40 (Utah 2012).
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-- (5) Accordingly, liberty alone is the Constitution's highest edict, the
dominant law of the land.
-- (6) Given its natural law origin, the actual meaning of liberty-of
"due process of law"-is discerned only through moral philosophy,
revealing what natural rights ascend from natural law and how such rights
apply in discrete legal conflicts. Therefore, this article argues that any law
or governmental conduct is constitutional as a matter of due process liberty
if it is moral. True, some constitutional commands, although moral,
implicate no moral conduct on the part of governmental actors.12
Nonetheless, most constitutional challenges ultimately involve questions
of individual liberty which are moral issues. Not only are such matters the
meat of constitutional rights emanating from the Bill of Rights and the Civil
War Amendments, but indeed, courts habitually resolve constitutional
issues such as commerce, taxes, and separation of powers, by assessing
whether the challenged law or official conduct offends principles of
liberty." Therefore, for simplicity's sake, this writing asserts that
constitutional dilemmas are, in fact, moral dilemmas.
Accepted and unquestioned by the 1700s and 1800s courts, 14 during
the Twentieth Century and into the new Millennium, the principles just
listed came under misguided attack, particularly by jurists and
commentators who embraced and continue to accept the interpretive
scheme popularly known as Originalism, the idea that "the discoverable
meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption [is]
authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.""
My claim is not that Originalism is wrong, but rather, no present iteration
of that theory completely captures the true and actual shared original
12. RONALD DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW--THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 8 (Harv. U. Press, 1996). "The American Constitution includes a great many
clauses that are neither particularly abstract nor drafted in the language of moral principle."
For example, Article II, sec. 1, cl. 4, requires that a sitting president must be thirty-five-
years-old or older. As Dworkin rightly noted, enforcement of that minimum age
requirement would not necessarily raise moral questions, but, rather, require only an
empirical assessment whether an elected person or candidate is or would be age-eligible to
assume the presidency. Id.
13. E.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate's Due Process Legality: A
Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 865, 879-84 (2013)
(hereinafter "Bayer I") (resolution of interstate commerce questions usually is predicated
on individual liberty interests).
14. See infra note 23, Part 11, Section 5-e-3-A, notes 1032-60 and accompanying text.
15. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 599, 599
(2004).
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intent of both the Founders and the Reconstruction Congress. In response,
I propose, as just mentioned, that the Constitution has but one core,
essential "original meaning"' 6 enforceable as America's supreme law: no
legislation, regulation, executive order, judicial opinion, governmental
conduct, or, other inferior law issuing from any office or official of any
branch, at any level, may violate the immutable, a priori principles of
natural-rights-based moral governance described in the Declaration of
Independence and commemorated as supreme law in the Constitution.
Premised in part on propositions I earlier advocated in Sacrifice and
Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is a "Suicide Pact, "l7 this theory,
which I call "Deontological Originalism," is the true originalist paradigm
of the United States Constitution, espoused by the original drafters in 1787
(and 1791 when the Bill of Rights was added), fostered almost a century
later by the Reconstruction Congress shortly after the Civil War, and
applicable to all matters of constitutional law to this day. Deontological
Originalism returns us to the original intent shared by both the 1787 and
1868 framers who through the United States Constitution, sanctioned
Enlightenment political and social philosophy by boldly, unprecedentedly
and correctly ordaining as America's paramount and controlling law, the
theory set forth in the Declaration that natural rights, which may be
summarized under the rubric "liberty," define the legitimate authority of
governments.
In this regard, I note at the outset that certainly I do not write on a new
slate. For instance, during his remarkable and influential career, the highly
regarded jurisprude Ronald Dworkin famously expounded at length that,
as intended by the Framers, the Constitution's text mandates a "moral
reading," a theory popularly referred to as Moral Reading Originalism."
Similarly, one fresh offshoot of Originalism, known as Liberal
Originalism, emphatically links the originally intended meaning of the
Constitution to the Declaration of Independence. 9 Along somewhat
similar lines, Professor Ian P. Farrell's recent provocative work
16. The idea that all moral principles can all be derived from a single, dominating,
overarching moral precept is known in moral theory as "value monism." See infra, notes
179-87 and accompanying text.
17. Peter B. Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution is a "Suicide
Pact", 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 287 (2011) (hereinafter "Bayer II").
18. See supra note 12 and infra notes 205-26 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
subtitle of Dworkin's important Freedom's Law is: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution.
19. See infra notes 562-78 and accompanying text.
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Enlightened Originalism20 in very broad strokes avers, as do I, that the
Constitution's drafters imbued as America's highest law, the immutable, a
priori moral precepts set forth in the Declaration.
However, each of these interesting theories have significant
infirmities that the proposed Deontological Originalism corrects. Indeed,
the weaknesses of Moral Reading Originalism, Liberal Originalism and
Enlightened Originalism highlight that what Originalism literature needs,
and what I believe this article supplies, is a meticulous metatheory,
meaning the scrupulous detailing of the many propositions that together
comprise Deontological Originalism. 2 1 The unavoidable hitch is that there
20. Ian P. Farrell, Enlightened Originalism, 54 Hous. L. REv. 569 (2017); see also infra
notes 579-93 and accompanying text.
21. The project to discern a framework defining the very core of the Constitution in a
way that allows resolution of specific constitutional issues, is the search for a metatheory -
an idea or approach that captures everything relevant and from which all particular problems
find solutions. As Thomas Baker summarized, "To develop a set of criteria for
understanding and evaluating existing theory, one must escape to a higher level of
abstraction and consider what would be an ideal theory. This [is] metatheory, or theory of
theories, ... " Thomas E. Baker, 'The Right of The People To Be Secure. . .': Toward a
Metatheory of The Fourth Amendment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881, 882 (1989); see also
e.g., H. William Fischer, Dworkin's Right Answer Thesis: A Statistical Regression
Coherence Model, 73 IOWA L. REV. 159, 162 (1987).
True, at an absolute level proof of any given metatheory may be impossible based
on an infinite progression analysis: "Comparison of one science to another requires a
metatheory outside the domain of any particular science, but any such metatheory can claim
scientific legitimacy only if it too is scientific. That task in turn calls for a metatheory ofthe
metatheory, then a metatheory of the metatheory of the metatheory, and so on, with the
result that no attempt at scientific closure can be scientifically legitimate." David M.
Frankford, Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic To Cure Legal Medicine, 66 So. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 77 (1992) (footnote omitted). Thus, as Professor D'Amato concluded, because
human beings are incapable of considering an infinite number of ever more abstract theories
in a finite amount of time, it follows that any "general theory of interpretation is
impossible." Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
134, 142 (1990) (quoting, Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial
Interpretation ofStatutes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561, 562-63 (1989)).
Of course, Humankind's postulated inability to discern an actual metatheory does
not mean that such fails to exist in nature. Cf, Michael S. Moore, PLACING BLAME: A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 724 (1997) (that human beings may never be
certain if and when they have found actual truth is no proof that there is no truth) (discussed
in, Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893, 896 (2000));
see, infra Section 2-d (discussing the "consequentialist error"), notes 83-123 and
accompanying text. Still, even if"at an epistemic or practical level" we can never actually
isolate a true metatheory, Kress at 142, at most D'Amato shows that what we hastily label
as a metatheory may be a highly abstract intermediate theory contained within other, even
broader as yet undiscovered theories, but nonetheless, complete and reliable enough for
pragmatic application. For instance, although our understanding of mathematics and
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are no convenient, reliable shortcuts to address the numerous and complex
matters attendant to proving Deontological Originalism, thereby debunking
anti-deontological originalist theories while simultaneously correcting the
misperceptions and filling the significant gaps of "Moral Reading,"
"Liberal," and, "Enlightened" Originalism. Consequently, demonstrating
that morality is deontological, proving that deontological morality was and
remains the foundation of the Constitution, and, defining the exact
parameters of constitutional morality which the Judiciary has
encapsulated under the Due Process Clauses, require exacting
fastidiousness to be persuasive. Such requisite detail takes space which is
why this article is uncommonly long. But, constitutional metatheory
requires nothing less; and, the time has come for the thoroughgoing
analysis this article attempts.22
Specifically, this article is divided into two parts each of which
contains discrete sections discussing relevant sub-topics that together
comprise Deontological Originalism. 23 Part I addresses the metaphysical
nature of morality and the philosophic basis of constitutions insofar as they
set forth the basic structures of governments. In particular, after this
Introduction which is Part I's Section 1, Section 2 explains that moral
principles indeed are immutable, a priori and emanate not from
individuals' imaginations but rather from impartial reason. Accordingly,
Section 2 explicates that, contrary to the unsupported assumptions made by
physical science surely is imperfect, it seems to be sufficient to build buildings that remain
standing, to construct bridges that do not collapse, and, to launch satellites capable of
successfully reaching objects millions of miles from Earth. In the realm of theories, we
know that often perfection is not required to do well enough.
22. Indeed, the moral theory portion of Ian Farrell's Enlightened Originalism can only
be described as skeletal, offering neither a detailed description, nor an in-depth historical
review, nor philosophical proof supporting his claims that morality is deontological and that
the Declaration of Independence sets forth correct moral precepts that the Founders
incorporated into the Constitution as supreme law. Nonetheless, Professor Farrell's
conclusory, sketchy presentation fills roughly fifty law review pages. Farrell, supra note
20, at 570-619. Surely then, the several law review pages herein both expounding a
comprehensive theory of Deontological Originalism and applying that theory to elucidate a
century and a half of American substantive due process jurisprudence, is fully warranted.
23. Peter B. Bayer, Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and,
Constitutional "Due Process," Part I- Originalism and Deontology, 43 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1 (2017) sets forth Part I. Peter B. Bayer, Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth,
Liberty, and, Constitutional "Due Process," Part II - The Reconstruction Amendments.
Kantian Morality and the Dominance ofDue Process, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 150 (2017)
(hereinafter "Part II").
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many, perhaps most legal commentators, morality is not humanly created,
but rather is deontological.24
The next logical question becomes: What precisely are the best extant
precepts of morality? In response, Section 3 extolls the deontological
perspectives of the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant who not
only aptly described the character of immutable, transcendent morality, but
as well explicated the precise, fundamental moral duties incumbent all
persons both natural and legal. Accordingly, the same abiding, primary
moral requisites demanded of human beings inure not only to groups,
organizations, corporations, but indeed to the very government individuals
designated to regulate and to stabilize their lives through law. Kant will
teach us that legitimate government is not merely a logical convenience,
but is rather a moral necessity because the rules of societal interactions
must be legally formalized to assure that they comport with the moral
requisites incumbent on all persons. Absent formal law enacted through
the legitimate source of formal law -Government- individual transactions
devolve into a series of ad hoc practices agreed to solely by the transacting
parties, and not subject to a communal review both to assure moral
comportment and to provide reliable, consistent neutral fora for the
resolution of legal disputes. Accordingly, the tenets to transact
commercial, personal and other dealings which individuals and their
respective groups, organizations, and corporations habitually undertake
cannot be left exclusively to the subjective, selfish, possibly imprudent and
ephemeral whims, preferences and caprices of the transacting parties. Even
if fortuitously such individual transactions actually conform to
deontological commands, absent societally set standards, there is no
overarching regulatory system which legitimately compels under threat of
punishment that individuals engage only in morally correct transactions,
and which duly handles transgressors.
The formation of governments, then, is a moral requisite because only
the offices of government rightfully may set societal-wide standards of
conduct enforced as law and subjecting offenders to legal punishments
compelled, ifnecessary, through violence. In turn, since Government itself
acts legitimately only if it acts morally, moral governance is the means to
forestall both tyranny and anarchy, which, of course, is the very theory of
our Constitution.25
24. See infra, notes 30-187 and accompanying text.
25. See Bayer, infra note 23, Part II, Sections 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Having set the general and specific moral framework, and having
established that Government not only must act morally but is itself the only
legitimate source of force compelling moral comportment from the people
it governs, this article's Part I, Section 4 verifies that the theory of
constitutional interpretation called Originalism correctly asserts that
"original meaning" is the sole appropriate source of the Constitution's
meaning.26 This section is essential lest critics assert that constitutional
theory should care nothing about Originalism, but instead simply concern
itself with discerning and applying moral precepts. Originalists cogently
assert that the very rightfulness of America (or indeed of any nation)
requires that its founding ideologies must be enforced by succeeding
generations unless changed through a legitimate amending or restructuring
processes. As detailed in Section 4, because we have decreed America's
establishing principles in the Constitution, if present-day constitutional
applications fail to comport with the original intent of the Framers, the
provisions of the Constitution, thus its establishing principles, become
unmoored from any reliable meaning rendering that charter's text
essentially hollow, subject to the fancies and vagaries of the particular
person or office that happens to be applying the Constitution at any
particular moment. A true Constitution cannot be the proverbial empty
vessel purporting to hold truths of proper governance but, in fact, bereft of
substance, thus constantly filled, emptied and refilled pursuant to the
preferences of whoever holds power. Accordingly, as Originalism urges,
every contemporary interpretation and application of the Constitution must
plausibly be traceable to its original meaning (or duly replaced by a re-
founding of the Nation).27
As shown in Part I, Sections 2 and 3, no government is legitimate
unless it is moral pursuant to Kantian precepts; and, as proven in Section
4, originalists properly understand that no charter of government, written
or unwritten, is legitimate unless its present meaning comports with its
original meaning. Consequently, true and correct Originalism -
Deontological Originalism- must require that founders of governments
intend that the particular governments they establish enact and enforce
laws, manage domestic and foreign relations, and otherwise conduct
business in perfect compliance with Kantian moral norms. Section 4
concludes, then, with a brief review of prevailing subcategories of
26. See infra, notes 386-449 and accompanying text.
27. Id.
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Originalism. As asserted earlier in this Introduction, none of the prevalent
originalist frameworks, even those purportedly steeped in moral theory, are
correct because they fail to espouse that the Founders understood
deontological morality as the sole legitimate foundation of government.
With the framework properly set, this article proceeds to Part II,
addresses the American constitutional experience. 28  Based on the
principles established in Part I, it is insufficient to claim that even if history
reveals that the Framers were unconcerned with enforcing deontological
moral precepts, they nonetheless drafted a charter of American government
that future generations could convert into a license for moral governance.
Rather, the legitimacy of the United States depends on whether indeed the
Framers were deontologists who expected -in fact, demanded- that
constitutional meanings and applications arise not pursuant to their own
moral beliefs, but rather to the best deontological principles available to the
particular generation enforcing the Constitution. And, of course, American
legitimacy further requires adherence to that original intent. Such is what
Part 11 hopes to establish.29
28. See supra, note 23, Peter B. Bayer, Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth,
Liberty, and, Constitutional "Due Process," Part 1 - The Reconstruction Amendments.
Kantian Morality and the Dominance ofDue Process, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 150 (2017).
29. Specifically, Part II, Sections 1-2 prove happily that both the Founders and the
Reconstruction Congress knowingly and deliberately incorporated deontological moral
principles into the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Indeed,- the
Reconstruction Congress' predominant goal was to rectify what it believed to have been
two critical, unfortunate concessions on the part of the original Founders: (1) legalizing
slavery and (2) declining to hold the States legally obliged to abide by the natural rights
principles set forth in the Bill of Rights. The post-Bellum Congress corrected those serious
failures through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Founders and the Reconstruction Congress understood as well that the
Constitution must be interpreted pursuant to the best moral theory extant. Because they
freely acknowledged knowing moral truth only imperfectly, the Founders and the
Reconstruction Congress entreated successor generations to comprehend the Constitution
by discerning morality more completely even if that superior understanding invalidated
deeply-rooted moral suppositions of the Framers and their greater society. As demonstrated
in Part I, Section 3, that superior understanding arises from Immanuel Kant's moral
philosophy. Thereafter, Part II, Section 3 explains that, indeed, the Natural Law principles
espoused in the Declaration and codified into the Constitution sound in deontological
morality.
This writing concludes with Section 4, an intricate examination exploring both the
meaning and the development of due process jurisprudence. Section 4 demonstrates that at
present, the modern Supreme Court employs not one, but two different and irreconcilable
frameworks when addressing liberty, meaning, constitutional issues sounding in "due
process of law." One standard defines due process liberty empirically, based on discerning
applicable liberty principles "deeply rooted" in American history and culture. I argue that
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II. WHY DEONTOLOGY IS THE CORRECT BASIS FOR MORAL THEORY
As noted in the Introduction, I begin by demonstrating that among
competing definitions of morality, Deontology alone is correct. Because
discerning the meaning of morality, surely among the most urgent tasks in
human experience, purportedly has confounded Humankind for eons,30
what follows may seem both a dubious and pompous assertion.
Nonetheless, I propose that defining morality, at least in meta-terms, is
curiously, almost bizarrely easy: it has to be Deontology, there really is no
other way. Not only is Deontology the only plausible, credible metatheory
for morality, but as well, Deontology's correctness is so patently obvious
that I cannot account for the persistent, widespread reluctance to
acknowledge Deontology; and, candidly, I do not have to. All I have to
show is why Deontology is correct.
Consequentialism and Deontology -- the "Good" Versus the "Right"
The overarching meaning of morality falls into two competing
paradigms: Consequentialism and Deontology.3 1 "The pivotal
reducing the meaning of liberty essentially to an uncritical historical review based on
popular culture defies the moral standards set forth in the Declaration.
The second framework defines due process liberty in terms of protecting and
respecting what the Court aptly denotes as the "dignity" innate in every human being.
Although declining to so attribute, through this dignity approach, the Judiciary correctly
evokes Kantian moral theory to animate the Constitution's overarching guaranty of morality
found in the liberty provisions of the Due Process Clauses. As part of that final proof, this
writing explains why the recent decisions Windsor v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), ruling that the Constitution requires all levels
of American government to treat same-sex marriages equally with opposite-sex marriages,
is eminently correct constitutional moral theory. (Understandably, the formal concluding
section is Section 5 -Conclusion- briefly encapsulating the teachings of this article.)
30. "It may seem a bit difficult to discuss the subject of corporate morality without
defining morality itself. Obviously, we are not, in these few pages, purporting to resolve a
matter that has occupied our philosophical betters for centuries." Lawrence E. Mitchell and
Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a Corporate
Morality, 76 TULANE L. REv. 1645, 1648 (2002) (footnote omitted).
31. Scholars have long noted that Deontology and Consequentialism are, "the two most
prominent traditions in Western normative ethics." Kiran lyler, Nudging Virtue, 26 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L.J., 469, 470 (2017). In his recent book, Professor John Lawrence Hill
accented, "It was in the 1780s that two contrasting schools of thought emerged, both of
which have dramatically and irrevocably influenced modern moral philosophy. Though
they are different in many crucial ways, the two systems of moral thought -utilitarianism
[for our purposes, synonymous with Consequentialism] and Kantian deontology-
represent the two last gasps of the moral objectivity thesis in modern philosophy." JoHN L.
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disagreement between deontology and consequentialism concerns whether
morality comprises the right -transcendent, compulsory principles
applicable come what may- or the good--the result that produces the
most pleasing outcome."3 2 Consequentialists argue the latter, that the
morally correct answer or outcome to any given dilemma is that which
produces the greatest "good" measured empirically as the greatest
aggregate happiness.33 Accordingly, a consequentialist claim or argument,
"seek[s] to maximize good consequences under some conception of which
kinds of good (or bad) consequences are to count in the consequentialist
calculus."34 Noted, legal and moral philosopher Gabriella Blum neatly
summarized the proposition. "Consequentialists maintain that choices are
not morally 'good' or 'bad' in themselves, but should instead be assessed
solely by virtue of the outcomes they bring about, that is, by their
consequences."
This is why it is said Consequentialism focuses on the good -- what
people want -- based on some estimation of a person or group's preferred
outcome. Thus, as its name suggests, 6 Consequentialism avers that the
moral answer is the one that produces the best outcome or consequence,
discerned empirically by determining whether a designated person or
group's aggregate happiness exceeds some other person or group's
HILL, AFrER THE NATURAL LAW: -lOW THE CLASSICAL WORLDVIEW SUPPORTS OUR
MODERN MORAL AND POLITICAL VIEws 216-17 (Ignatius Press 2016).
32. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 294 (citing ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 261-62
(2008)).
33. E.g., Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS 262 (2008); see also, e.g., William Powers,
On the Priority of Justice, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1569, 1569 (1985) (reviewing MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (footnote omitted)).
34. Frederick Schaurer, The Annoying Constitution: Implications for the Allocation of
Interpretive Authority, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1689, 1692 (2017) (footnote omitted).
35. Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil", 35 YALE I. INT'L L. 1, 38
n. 166 (2010); see also, Bayer I, supra note 11, at 889. Professor Kramer likewise explained,
because Consequentialists hold, "that the moral character of any type or instance of conduct
is fully determined by the probable consequences thereof ... no type or instance of conduct
is ever endowed with any inherent moral status. Instead, every action or omission derives
its moral status from the effects with which it is associated." MATTHEW H. KRAMER
TORTURE AND MORAL INTEGRITY 21 (Oxford U. Press 2014).
36. "[Cjonsequentialism ... holds that behaviors, laws, and policies are either right or
wrong; just or unjust; or better or worse, solely on the basis of their consequences." Tyler
A. LeFevre, Justice in Taxation, 41 VT. L. REv. 763,779(2017) (citing, STEVE MCCARTNEY
& RICK PARENT, ETHICS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 13 (2015),
http://opentextbc.ca/ethicsinlawenforcement (last visited May 7, 2017)).
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aggregate unhappiness. Perhaps the most famous among such theorists,
noted utilitarian,
[Jeremy] Bentham defined happiness as whatever brings pleasure and
reduces pain. Deriving morality and public policy through the []
pleasure-pain principle meant that every precept would be judged by its
consequences, not by some fixed standards. Based on this view of
morality, Bentham derided the notion of human rights as nonsense and
famously called imprescriptible human rights "nonsense upon stilts."38
Pursuant to the influence of respected scholars such as Bentham,
among various competing forms, Utilitarianism is, "[t]he paradigmatic
strand of consequentialism . . . ."3 As Professor Robin West explained,
Utilitarianism alone, however, only requires that individuals, when
making moral decisions, choose those actions which will maximize the
pleasure and minimize the pain of the affected community. On an
37. For example, "direct utilitarianism" is "Any object of moral assessment (e.g., action,
motive, policy, or institution) should be assessed by and in proportion to the value of its
consequences for the general happiness." David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence about Rights,
90 B.U. L. REv. 1669, 1671 (2010).
38. Richard Weikart, Ph.D., Upholding the Sanctity of Life in a Culture of Death, 32
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 269,272 (2017) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ED. J. H. BURNS AND H. L. A. HART (London:
University of London, The Athlone Press, 1970), 100)).
Some strains of Consequentialism have tried to escape the inherent selfishness and
shallowness of discerning morality as a given person's or group's aggregate happiness
outweighing others' by requiring some measure of overarching society "good." For
example, the celebrated philosopher John Stuart Mill refined the classic Utilitarianism of
Jeremy Bentham by espousing, "consequential utilitarianism [under which] the happiness
of the greatest number of persons is not sufficient to render an action, or course of action,
correct. To qualify as correct, a course of action must result in foreseeable consequences
that provide the greatest good to the greatest number of persons." Kenneth Schuster,
Because of History, Philosophy, the Constitution, Fairness & Need: Why Americans Have
a Right to National Health Care, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 75, 111 (2013) (citing JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 263 (Mary Warnock ed., World Publishing Company 1971)
(1863)).
Of course, the question remains how to discern in any give instance what is "the
greatest good for the greatest number of persons." Insofar as that determination is premised
on what people want rather than on what they must do, seemingly benign or altruistic forms
of Consequentialism still are fundamentally wrong, the next proven in this writing's text.
39. Blum, supra note 35, at 38 n.166. Indeed, commentators usually identify
utilitarianism as the most prevalent type ofconsequentialism. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 23 (1994); Bailey Kuklin, The Morality ofEvolutionarily
Self-Interested Rescues, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 477 (2008).
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institutional level utilitarianism holds that the community's happiness
is the only moral goal of government, and, therefore, community
happiness is the end for which people in government must aim.4 0
Therefore, aside from the principle of maximizing happiness, there are
no abiding moral truths under Consequentialism because over time
individuals and groups can shift their preferences, regarding what once
made them happy or unhappy may vary. Correspondingly, the morally
correct answer to any particular consequentialist dilemma may be X one
day and Y the next day simply because, for whatever reasons, the relevant
individual or group changed its mind. This shows that Consequentialism
renders moral matters into political issues, meaning that the "determination
of a society's goals and ideals, mobilization of its resources to achieve
those goals and ideals, and distribution of rights, duties, costs, benefits,
rewards, and punishments among members of that society." 4 ' As
purportedly there are no enduring moral truths (except aggregate happiness
uber alles), morality itself must be a humanly conceived and constructed
notion reducing moral dilemmas to political disputes, the resolving which
might as well depend more on partisan power, influence, and bribery than
on rational discourse.42
40. Robin L. West, In the Interest of the Governed: A Utilitarian Justification for
Substantive Judicial Review, 18 GA. L. REv. 469, 475 (1984) (citing, J. BENTHAM, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, inTHE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM I (J. Bowring ed. 1962) (1st ed. London 1789)); Marco I. Jimenez, The Value of
a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REv. 59, 73 n.
59 (2008), HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 411, 413 (7th ed. 1907) (defining
utilitarianism as "conduct which.. .will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the
whole' and defining happiness as "the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain, the
pain being conceived as balanced against an equal amount of pleasure, so that the two
contrasted amounts annihilate each other for purposes of ethical calculation").
41. WALTER F. MURPHY & C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS 2 (4th
ed. 1986) (quoted in Timothy 0. Lenz, State Constitutional Commentary: Article: The
Restriction ofAbortion Protesters in Florida, 59 ALB.L. REv. 1685, 1685 n. 1 (1996)).
42. Consequentialism's proposition that moral principles are humanly conceived and
endure or fail through political means is consistent with the still prominent Legal Realism
movement that seeks "to understand legal rules in terms of their social consequences" and
that "proclaim[s] the uselessness of both legal rules and abstract concepts... Rules do not
decide cases; they are merely tentative classifications of decisions reached, for the most
part, on other grounds." Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465,
468-69 (1988) (review essay of LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press 1986)). As one author put it,
Surprisingly, the realists' rejection of legal rules is their most defensible
theory of law, ... Properly understood, however, it does not deny that statutes and
the like can be law; nor does it deny that these laws can guide a judge's decision
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Regarding particularly Consequentialism's most famous and
pervasive form, Utilitarianism avers that maximizing "utility" is
considered the greatest possible good.43 Of course, theorists do not all
agree on what measures or aspects best define "utility."" That
making when the judge's attitudes recommend conformity with the law. Instead,
the theory rejects the ability of the law to provide reasons for conformity with what
the law recommends that exist independently of the judge's attitudes. The realists'
rejection of legal rules was an attack on the idea of political obligation and the duty
to obey the law.
Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915,
1919-20 (2005).
Accordingly, legal realists did not necessarily claim that rules and general principles
must be both meaningless and harmful. But, realists eschewed the idea that law and legal
norms exist independently of their outcomes. Rather, law should advance "socially
desirable consequences" through, inter alia,judicial opinions premised on consistent, easily
understood principles that promote stability, predictability and just results. Singer, 76 CAL.
L. REv. 465 at 471-73.
43. "The utilitarian version of consequentialism evaluates the rightness and wrongness
of actions by the degree to which those actions increase utility." Jennifer Bird-Pollan,
Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 69 ARK. L. REv. 695, 709-710 (2016-17)
(article defining "utility;" footnote omitted). Similarly, Professor Schaurer noted,
"Utilitarianism is the subset of consequentialism presupposing that utility is the
consequence to be maximized. But other consequentialisms seek to maximize consequences
other than utility." Schauer, supra note 34, The Annoying Constitution: Implication for the
Allocation of Interpretive Authority, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1688, at 1692 n. 13 (citing,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/consequentialism [https://perma.cc/7HAK-9FNB] (last
revised Oct. 22, 2015)).
Commonly, the Enlightenment English philosopher Jeremy Bentham is deemed the
fountainhead of pioneering Utilitarianism. "Utilitarianism is an ethical philosophy
postulating that the morally 'right' action is the one that best maximizes 'utility." ... Jeremy
Bentham, the father of modem utilitarianism, defined 'utility' as that which maximizes
pleasure and minimizes pain. Bentham named this 'the principle of utility,' although it is
often referred to as the 'felicific calculus.' Bentham conceptualized pleasure and pain as the
two 'sovereign masters' with complete control over what a person should do and what a
person ought to do." Wesley M. Bernhardt, A Clash of Principles: Personal Jurisdiction
and Two-Level Utilitarianism in the Information Age II Wash. U. Jurisprudence Rev. 13,
114 (2018) (quoting, JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-2 and n.1 (1823), and citing, Linda
S. Mullenix, Burving (With Kindness) the Felicific Calculus ofCivil Procedure, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 541, 557 (1987) ("Bentham postulated the felicific calculus, a method of codifying
the law based on the 'greatest happiness' utility principle.")).
44. LeFevre, supra note 36, at 780-81; David Fagundes, Buying Happiness: Property,
Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, WM. & MARY L. REv. 1851, 1881-1890 (2017)
(discussing utilitarian theories of property, particularly wealth maximization); Bird-Pollan,
supra note 43 (discussing numerous approaches to defining "utility"). As Prof. Bernhart
explained, "The abstract principles of 'pleasure' and 'pain"'leave much to the imagination.
Is pleasure defined purely as that which most activates the brain's reward system? Or is it
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disagreement, happily, is immaterial in this writing because whatever its
formulation, Utilitarianism in particular and Consequentialism in general
remain premised on defining morality as that which attains the greatest
fulfillment of the "good," meaning, maximizing some person's, group's or
society's concept of happiness. As explained below, any moral theory
based on attaining "good" or avoiding "bad" outcomes is erroneous
because "good" is what best engenders "happiness" or most avoids
"unhappiness" (and "bad," consequently, is what engenders more
unhappiness than happiness). Determining "good" versus "bad," as noted,
depends upon the peculiar preferences and predilections of some chosen
person, groups or social order. But, as next shown, no true moral code can
be justified fully, predominately or even partially because such is what
some person, group or society wants. Morality is not discerned by what
any given person, groups, or society wants; rather, morality is predicated
on what people, groups and societies must do to become and to remain
upright and honorable.4 5
defined more broadly as that which is pro-social? Is it that which progresses humanity
forward, rather than backwards? If the latter, how is pro-social defined? If 'pro-social' can
be defined, who defines it?" Bernhart, supra note 43, at 114-15 (footnote omitted).
45 Certainly, utilitarians do not wish their theories to be used to justify evil even if the pursuit
of evil engenders greater aggragate happiness than does the pursuit ofjustice. The problem
facing utilitarians (and indeed consequentialists of any bent), then, is reconciling the pain-
pleasure principle with a greater sense of decency. Efforts may be noble as, for example,
"Jeremy Bentham provided us at least some guidance:
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case
comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose
interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the
happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of
that individual.
Indeed, Bentham's felicific calculus accounts for goodness of the individual and goodness
of society as a whole." Bernhart, supra note 43, at 115 (quoting, JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2
(1823), and thereafter discussing several factors that Bentham suggested inform the felicific
calculus).
For all their conceptual shortcomings, one cannot accuse utilitarians in particular
and consequentialists in general of utterly disregarding overarching societal good in favor
of the selfish pursuit of individual or group happiness. Yet, as explicated next, so long as
the pain-pleasure calculus is a sine qua non, any consequentialist model must fail.
Correspondingly, so long as some principle greater than human desire is a sine qua non, the
applicable theory becomes deontological not consequentialist because no matter how dire,
the event of an adverse consequence no longer disctates the correct outcome of any given
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Accenting the upright and the honorable, in stark contrast to
consequentialist theories, Deontology focuses on what individuals and
groups must do, how they must comport themselves regardless of any
personal preferences otherwise inducing them to behave differently from
that which morality mandates.46 Deontologists so conclude because
morality antecedes and, therefore, is not dependent on Humankind for
either its reality or its meaning. Rather, morality comprises immutable, a
priori propositions, 47 part of the natural order of all things, and regardless
of culture, history, or politics applicable to every human being, and their
respective groups, corporations, cultures, governments and other
collectives. 48 Asjurisprudent Edward S. Corwin explained nearly a century
ago:
moral dilemma. Bayer Il, supra note 17, at 322-28 (discussing various refined
consequentialist theories attempting to include principles of right).
46. Sometimes theorists employ different terms for essentially identical propositions.
For example, Professor Michael Dorf used the alternative terms 'realist' and "anti-realist."
[Mioral philosophers may be divided into realist and anti-realist camps. A moral
realist believes that moral propositions are true, even though we lack the tools to
prove their truth. Moral anti-realists deny this, and accordingly interpret moral
statements such as 'slavery is wrong' as expressing preferences or emotions of the
speaker. Thus, according to the moral anti-realist, the speaker means to say that he
dislikes slavery or slavery makes him feel bad.
Michael C. Dorf, Review Essay: Truth Justice, and the American Constitution, Freedom's
Law: The Moral Reading ofthe American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 133, 145 (1997).
(citing DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (Oxford U. Press 1999)).
As the terms Dontology and Consequentialism (along with its massive offshoot
Utilitarianism) predominate, those are the idioms this writing will employ.
47. A priori means, "Relating to or denoting reasoning or knowledge which proceeds
from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience." A Priori, ENGLISH
OXFORD LIViNG DICTIONARIES (2d ed. 2017)
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/a_priori (accessed August, 19, 2017).
48. It must be axiomatic, of course, that the deontological principles constraining
individual actions likewise constrain the various groups to which those individuals belong.
Otherwise, individuals could escape their moral duties simply by forming groups, thereby
pursuing immoral activities and attaining immoral ends not as individuals, but as
collectives. Certainly, no moral theory is either apt or useful if its edicts as applied to
individual persons legitimately may be circumvented by joining like-minded others to act
collectively. See e.g., Wood, supra note 33, at 37; THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE PHILOSOPHIC
UNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN NATURE INFORMING THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFRONTING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CHALLENGE TO LOCKE, MONTESQUIEU, JEFFERSON, AND THE
FEDERALISTS FROM UTILITARIANISM, HISTORICISM, MARXISM, FREUDIANISM, PRAGMATISM,
EXISTENTIALISM. . . 52-53 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990) (discussing Locke and Montesquieu);
Bayer II, supra note 17, at 297-99.
Homicide, for instance, must remain immoral whether perpetrated by Al Capone or
by Murder, Inc. See generally, Bayer II, supra note 17, at 297-99
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There are certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the
attitude of those who wield the physical resources of the community. .
. . They are external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as
such. They are eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles,
human laws are . .. merely a record or transcript, and their enactment
an act not of will or power but one of discovery and declaration.4 9
Thus, "A deontologically prohibited type of conduct is wrong always
and everywhere."o That is because, "from a deontological perspective,
certain choices are inherently evil and can never be justified, even if they
would bring about a good outcome."" By logical contrast, deontologically
allowable conduct is right "always and everywhere" because, by definition,
"If a course of conduct on the part of any person P is covered by
deontological permission, then P's engaging in that conduct is not wrong
in any respect regardless of the consequences that it causes or is likely to
cause." 52
From this dominance of the right over the good, deontologists derive
the startling, hugely uncomfortable, counterintuitive reality that outcomes
simply do not matter. They are utterly irrelevant and, indeed, dangerous in
their propensity to distract from discerning the right moral answer to
whatever ethical issue, great or small, is under consideration. Therefore,
moral reality cannot depend on how any given person or collection would
prefer to act, nor on what outcomes or results any given person or collective
would like either to occur or avoid. Even more startlingly, moral
comportment may require persons or groups to act in ways producing truly
horrific outcomes that any reasonable person vehemently would lament.
Certainly, one may hope the right outcome likewise will be a good outcome
but; the possibility exists that the right outcome may not be the one that
makes either the most people or a certain segment happy.53 Indeed, the
49. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 152 (1928) (quoted in, Roger P. Alford, In Search ofa Theory
for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 639,659 (2005)).
50. Kramer, supra note 35, at 21.
51. Blum, supra note 35, at 38 n.165.
52. Kramer, supra note 35, at 20.
53. See Wood, supra note 33, at 262; Bayer II, supra note 17, at 294.
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right outcome may cause great harm to innocent persons who have done
nothing to deserve such harm.54
By demarcating the immutably right from the immutably wrong,
morality knows no compromise." The respected Enlightenment
54. To mention one of the most prominent examples, if torturing a suspected terrorist is
immoral, then the suspect may not be tortured even if almost certainly she knows where a
primed nuclear bomb is hidden and even if under torture she likely would reveal the bomb's
location, thus saving tens of thousands of lives, preventing tens of thousands of injuries,
and, forestalling tens of millions of dollars' worth of property damage. See e.g., RICHARD
A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
81 (2006) (criticizing the deontological stance regarding the ticking time bomb scenario
among others); see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTs 215 (2007).
55. In an often cited and quoted work, Arthur Kuflik offered that "willingness to
compromise is often viewed as a profound 'expression of moral goodwill."' Fred S.
Hjelmeset, Impeachment of Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement in Compromise
Negotiations: Admissibility Under Federal Rule ofEvidence 408, 43 CLEVE. ST. L. REv.75,
81 n. 19 (1995) (describing 1995 Judge John M. Manos Writing Competition on Evidence)
(quoting, ARTHUR KUFLIK, Morality and Compromise, in NoMos XXI: COMPROMISE IN
ETI-nCs, LAw, AND POLITICs 38 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979)).
Kuflik elucidated,
There is at least an air of paradox surrounding the connection between morality
and compromise. As we want to say that the person of good-will is a person of
firm principle, we are often inclined to suppose that the willingness to compromise
is a sad but sure sign of moral turpitude. ... Of course, to affirm that compromise
is in many cases morally commendable is not to deny that at times it is
reprehensible.
Id. at 81 n. 21 (quoting, Kuflik at 38, 52).
With respect, Kuflik mispeeceives the nature of moral obligation. Under
deontological principles, compromise can be an act of "moral good will," accordingly, one
rightly may, "affirm that compromise is in many cases morally commendable" only if the
particular compromise itself is moral. Put slightly differently, there is never a moral
obligation to compromise because, if the given matter raises a moral issue, the sole choice
is to act morally. Therefore, to compromise in a moral fashion may be "morally
commendable" when and only when the compromise itself is moral. But, as there is never
an obligation to compromise on moral matters, an immoral compromise that pleases others
is never "morally commendable;" nor can pleasing others turn an immoral compromise into
an act of "moral good will" although the compromiser intended to make others happy, this
seemingly expressed a "good will."
For instance, if the issue is where to have dinner, Smith may feel strongly in favor
of steak while her friend Jones may be vegan and the three others in the party do not care
deeply. Unless Smith affirmative promised otherwise, in which case her promise created a
moral duty, Smith has no obligation to compromise in favor of veganism any more than
Jones, absent a promise, has a duty to compromise by eating at a steakhouse where there
may be few if any vegan choices. So, if Smith agrees to forgo meat that evening by eating
at a vegan restaurant that pleases Jones, she and the three others may carelessly say that
Smith's compromise was "morally commendable" in that, Smith ended what might have
become a needlessly prolonged and aggravating quarrel among friends by compromising
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philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose deontological moral theory essentially
has been adopted, albeit without attribution, by the Supreme Court,56 was
not being hyperbolic when he wrote, "Fiat iustia, pereat mundus," that is,
"Let justice be done even if the world should perish."5 7
At the risk of understatement, then, deontological morality is a harsh,
unbending, and, unforgiving taskmaster that cares nothing about what
people want, nor whether following its inflexible edicts results in
catastrophic harm to the blameless as well as the blameworthy. A course
of conduct either is moral or it is not. Consequently, people either act
morally or they do not. Because immoral conduct by definition is wrongful
regardless whether we wish it were otherwise, there simply is no excuse
for failing to abide by whatever morality commands. We may understand,
even sympathize with those who act immorally, but understanding and
sympathy cannot excuse immoral behavior, nor transform immorality into
morality.
her preferences. They might add that Smith's compromise is all the more "morally
commendable" because as Jones is vegan, she could not comfortably have eaten at a
steakhouse while, because Smith likes meat but has no dietary limitations, she can enjoy
food at a vegan restaurant.
However, while Smith's peacemaking may be commendable, it was not morally
required and thus is not "morally commendable" because it made peace, rather it was
arguably "morally commendable" because it was not immoral for Smith to compromise her
then-preference for steak to accommodate her friend. But, had Smith promised the other
three that she would support eating at a steakhouse, her compromise would have been
immoral as promise-breaking unless she affirmatively asked for and received a release from
those to whom she made that promise.
56. See infra, Part II, Section 3-d (Kant's theory of morality and human dignity), and,
Bayer, supra note 23, Section 6-c-5 (how the Supreme Court has applied Kantian dignity
theory as the framework for substantive due process).
57. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 133 (Ted
Humphrey trans., 1983). Prof. Rabkin offers an interesting sidebar which, as Rabkin notes,
does not really diminish the meaning of Kant's unrelenting sentiments: "Kant himself
somewhat flinches from the implications of this motto, rendering it (in Humphrey's
translation) 'Let justice reign, even if all the rogues in the world should perish.' But the
righteous would perish with the rogues if 'the world should perish."' Jeremy
Rabkin, American Self-Defense Shouldn't Be Too Distracted by International Law, 30 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 31, 49 (2006).IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER
WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 102 n.16 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L.
Colclasure trans., 2006).
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b. Why Deontology Must Be Correct -- the Consequentialist Error --
Interestingly, there are no alternatives between these two
diametrically opposing perspectives; that is, there is no third choice, one
either must be a deontologist or a consequentialist. True, there are different
proposed varieties of Consequentialism and Deontology some of which
attempt (but fail as we will see) to be simultaneously partially deontological
and partially consequentialist." Regardless, any paradigm of moral theory
must embrace either Consequentialism or Deontology as its sine qua non,
not both.59 That is because either, as Deontology claims, morality is
transcendent, inherent in the natural order of existence and, thus, not in any
fashion or measure the product of human imagination, or, as
Consequentialism claims, morality is a human invention wherein whatever
engenders the greatest happiness for some designated person or group is
the morally correct answer to the relevant moral dilemma. Morality cannot
be partially deontological and partially consequentialist, nor can there by a
third option because either morality is in whole or part a human creation or
it is not. As the two are the only options, and as the two are irredeemably
incompatible, one of the theories -- Consequentialism or Deontology --
must be right and the other must be wrong.' Accordingly, disproving one
inevitably means the second must be correct.6 1
58. See infra, notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
59. This article's Section 4 on Originalism discusses virtue ethics originalism which
claims that understanding the meaning of the Constitution should be based on moral theory
known as "virtue ethics." Briefly, virtue ethics proposes that human conduct should be
guided by certain ennobling characteristics such as forthrightness and integrity.
Accordingly, virtue ethics is a "middle level" theory because it lacks a paradigmatic
principle defining morality. As its proponents recognize, virtue ethics is not enough to
define moral precepts because we do not know from that theory itself whether the applicable
virtuous qualities are humanly invented or emanate from the natural order of existence. See
supra, notes 539-61 and accompanying text.
60. Therefore, by averring that Deontology is the correct theory of morality, I am not
committing, "a textbook example of what logicians call the fallacy of black-and-white
reasoning. The fallacy consists of falsely positing that there are only two alternatives, and
then purporting to prove one by disproving the other." Michael W. McConnell, The
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral
Reading" ofthe Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269, 1282 (1997).
61. The proposition recalls the famous and logically sound observation of author Sir.
Arthur Conan Doyle's beloved fictional character, the brilliant "consulting detective"
Sherlock Holmes, "How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" Sherlock Holmes,
The Sign of the Four, ch. 6 (1890), http://www. bestofsherlock.com/top-10-sherlock-
quotes.htm#impossible (accessed on February 17, 2017) (emphasis in original).
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Given centuries of impassioned debate continuing to the present, one
might expect that demonstrating Deontology's correctness and
Consequentialism's erroneousness is not simply difficult but perhaps
impossible. After all, unless no actual answer existed, it seems intuitively
unlikely that the accumulated wisdom and experience of Humankind over
millennia would have failed to resolve absolutely a philosophic matter as
basic as: Is morality a construct of human beings or is it extra-human,
originating from the very nature of existence? The persistence of
disagreement over Deontology versus Consequentialism implies no
definitive resolution exists and that, unlike, for example, science or
mathematics, the meaning of morality is merely a matter of opinion
wherein one's estimation arguably is as cogent as another's.
Yet, Deontology's rightness is so palpable and Consequentialism's
infirmities shimmer with such sharp clarity, that one can only surmise the
persistence, 62  actually the petulance of anti-deontologists evinces
understandable resistance to a moral philosophy that, as Kant understood,
62. For example, Professor Simon asserted in a conclusory manner, "All I am trying to
establish at this time is that in arguing about constitutional interpretation, 'goodness' and
'justice' are exactly what we ought to be, and the only thing we could coherently be, arguing
about ... In my opinion, no 'objective truth' stands behind justification." Larry G. Simon,
The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1482, 1488 n. 20 (1985). Similarly, Justice William Brennan,
echoing principles often stated in judicial opinions, boldly but unprovenly averred, "that a
state's interest in suppressing obscenity was 'predicated on unprovable, although strongly
held, assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion,' and that such
assumptions could not validate a statute substantially undermining the guarantees of the
First Amendment"
Manuel Possolo, Morals Legislation After Lawrence: Can States Criminalize the Sale of
Sexual Devices?, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 565, 575 (2013) (quoting, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 109-10 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)); see also, Stephen
J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 438-39
(2004) ("My defense of compatibilism begins with the unprovable but common and
plausible assumption that morality and its practices, including blame and punishment, are
human constructs and that there are no metaphysical moral facts about the universe to which
our moral judgments and practices may appeal."); Julie Turner, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion,
Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law by Leo Katz. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. Xiv, 293. $29.95 Cloth., 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1492, 1494 (1996)
(discussing, the "irretractably unprovable nature of morality").
Such sentiments led one commentator observed perhaps hyperbolically, "Moral
values are generally ignored as being subjective and/or indemonstrable and/or unscientific
in contemporary legal discourse. As a result, economic analysis is ascendant. This is
because economic analysis can claim to be objective, and thus scientific." Eric Engle,
Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate: Beyond Legal Realism, 41 VAL.. U. L. REv.. 1633, 1676
(2007) (footnote omitted).
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requires the obliteration of Humanity if nothing else will prevent an
immoral outcome.
Doubtless, at first blush, it seems peculiar to claim, as does
Deontology, that assessing the relative harm of possible outcomes is not
only irrelevant but is actually a treacherous distraction likely to thwart
discerning the true moral answer. One might suppose that any outcome in
which many are hurt and few are bettered is, if not immoral per se, likely
to be proved immoral due, at least in part, to that outcome's starkly
disproportional harm. Regardless, Consequentialism as a moral theory
simply is impossible; that is, no rational moral theory could be grounded
on consequentialist principles.
The ineptness of Consequentialism is blatant because it has no bases
-- no standards -- tojudge whether the ends -- the goal of optimal happiness
-- and means that maximize happiness are worthy in and ofthemselves, that
is, whether they are inherently commendable. Consequentialism proposes
that morality is defined not by its content, but by some empirically deduced
measure of acceptance, whether it be acceptance by the majority, by a
powerful elite, by a purported group of experts, or some other designated
individual or group. Indeed, as Profs. Zamir and Medina correctly asserted,
there are no inherent limits to what consequentialist morally will justify to
maximize the designated group's aggregate happiness: "The first critique
is that Consequentialism allows too much. Consequentialism imposes no
restrictions on attaining the best outcomes, thus legitimizing and even
requiring harming people, lying and breaking promises to achieve desirable
ends."6" Conflating what "is" with what "ought to be" engenders a morality
of popularity, not principle.
Thus, the uncomplicated, easily identified and just as easily
understood fatal flaw of Consequentialism is that any theory delineating
moral correctness as that which most pleases either greater Society or some
favored group or individual, abdicates the very meaning of morality to the
selfish preferences of that Society or favored member. Such preferences
may be deeply held, persisting long enough to become honored traditions,
even revered norms. They may be not only intense and enduring, but
honest and noble in that adherents truly believe that the specific preferences
they assert are best for Society. But, none of that really matters. No matter
how sincere and seemingly unselfish any given consequentialist
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64. Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Economics, and Morality, 96 CAL. L. REv. 325
(2008).
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proposition may be, its merit is no better than the demands of a petulant
child because the "but-for" cause -- the sine qua non -- the defining premise
-- of the particular moral proposition is that its advocate wants it. Indeed,
under Consequential ism, wanting something -- maximizing one's
happiness -- is all the justification one needs so long as some sufficient
number of sufficiently dominant others agree. We may call this: the
65
consequentialist error.
The definition of morality cannot depend simply on an empirical
assessment of competing groups favored outcomes absent an independent,
impartial reckoning of the inherent rightness of one outcome over
65. Professor Kramer offered a fascinating corollary to Consequentialism's inherent
infirmity: under a consequentialist regime, "one's sole fundamental moral obligation is to
contribute maximally to the realization of the [particular] commended objective [at issue.]
... In the eyes of consequentialist theorists, the lone source of moral obligatoriness is the
conduciveness of this or that mode of conduct to the maximal attainment of the desideratum
or set of desiderata which the theorists favour." Kramer, supra note 35, at 12. Certainly,
Consequentialism's potential for tyranny is clear in that, to maximize happiness, the
relevant government could require unwilling others to perform acts that "contribute
maximally to the realization of the [particular] commended objective." But, contrary to
Kramer's assertions, such oppressiveness is neither mandatory nor inevitable.
In a non-totalitarian nation with democratic institutions, policies arise in substantial
part from the way people vote, with votes presumably expressing what maximizes the
happiness of the voters. The perfectly moral outcome of the democratic process is that the
losers have an obligation to act in ways that comport with what the winners won, but such
does not inevitably require the losers to "contribute maximally to the realization of the
[particular] commended objective." (Emphasis added.) Rather, in many, perhaps most
instances, all they will need to do is not unlawfully interfere with, rather than affirmatively
promote the "commended objective." For example, although I might oppose a war that my
nation has commenced -- therefore, I am not part of the national group whose aggregate
happiness is maximized by that war -- I nonetheless must obey lawful orders or face
prosecution, such as complying with a draft notice, pay relevant taxes that fund the war,
and, observe regulations requiring rationing and other sacrifices to prosecute the war. But
otherwise, I do not have to support the war effort such as buying government bonds issued
to help finance the war, joining pro-war rallies, or supporting charities to help soldiers and
their families.
Moreover, I am free to advocate my opposition to the war through speeches,
writings, peaceful assemblies, and, other such lawful protests. Indeed, consistent with
consequentialist principles, I ought to be free to oppose actively whatever at present is
maximizing happiness, such as the war in the above example, in the hope of changing
peoples' minds, thus shifting the aggregate happiness balance to what makes me happy.
Because, Professor Kramer has overstated his point by asserting as a per se maxim that,
"under a consequentialist regime, "one's sole fundamental moral obligation is to contribute
maximally to the realization of the [particular] commended objective," I have not based my
argument that Consequentialism in and of itself is an unfeasible moral theory on Kramer's
assertion.
272017]
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
alternative others.6 6 Indeed, over two millennia ago, the great philosopher-
attorney Cicero recognized that very proposition.6 7 Beginning with his
assertion that "Law" is immutable, "the highest reason, implanted in
Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the
opposite," 68 Cicero drew the logical conclusion:
The most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which
is found in the customs or laws of nations. . . . But if the principles of
Justice were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or
the decisions of judges, then Justice would sanction robbery and
adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the
votes or decrees of the populace.6 9
Consistent with Cicero's irrefutable logic, Professor Sagoff brusquely
but aptly characterized consequentialists' perception of morality as, "a
notion of the good based on sheer preference or inclination, a conception
so shallow, arbitrary, heteronomous, and mired in contingency that no one
could defend it in the first place."" If arguably surly, Sagoff's dismissive
tone is pardonable. No advanced degree in Philosophy is needed to
understand that a moral theory based on individuals' or groups' subjective
pursuits of happiness would have to concede the moral fitness of, inter alia,
slavery, genocide, homicide, rape, racism and any other similar atrocity if
that atrocity happened to produce more happiness than unhappiness.7 1
66. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 295.
67. Armando Gustavo Hernandez, Delineating Defects: A Primer on Florida Product
Liability Law (2017), 30 St. Thomas L. Rev. 141, 179 (2018) ("See generally Marcus
Tullius Cicero, HISTORY CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-
history/marcus-tullius-cicero (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (noting how Cicero was one of the
"greatest orator[s] of the late Roman Republic" as well as '[a] brilliant lawyer ... [who] was
one of the leading political figures of the era of Julius Caesar, Pompey, Marc Antony and
Octavian"').
68. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, Laws-Book I, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS:
SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (Clarence Morris ed., University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1959) (quoted in, Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for The
Twenty-First Century - A Principle ofJudicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 383, 391 (2007)).
69. Id. at 47-48 (quoted in Kmiec, supra note 67, at 391).
70. Mark Sagoff, The Limits of Justice, 92 YALE L.J. 1065, 1079 (1983) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)).
71. "Classic utilitarianism does not deal with intensity of feelings, but rather only with
the number of people affected." Stephanie Loomis-Price, Decision-Making in the Law:
What Constitutes A Good Decision - the Outcome or the Reasoning Behind It?, 12 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 623, 638 note 20 (1999) (note); but see, e.g., Bird-Pollan, supra note 43, at
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Similarly, consequentialism notoriously can justify killing knowingly
innocent individuals to prevent purportedly worse outcomes than the
deliberate slaying of the blameless.72 Indeed, if the greater happiness
726 ("[R]obust utilitarianism evaluates pleasures based not merely on their intensity or
duration, but also on the quality of the pleasure, ... "). Nonetheless, certainly it is possible
that, taking intensity into account, the unhappiness of a minority might outweigh the
happiness of the majority, but, that hardly assures that the consequentialist outcome is just.
Let us suppose in a population of fifty individuals, there are forty white persons who wish
to enslave the ten black persons. Possibly, the accumulated unhappiness of the ten black
slaves would far exceed the combined happiness of the forty white persons, especially
presuming that slaves are not co-owned so that only a maximum of ten white persons would
each own a slave. But, if, for some reason, the white persons' love of enslaving the black
persons exceeds the latter's misery, then under Consequentialism, the regime of slavery is
moral.
Let me further state in passing that examples such as the above involving slavery
seem to immediately spring to mind when considering the bona fides of competing moral
theories. I certainly make no claim of originality; but, rather, present this and other
examples as emerging from the common sense imagining of which all of us are capable.
For example, Meir Dan-Cohen observed, "One way in which slavery serves as a
counterexample to utilitarianism is by exposing and targeting its aggregative aspect: As long
as enough people are sufficiently benefited by slavery, the institution is justified on
utilitarian grounds, no matter how wretched the slaves' lives turn out to be. Utilitarianism
is here castigated for its willingness to sacrifice some people in order to benefit others."
Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim's State of Mind, 88 CAL. L. REV. 759, 768
(2000) (citing see, e.g., R. M. Hare, What Is Wrong with Slavery, 8 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 103 (1979)); see also e.g., John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 188
(1958)
72. E.g., Adam Slavny, Alon Harel on How To Deliberate Permissibly, 11 CRIM. L. &
PILO. 833, 834 (2017) ("Consequentialists typically think that harming for the greater good
is fundamentally permissible ... whilst non-consequentialists typically think that it is not.");
J. G. Moore, Criminal Responsibility and Causal Determinism, 9 WASH. U. JuRIS. REV. 43,
77 (2016) ("Indeed, as Hart suggests, consequentialism could lead to punishing the innocent
if doing so would maximize the desired good.") (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82 (2d ed. 2008)); Brian Neill, A
RetributivistApproach to Parental Responsibility Laws, 27 OmoN.U. L. REV. 119, 125 note
42 (2000) (H.J. MCCLOSKEY, A NON-UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT, IN
CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 239, 244-49 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968) (posing a
hypothetical where utilitarianism would condone killing an innocent African American for
the rape and murder of a white woman when the real culprit could not be found and a threat
of vigilante groups killing dozens of innocents existed).
Indeed, regarding events most notorious among the history of human evil, Prof.
Howard F. Chang recently and similarly explained regarding the purported unlikelihood of
a utilitarian justification for the "Final Solution,"
It is not "obvious," however, that the [a consequentialist justification] requires a
"fantastic" intensity of desire among the Nazis. We can simply increase the
number of Nazis and reduce the number of Jews in the hypothetical until the
benefits of "ethnic cleansing" (or perhaps even genocide) exceed the costs. Under
utilitarianism, for any given intensity of satisfaction for each Nazi and any given
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derives from executing or torturing persons who disagree with the happy
majority's or elite's principles, then those executions and torture are
moral.73 Such is the moral theory of a petulant child who equates fairness
with being told "yes" and unfairness with being told "no."7 A moral theory
must have more to it than a major premise of, "This makes me feel good.""
amount of suffering for each Jew, there must be some ratio of Nazis to Jews that
would be large enough to justify the policy in question. [R.M.] Hare apparently
believes that the necessary ratio would border on "fantasy," but given the intensity
of violent ethnic hatreds we observe in the world, it is not "obvious" that such a
ratio is necessarily "fantastic," especially if we assume a very small number of
victims.
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory ofSocial Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 173, 181 (2000) (quoting, R.M. Hare, Comments, in Hare and
Critics 199, 245 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988), and citing, John C. Harsanyi,
Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and with Malevolent Preferences, in Hare and Critics 89,
96).
73. To offer still another distressing example, thanks to modem science, the organs of a fit
persons may be transplanted to save the lives of many others. Accordingly,
Consequentialism could morally condone the random abduction and euthanizing of healthy
persons so that their harvested organs can save numerous others, and, as well, enhance the
lives of still more. One individual might supply to otherwise doomed persons, a heart, two
lungs, two kidneys, a liver (or more if the liver can be safely cut into working portions),
blood, and, bone marrow. Thus, the euthanizing of one human being, willing or otherwise,
could save eight or more lives. Plus, the eyes, skin and other portions of the sacrificed
person could enhance the quality of life of many others which alone would notjustify killing
an unwilling healthy person but brings added value. Given the simple utilitarian calculous
that saving many lives at the cost of one is moral, Consequentialism could justify euthanasia
ofthe unwilling to serve the greater good. Cf, Kurt Darr, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Legal
and Ethical Considerations, 40 J. Health L. 29, 42 (2007) ("The elderly and those with
severe chronic and degenerative diseases may believe that, as in the Netherlands, they are
at a higher risk of active, involuntary euthanasia because of the effects of an express or
implied utilitarian calculus that will value their lives as less worthy."); but see, Hon. Neil
M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 599,
677-90 (2000) (arguing that empirical research debunks utilitarian justifications for assisted
suicide and euthanasia).
74. It is no response to assert, for example, that, at least in extreme cases, people have
the fortitude to set aside their selfish preferences for the sake of the greater good. Therefore,
more people will oppose immoral conduct such as slavery than will support it. Even
assuming such likely is true, if in a given society the presumption fails, as history recounts
has occurred persistently and continues to occur at present, Consequentialism will validate
the conduct whether slavery, Nazi concentration camps, laws permitting persons to rape
their spouses, or any other horrid abuse of human beings. See, Chang, supra note 74, at
181.
75. Altruism, if such exists, does not disprove the criticisms against Consequentialism.
For instance, a person who espouses moral proposition X that makes her personally unhappy
but, in her assessment, increases aggregate societal happiness is not being unselfish. The
reason is clear. The unhappiness she feels by supporting X is less than the dismay should
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For these reasons, since I first embarked on studying moral issues, I
have not budged an iota from the conclusion I drew five years ago, "Human
desire alone may demonstrate the good but it is insufficient to prove the
right unless one simply wishes to define morality as a state of nature --
pursuing whatever one wants by whatever means one wishes. Thus, a
consequentialist definition of morality is both unremittingly circular and
distressingly self-indulgent." 76
c. Experience and the Processes ofDeontology --
Doubtless, personal preferences -- maximizing happiness and
minimizing unhappiness -- may be the starting point of analysis.
Contrary to a frequent criticism by consequentialists, deontologists
fully appreciate that contemplating the experience of one's life is a
formative step in the process of discovering and applying moral
precepts. The pursuit of timeless morality does not require deontology
would endure by opposing X to promote her immediate good. In other words, apparent
selflessness is more pleasing to this person than would be apparent selfishness; she is
indulging the greater selfishness of promoting the interests of others because by doing so,
she makes herself happier than if she opposed X.
76. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 296 (footnote omitted).
Importantly, that Consequentialism is an inadequate moral theory does not mean
that its utilitarian aspects are inapt for all human conduct. To the contrary, within the realm
ofmoral conduct, Consequentialism is the way people choose from among competing moral
choices when resources such as time, finances, physical capacity, and, other factors mean
that one cannot do everything one would like, at the given time, in the given place. In other
words, choosing among moral "pursuit[s] of happiness," requires a consequentialist
approach. "In regard to manifold sets of circumstances, a consequentialist emphasis on
balancing is entirely appropriate; countless sets of circumstances do not pose any moral
conflicts." Kramer, supra note 35, at 12.
For example, Smith has $5,000 to spend as she wishes. She would like to buy a new
television, go on a vacation and save some of that money for retirement. Her $5,000 will
not buy the perfect TV set, nor buy the perfect vacation, nor provide fully for Smith's
retirement. Therefore, using the principles of Consequentialism, Smith will decide whether
she wants to use her available cash to get the best TV she can, or buy the best vacation she
can, or put it all towards enhancing her retirement fund, or choose to spend the money on
some combination of her preferences. Any of these consequentialist choices are moral
because, absent additional facts, Smith's desires for a new television, for a vacation and for
enhancing her retirement fund, are moral pursuits. But, while it can tell Smith how to spend
her $5,000, Consequentialism cannot tell us why those choices are moral.
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to ignore "all empirical facts about the world, including all facts about
human beings, as irrelevant to explaining the nature of morality.""
Likewise, the arch deontologist Immanuel Kant" aptly understood
that, "Though all of our knowledge begins with experience, it does not
follow that it all arises out of experience."79 Deontologists have no quarrel
that individuals' chosen preferences and beliefs "give individuals identity
and character; they reflect what they are, not just what they want."8 0 That
starting point, however, cannot be part of the ending point. Rather, proof
of a moral argument must stand on its own, unattached to any outcomes the
proposer prefers or abhors; otherwise, we cannot judge whether the
proposed morality truly is apt or, instead, is a ruse to attain the proposer's
desired result.
d. The "Consequentialist Error" and Three Related Specious
Presumptions Against Deontology
Despite its manifest correctness, critics both legal and otherwise tend
to dismiss Deontology by resorting to what I denoted above as the
consequentialist error: presuming without explication that morality is a
human creation reflecting the preferred outcomes of one or more
individuals, or of one or more groups, or of greater Society; and that, even
were it otherwise, our inate inability to understand fully metaphysical
morality renders any attempt useless, indeed dangerous. The
consequentialist error is predicated on three interrelated and equally
fallacious modes of reasoning. First, critics habitually assume that because
morality is an idea the appliances of which depend solely on human
behavior, it cannot exist independently from human imagining;
accordingly, morality could not have emerged from some natural order of
77. Bayer 1l, supra note 17, at 305 (quoting, Bernard Gert, MORALITY: ITS NATURE AND
JUSTIFICATION 241 (2005)).
78. See infra Section 3.
79. Murphy, supra note 39, at 14 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason I
(2d ed. 1787)); see also, Wood, supra note 33, at 28. As Professor Wright explained, "Kant
sensibly recognizes that the duty of [morality] . . . cannot be determined by a precise
universal rule, because context and circumstance play important roles. The exercise of
judgment is necessary to decide particular cases." R. George Wright, Treating Persons as
Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV.
271, 278 (2002) (discussing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 156 (Mary Gregor
ed. & trans., 1996) (1797)).
80. Sagoff, supra note 72, at 1070.
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existence that would persis absent human intervention as do planets and
galaxies -- physics, biology and chemistry -- due to the Big Bang and its
aftermath."' The second assertion, often conjoined with the claim that
morality can have no existence outside of the human imagination, is that
because purportedly thoughtful academics earnestly disagree, there cannot
be one provably correct concept of morality from which to discern equally
true sub-principles to resolve any given moral dilemma.
Particularly relevant to constitutional analysis, like morality, the third
false avowal avers that law does not deal with "absolutes," but rather, law
enforces personal preferences sufficiently shared throughout a given
community to be formally legitimaized into law.82
Addressing together these three objections to Deontology as they
seem to come in tandem, one odd and, frankly, annoying aspect is that
commonly critics assume that morality's subjective character is too
obvious to require thoughtful explication supported by cogent authority.
Such dismissive attitudes, entirely inconsistent with proper research and
analytical methodology, rightly would not be tolerated in any other
analytical context, especially judicial opinions 8 3 and scholarly excursions
81. "The big bang theory holds that an unknown singularity exploded and transformed
itself into an ordered universe with fixed laws." Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on The
Horizon of Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the
Public Schools, 63 OHIo ST. L. J. 1507, 1584 n. 455 (2002) (citing inter alia, Arthur S.
Eddington, The End of the World: From the Standpoint of Mathematical Physics, 127
NATURE 447, 450 (1931); Timothy Ferris, THE WHOLE SHEBANG 17 (1997)).
82. While technically the third fallacy concerns legal, not purely abstract moral theory,
it is so closely related to moral theory that discussing it here makes more sense than
presenting such legal theory as part of this article's Part 11, Section 4's discussion of
constitutional law. Deflating all three related fallacies together saves space, thereby
avoiding any redundancy or confusion that would result if this analysis were divided
between two separate sections of this article.
83. Courts traditionally pride themselves on demanding empirical and logical proof
while, concurrently, eschewing as manifestly improper, ruling in favor of parties' unproven
assertions of law or fact. For example, in 2005 the Supreme Court noted, "Without concrete
evidence that direct shipping of wine is likely to increase alcohol consumption by minors,
we are left with the States' unsupported assertions. Under our precedents, which require
the 'clearest showing' to justify discriminatory state regulation ... this is not enough."
Granholm v. Healed, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S.
383, 393 (1994)); see also e.g., Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 438-39 (1968) ("[Tlhe record contains solid
facts ... point[ing] to the probable existence of valid and valuable causes of action.
Balancing these facts are nothing but bald assertions to the contrary and general conclusions
for which foundations nowhere appear."); LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting, Gossett v. Du-Ra-Kel Corp., 569 F.2d 869,
872 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[Blald assertions of ultimate facts are ordinarily insufficient to support
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into legal theory," particularly when interdisciplnary.' As Robert F.
Geroge succinctly stated the crucial if unsurprising premise, "Any
philosophy worth entertaining must be capable of providing an intelligible
(coherent, internally consistent, plausible) account of itself. Its claims must
square with its own premises, other claims and implications. This is true of
skeptical philosophies, as much as non-skeptical ones."'
There likewise is no reason to tolerate conceptual laxity when
discussing the nature and application of morality. Doubtless, instinct,
experience, purported "common sense" and homely wisdom may disclose
much;8 ' but, morality and its legal applications are complex, often
summary judgment."); Yufa v. TSI, Inc., 652 Fed. Appx. 939, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
("unsupported assertions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (a party may not avoid a motion for summary
judgment by resting on "conclusory allegations of the complaint" or by answering "with
conclusory allegations of an affidavit." (citation omitted))."); Michael J. Garrisona and J.
David Reitzel, Zoning Restrictions and Marketability of Title, 35 REAL EST. L. J. 257, 278
(2006) ("The courts' failure to articulate a cogent legal theory for the 'existing violation'
exception creates uncertainty in its application.").
84 E.g., Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 153, 153 (2002) ("Scholarship generally, not only in law or
political science, should ground its empirical assertions in warranted inferences from sound
evidence, should admit to causal and empirical uncertainty where it exists, should avoid
tendentiousness and selection bias, and should follow the best statistical practices when
making statistical claims."); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and
Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404, 1441 n. 91 (2006) (quoting
Goldsmith and Vermeule).
85. Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 521, 521
(1997) ("[L]egal scholarship needs to rely on other methodologies, particularly social
science, to provide an understanding of the forces that act upon the legal system and of the
impact of legal decisions.").
86 Robert P. George, Holmes on Natural Law, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (2003). George
continued,
And the problem is not simply logical, though logical inconsistency, if proven, is
damning to any philosophical claim. For the canons of reasoning include elements
that go beyond the demand for logical consistency. If, for example, a philosopher
lays claim on our attention to consider a proposition he is asserting, we are entitled
to count it against his assertion that the claim itself, even if internally consistent,
is being asserted, not as true, but as, say, merely his opinion, where he has
detached the idea of "opinion" from the concept of truth, such that his opinion is
put forward as something other than an opinion about the truth of what he is
asserting. Similarly, we need not, and should not, credit a claim being asserted as
something other than a proposition we ought to hold because the reasons for
holding it are, all things considered, sound, or, at least, sounder than the reasons,
if any, for not holding it.
Id. at 9.
87. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
34 [Vol. 43:1
PART I- ORIGINALISMAND DEONTOLOGY
counterintuitive concepts that must be studied earnestly, assiduously and
with respect for the subject matter, as one would scrutinize conscientiously
the meaning and extent of comparably abstract concepts, legal or
otherwise, such as "interstate commerce," "right to bear arms,"
"unreasonable searches and seizures," and, our Constitution's bedrock
legal principle, "due process of law."
Nonetheless, the consequentialist error -presuming without
explication that morality is an essentially deficient and subjective human
creation-is common to American courts and legal commentators who
perpetuate the related, ubiquitous, and equally inaccurate proposition that,
"As a general rule, law is not a space for [moral] absolutes."88 Agreeing
with critics who deny Deontology, the Supreme Court bluntly asserted that,
"We do not think the [Due Process] Clause lays down any ... categorical
imperative." 89 In that light, roughly a quarter-century later, Chief Justice
John Roberts casually and speciously asserted with neither explication nor
elaboration the purported discordance between law and moral truth,
"Whatever force th[e] belief [in some principle such as the rightness of
same-sex marriage] may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no . .
basis in the Constitution..." 90
Hardly surprising, the acerbic Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
foremost among legal realists, castigated in the typically conclusory
manner noted above those who claim that law is predicated on immutable
88. Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
331, 354 (2012).
89. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), permitting certain pretrial detentions without bail, is not
per se unconstitutional); see also e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 591 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting, urging that the Constitution sets no "categorical imperatives)).
Shortly before Salerno, discussing its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court noting
that "[Ojur decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches
.
Comm. for Pub. Ed. andReligious Liberty v. gan, 444 U.S. 6 6,62(1980).
90. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting). Commenting on the specific issue of abortion, the California Supreme Court
comparably and erroneously asserted, "we emphasize at the outset that the morality of
abortion is not at issue in this case. 'The morality of abortion is not a legal or constitutional
issue; it is a matter of philosophy, of ethics, and of theology. It is a subject upon which
reasonable people can, and do, adhere to vastly divergent convictions and principles.' Our
decision in this case does not turn upon the personal views of any justice with regard to that
moral issue." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 313-14 (Cal.
1997) (footnote omitted) (quoting, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29
Cal. 3d 252, 284, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779 (1981)).
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moral precepts. For instance, in 1908, describing states' "police powers,"
Holmes offered without exposition,
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and
which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached. ... The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance
cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points in
the line...9
Aversion to deontological moral philosophy and its influence on
constitutional law is not necessarily limited to so-called "conservative" or
"strict constructionist" judges. To offer one example, Justice John Paul
Stevens, often classified as a "liberal" prone to expansive readings of
constitutional provisions,9 2 likewise curtly asserted that although due
process analysis "requires judges to apply their own reasoned
judgment.. .that does not mean it involves an exercise in abstract
91. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1908); see also Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978) (quoting McCarter); U.S. v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1953) (per Frankfurter, J., quoting McCarter); Gilbert v. U.S.,
640 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2011).
Five years earlier, Holmes correctly offered, "While the courts must exercise a
judgment of their own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the
judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions
of morality with which they disagree." Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903) (per
Holmes, J.). Justice Holmes was perhaps inadvertently astute in Otis. Likely, Holmes was
reiterating his belief in the political mutability of moral theory which, if true, would estop
judges from substituting their personal moral preferences for those expressed in legislation
and referenda. However, because as now we know, moral principles are deontological, that
is, absotule, pre-existing Humanity, and neutral, judges can lament, but may not "disagree"
with moral precepts that define law (although, in the good and neutral quest to discern the
actual meaning, judges may disagree that exant elucidations properly depict true, immutable
moral standards). Thus, Holmes' observation in Otis was apt, but perhaps not for the
reasons he thought.
Summarizing Holmes' ideas, then-Professor (later Justice) Felix Frankfurter
explained, "For Mr. Justice Holmes, 'principles' are rarely absolute. Usually they are
sententious expressions of conflicting or at least overlapping policies. The vital issue is
their accommodation. Decisions thus become a matter of more or less, of drawing lines."
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HARv. L. REv. 121, 133
(1927) (footnote omitted).
92. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not)
from Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study ofthe Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1115, 1125 (2015); Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 800 n. 171 (2015).
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philosophy."9 3 According to Holmes, Stevens, and similar theoriests, any
invocation of metaphysics is either false-a facade to make the theorist's
personal beliefs appear impersonal assertions of inherent truths-or such
an invocation becomes so vague that its meaning can accommodate
anything the theorist wants.94 Indeed, both could be true -- the claim of
transcendent moral truth could be at once pretense and indeterminate.
Equally, many eminent legal scholars, who otherwise would saturate
their scholarly writings with both copious attributions and meticulous
coherent expositions, are content to assert as facially obvious the same
infirm conclusions. For instance, Professor Broyles opined:
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no
basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve
as a platform for the launching of moral judgments. There is no
conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you that the
judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your
conscience, and vice versa.9 5
93. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 872 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Intriguingly acknowledging concepts that animate this article's thesis, Justice Stevens could
not quite bring himself to discard entirely an arguably deontological vision of constitutional
law. "Implicit in [the Court's due process] test is a recognition that the postulates of liberty
have a universal character. ... Whether conceptualized as a 'rational continuum' of legal
precepts, or a seamless web of moral commitments, the rights embraced by the liberty clause
transcend the local and the particular." McDonald, 561 U.S. at 871-72 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S., 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Indeed, Justice Harlan's concept of due process jurisprudence as a "rational continuum"
helps explain why, in fact, fundamental constitutional rights are deontological moral
constructs. See supra note 23, Part II at section 5-e-3-B-iii (discussing Justice Harlan's
theory).
94. For example, Professor Alford offered that there is an inherent vagueness in judicial
decisions based on natural law "that permits invocation of metaphysical principles to
support constitutional propositions [that] also has the distinct disadvantage of its transparent
indeterminacy." Roger P. Alford, In Search ofa Theory for Constitutional Comparativism,
52 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 639, 672 (2005) (footnote omitted).
95. D. Scott Broyles, Doubting Thomas: Justice Clarence Thomas's Effort to Resurrect
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 46 IND. L. REv. 341, 356 (2013) (quoting, William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 704 (1976)).
Similarly, Profs. Purdy and Siegel aver without proof that because theorists earnestly
disagree about what is or is not moral, there cannot be one truly correct set of moral precepts,
nor one truly correct resolution of any moral dilemma:
No doubt many [persons] today believe that the moral and philosophical truth of
their commitments is independent of current social morality. But there is deep and
extensive disagreement over the basis and content of any such reasons and, indeed,
whether they exist at all. Absent some means of persuasion that can bridge these
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In this regard, let us return to Oliver Wendell Holmes, but in the role
of scholar rather than Associate Justice, who rightly noted that, "Certitude
is not the test of certainty."' Holmes aptly discerned that because we so
dearly love our personal preferences, we often confuse them, innocently or
otherwise, with transcendent morality. We deem our preferences to be
naturally right, while correspondingly judging others' contrary preferences
to be both unnatural and wrong.97 Unfortunately, the truth of Holmes'
above observation led him astray as part of his wholehearted indulgence of
the consequentialist error that morality is simply a matter of opinion:
Deep-seated preferences can not be argued about - you can not argue
a man into liking a glass of beer - and therefore, when differences are
sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him
have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far
as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours.98
I agree with Prof. George's conclusion regarding Holmes' clearly
stated propostions:
I take Holmes to be denying that there are objective truths
about what it is ultimately reasonable to want and to consider
worthy of acting to realize, attain, preserve, promote and
participate in. "Values" are subjective, according to Holmes,
inasmuch as they are given by emotion, which varies from
person to person and from culture to culture, and are not
susceptible of rational evaluation. People act in light of their
values; but values provide merely emotional, and not rational,
motivation. ...
gaps ... these principles cannot count as public reason-giving in the United States
today.
Jedediah Purdy and Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage
Provision, Mill's "Harm Principle," and American Social Morality, AM. J. OF L. & MED.
374 at 388 (2012) (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICALLIBERALISM 223-27 (1993)).
Professor Simon offered the same conclusory assertion, "Claims on behalf of the
'authoritativeness' of competing constitutional interpretive methodologies or
interpretations ... rest ultimately upon the authority of moral reasoning .... Given the range
of legitimate disagreement about the requirements of political morality, the 'correct' or
'authoritative' interpretation will often depend on the interpreter." Simon, supra note 63,
at 1487.
96. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 41 (1918).
97. Id. ("[O]ne's experience ... makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, ... ")
98. Id.
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Holmes disbelieves in the possibility of normative science
or rationality--the use of intellectual faculties to ascertain
objective truths about what one ought to want, what is worth
wanting and what is not.99
Indeed, Prof. Geroge agrees that Justice Holmes' skepticism of
Deontology in general and of natural law principles in particular, "is central
among the views that qualify Holmes, in Richard Posner's approving
judgment, as 'the American Nietzsche'."'00
Consistent with his Harvard Law Review article's sprawling title
"Natural Law," nowhere does Holmes imply that he is reserving arguments
for another time, nor does he cite any of his other works as necessary
sources to fully understand his stance. Given that Holmes is lauded as one
of America's foremost legal and philosophical intellects,o' I feel justified
99 George, supra note 88, at 2 (footnotes citing Holmes' correspondence with Harold
Lasky omitted). Consistent with this writing's explanation of Consequentialism versus
Deontology, Prof. George noted the alarming aspect that, "Hitler's hatred of Jews, or ancient
Rome's quest for glory in the conquest and domination of other peoples, are, or were,
expressions of subjective values. Under Holmes's view, they are intrinsically neither more
nor less rational than the opposing values of others--say Mother Teresa and the Quakers."
Id.
100 Id at 8 (quoting, Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 239-
42 (1990) ( "[Holmes] enforced the lesson of ethical relativism, thereby turning law into
dominant public opinion in much the same way that Nietzsche turned morality into public
opinion.")).
101. In his introduction to a collection of articles inspired by Brooklyn Law School's
November 15, 1996, conference on Holmes, The Path of the Law: One Hundred Years
Later, Professor Anthony J. Sebok offered that "Oliver Wendell Holmes's landmark essay,
... The Path of the Law, originally delivered as a speech on January 8, 1897, is generally
considered to have heralded the beginning of the modern era of American jurisprudence."
Anthony J. Sebok, The Path of The Law 100 Years Later: Holmes's Influence on Modern
Jurisprudence, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 1 (1997). Similarly, noted contracts authority
Professor Grant Gilmore proclaimed that "Holmes's series of lectures that became the
Contracts chapters of [Holmes' book] The Common Law were 'astonishing.' ... [fIt was
Holmes whose 'genius' 'brilliantly reformulated' the Langdellian idea of a general theory
of contract." Charles M. Yablon, Grant Gilmore, Holmes, and the Anxiety of Influence, 90
Nw. U. L. REv. 236, 238-39 (995) (quoting, GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6,
107,15 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995)). See generally Gary Lawson, Original
Foreign Affairs Federalism, 97 BosTON U. L. REv. 301, 306 note 5 (2017) ("Justice Holmes
is widely admired in American legal circles. See e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW
WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 14-15 (2000) (noting
praise for Justice Holmes among jurists, legal scholars, law schools, law reviews, as well as
in popular culture); MORTON J. HORWITZ, The Place ofJustice Holmes in American Legal
Thought, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 31, 31 (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992) ('There has been only one great American legal thinker and it was Holmes.');
RICHARD A. POSNER, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR, The Essential
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in criticizing at some length his entirely conclusory and sketchy logic, the
same intellectual laxity that habitually delineates judges' and scholars'
anti-deontological stands.
One immediately senses the weakness of Holmes' approach: did he
actually believe that principles of philosophy such as moral norms truly are
akin to minor if "deep-seated" personal preferences such as enjoying or
detesting the taste of beer? Appreciating his legal forte, it defies logic that
a mind as nimble as Holmes' truly concluded that prohibitions
criminalizing child molestation for instance, enforces not immutable moral
norms, but rather mere, ephemeral societal preferences.10 2 Adapting his
metaphor about enjoying beer, even if, for instance, it is true that, "you can
not argue a [child molester] into [not] liking [to molest children]," reducing
the law to "Deep-seated preferences [that] can not be argued about"l03 is
absurd. One can explain logically and rationally why acts such as
molesting children are inherently immoral and thus, socially proscribed
even if some persons' "deep-seated preference" is sexual contact with
minors.1 0 4 It seems odd that any thoughtful legal theorist would reduce the
HolmesOLMES, at ix (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (referring to Justice Holmes as 'the
most illustrious figure in the history of American law'); Benjamin N. Cardozo, Tribute, Mr.
Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 684 (1931) (describing Justice Holmes as 'the
greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence')").
This is not to say that commentators have declined to reassess Holmes the scholar,
philosopher, judge and person. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes and ChiefJustice John Roberts's Dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges,
8 ELON L. REV. 1 (2016). As Profs. Rogat and O'Fallon noted roughly thirty years ago, "By
1962, when the Stanford Law Review published the first part of Yosal Rogat's Mr. Justice
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, [15 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962-63),] scholars had begun a sober
reconsideration of Holmes." Yosal Rogat and James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A
Dissenting Opinion -- the Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV 1349, 1349 (1984). Indeed, with
sharp wit, "Walton Hamilton wrote, in 1941, that it had 'taken a decade to elevate Mr.
Justice Holmes from deity to mortality,'.. . Id. (quoting, Walton Hamilton, On Dating Mr.
Justice Holmes, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 1 (1941)).
Nonetheless, his legacy remains vivid even if, in the perhaps unsympathetic words
of Andres Yoder, Holmes', "outsized influence on American law is beyond dispute, [but]
his worldview and self-understanding seem to come from anywhere but here." Andres
Yoder, 39 CAMP. L. REV. 353, 354 (2017) (citing, Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal
Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6 (2000) ("identifying Holmes as the third-most
cited American legal scholar of all time")).
102. George, supra note 88, at 8-11 (arguing the weaknesses of Holmes' analysis).
103. Holmes, supra note 98, at 41.
104. "Some acts are so inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent
to harm are one and the same. The act is the harm. Child molestation is not the kind of act
that results in emotional and psychological harm only occasionally. The contrary view
would be absurd. Indeed, a recent federal decision well demonstrates the point." J. C.
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profundities of law, such as time-honored proscriptions against homicide,
rape, battery, and thievery to mere societal preferences suggesting sheer if
fortuitous happenstance instead of the discovery of immutable moral
precepts.
Regardless, from the foregoing, Holmes drew the false associated
conclusion that, "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be
in that na~ive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted
by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men
everywhere."i'o Such devotion, Holmes rightly cautioned, often is
mistaken for the discovery of transcendent moralityio' inspiring an animal-
like insistence on the inherent rightness of the particular moral preference,
just as a "dog will fight for his bone."'o7 However, the propensity to
conflate erroneously one's preference with immutable philosophic truths
does not prove that there are no immutable philosophic truths any more
than the formerly popular but incorrect supposition that the World is flat
proves that there is no reliable physical science.
Doubtless, as for instance Joshua Samoff argues, human frailty may
prevent the full discovery of complete moral truth.' But from that,
consistent with the consequentialist error, Sarnoff joins the many who
speciously surmise, "If morality is metaphysically uncertain, there simply
Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M. K., 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 1026, 804 P.2d 689,698 (1991). By obvious
contrast, while one may not be able, "to argue a man into liking a glass of beer," Holmes,
supra note 98, at 41, one can explain why enjoying beer is no more or less moral than not
enjoying beer.
105. Id. Holmes accepted that there are certain physical needs to live, such as "food and
drink," that may be considered immutable. Id He further presumed that forming and
participating in some social order is so essential to remaining alive that some form of social
contract (although he does not use that term) essentially is an immutable element of human
life. Id. at 42. But, otherwise, there are no transcendent rules of moral comportment, rather,
over time, one tends to embrace the precepts of one's society to the degree that, "I not only
accept the rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation
and begin to talk about duties and rights." Id..
106. "No doubt behind these legal rights is the fighting will of the subject to maintain
them, and the spread of his emotions to the general rules by which they are maintained; but
that does not seem to me the same thing as the supposed a priori discernment of a duty or
the assertion of a preexisting right." Id.
107. Id.
108. "The reason that just treatment is not self-evident is that substantive morality is
'epistemologically' or 'metaphysically' 'uncertain.' Therefore, justice should not be
conceived as 'the result of the application of all, and only, the relevant criteria.' If morality
is epistemologically uncertain, we can never know all the relevant criteria and how they
should be applied." Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377,
384-85 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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is no objective standard to determine the relevant criteria of justice. ...
[W]e cannot know whether and when we treat people justly in an absolute
sense."" Sarnoff and his ilk conflate the presumed inability to fully
apprehend abstract concepts with the conclusions that (1) such concepts
cannot exist outside of human imaginging and (2) therefore we cannot
know if we have fulfilled some goal or obligation such as attaining justice.
Regarding the role of human imagining, as juriprude Michael Moore,
among others, has forefully rejoined, that human beings may never be
certain if and when they have found actual truth is no proof that there is no
truth, but rather, simply offers proof of human inperfection." Equally
important, accepting without admitting that, as Sarnoff claims, human
limitations may prevent us from ever, "know[ing] whether and when we
treat people justly in an absolute sense,""' that observation essentially has
no practical significance. Even in the "hard sciences," such as physics and
chemistry, and as well in the social sciences, we function effectively
without full knowledge.
Of course, incompete understanding has led to failures, some of which
have been calamitous. But, in many vital regards, we have acquired
knowledge of truths, imperfect but nonetheless sufficient to legitimately
and validly attain our ends. We do not seriously doubt that pursuant to the
natural order of our physical universe, there is a compete science of, inter
alia, physics and chemistry that can be, but likely never will be learned
fully. Correspondingly, as experiences teaches, we know that we can learn,
and often have learned, well enough to employ such science reliably
despite our incomplete knowledge.' 12 While unfinished, our
109. Id.
110. Michael S. Moore, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
724 (1997) (discussed in, Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 893, 896 (2000)).
111. Sarnoff, supra note 111, at 384-85.
112. "For those practitioners who really know, science is a gloriously messy business,
where things at the exciting research fronts are totally insecure in nearly every way and
where the different sorts of scientific communities solve their communal problems
imperfectly but still (we hope) well enough." Jerome R. Ravetz, Essay: Conventions in
Science and in the Courts: Images and Realities, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 2009, at
25, 31; see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, OVERCOMING LAW 10, 19, 450 (1994). As
discussed in David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on A Theme by
Holmes), 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1001, 1007 (1996) (footnotes omitted),
For Posner, pragmatism means being a consequentialist in ethics and a moderate
skeptic in epistemology, who doubts that we can know anything infallibly, but
not that we can know things well enough for practical purposes. In his philosophy
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comprehension of physics and chemistry is sufficient to build hugh
structures that do not collapse, to design vehicles that move, even fly, as
planned, and to otherwise bring the benefits of modernity despite our lack
of absolute or complete knowledge.
Likewise, one might as well say that mathematics is merely a purely
human construct, unrealted to physical actuality, because mathemitics is an
idea that we likely never will fully understand nor appreciate. However, as
Prof. Anthony D'Amato rejoined,
[E]very bridge, tunnel, and skyscraper relies upon mathematics in its
design, as do molecular biology, genetic engineering, and all statistics.
A point of contact, or isomorphism, is a two-way street. Not only does
it confirm the applicability of the system to a real-world event, but it
also counts the real-world event as corroborating the utility of the
system. The net result is a heightening of our level of confidence that
the system can successfully predict other potential applications to real-
world events. This is not to say that mathematics is analytically
congruent with the real world, but it fits well enough for practical
purposes." 3
Indeed, if erroneous conclusions proved that there are no bases outside
of the human imagination, then, "nothing is real except our desires,"l4 a
proposition specious on its face.
of science, Posner is a falsificationist, who believes that we test theories
empirically not to confirm the true ones, but to expose the false ones. This
conception of science fits Posner's version of pragmatism, which is decidedly
pro-science and anti-philosophy.
113. Anthony D'Amato, Anthony D'amato Responds, 108 Am. J. Int'l L. 715, 716 (2014).
As one commentator explained, "[M]athematics includes not only fundamental rules, but
also practical applications based on those rules. Mathematics is another tool in the arsenal
of the inventor, just as chemistry is such a tool." W. Wayt King, Jr., The Soul of the Virtual
Machine: In Re Alappat, 2 J. Intell. Prop. L. 575, 591 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
114. Peter Berkowitz, On the Laws Governing Free Spirits and Philosophers of the
Future: A Response to Nonet's "What Is Positive Law?", 100 YALE L. J. 701, 716 (1990)
(discussing Nietzsche's "distinction between appearance and reality. Nietzsche introduces
section 36 [of his Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann trans. 1966) (orig. ed. 1886)] with
the command to suppose (gesetz), or consider as a hypothesis, that nothing is real except
our desires (Begierden), passions (Leidenschaften), and drives (Triebe)."); cf, Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI-KENT. L. REv. 687, 711-712 (2000).
Postmodemists' "critically-minded students are taught that nothing is real, that
disengagement is smart (not to mention career-promoting), that politics is pantomime and
ventriloquism, that reality is a text (reading is safer than acting any day), that creative
misreading is resistance (you feel so radical and comfortably marginal), that nothing can be
changed (you can only amuse yourself)."
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Ironically then, the whole rationale of Holmes' argument sounds in the
very mistake he chides in others: assuming that his instinctive, experiential,
deeply-held beliefs, herein morality is not deontological, are entirely
correct and require no independent proof.' Throughout his article,
Holmes presumes but never proves that because people usually do not
engage in reliable deontological analysis, there is no such thing as reliable
deontological analysis. Instinct, mere inferences from experience and coy
prose,H6 are no substitutes for reasoned analysis."' Holmes' bald
assertions that morality is merely opinion are unsupported by logic, only
insinuation, while Deontology is predicated firmly on reason.
To close this part of the discussion, just as the mere presumption that
morality is a human creation cannot vindicate Consequentialism, neither
115. Homes does attempt one logical argument, "The most fundamental of the supposed
preexisting rights - the right to life - is sacrificed without a scruple not only in war, but
whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power in the community, is
thought to demand it. Whether that interest is the interest of mankind in the long run no one
can tell, ... " Holmes, supra note 92, at 42. Holmes may be correct that people and
governments, particularly through war, immorally deprive individuals of "the right to life;"
but he failed to disprove the existence of transcendent morality because he inaccurately
presumed that under deontological theory, "the right to life" is a supreme moral right that
has no limits. Holmes' error is supposing without verifying that there are no rights greater
than "the right to life," which, if true, indeed would preclude any social policies justifying
the deliberate taking of life. Rather, as we will learn, there are overarching moral principles
sounding in the innate dignity of Humankind that trump even the "right to life," as when,
for instance, persons kill in true self-defense of their own lives. In this regard, it is worth
recalling Kant's stunning pronouncement "justice [must] be done even if the world should
perish." KANT, supra note 57. Because, as we will learn, Kant is correct, much in morality
proves that the "right to life" is not supreme. See, infra Section 3.
Accordingly, that through ignorance or guile, Society may condone immoral killing,
is no proof that deontological principles of morality do not exist. At most, it is proof that
Society has failed to appreciate the nuances of Deontology.
116. See generally, Richard A. Primust, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L. J. 243, 268 n.85 (1998) (quoting Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial
Figure, 55 CHi. L. REv. 506, 506 (1988) ("The tradition of praising Holmes's prose
continues. Robert Ferguson has recently opined that 'Holmes's mastery of the judicial
opinion as literary genre is unmatched in the twentieth century")).
117. See generally George, supra note 88 at II (critiquing Professor Holmes, on the issue
of whether people ought to believe and act on the basis of what is true, correct, sound,
warranted; Holmes's assertion of his view presupposes that they should, and, thus,
presupposes that people can and should grasp the point--the basic, more-than-merely-
instrumental, point and value--of truth, knowledge, reasonableness, rationality. But, if they
can, then it is a mistake to suppose that all values are subjective, and it is time to launch, or
continue, the quest to distinguish mere matters of taste (a glass of beer) from those aspects
of human well-being and fulfillment (such as practical and theoretical knowledge of truth)
that have objective worth and, thus, standing as principles of "natural law.").
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can the equally familiar claim that because over the course of centuries
thoughtful people sincerely and intensely have disagreed about the nature
and meaning of morality, there is no single correct meaning.
Relying on rejoinders similar to those above debunking the claim that
moral truth does not exist, all disagreement qua disagreement can show is,
well, that there is disagreement. Only a profound and serious inquiry can
prove whether the particular disagreement concerns a matter for which
there is or is not a definitive answer outside of the particular preferences of
the disagreeing parties. That persons happen to disagree does not foreclose
the possibility that one of them actually may be right, or that none of them
are, but rather the truth has yet to be discovered."' Thus, we recall noted
jurisprude Michael Moore, whose specialties include expounding on the
theory of truth, who made the point succinctly: "Discussing the possible
legitimacy of torture, Professor Moore noted by analogy 'the medieval
worry of how many stones make a heap. Our uncertainty whether it takes
three, or four, or five, etc., does not justify us in thinking that there are no
118. Even perennial skeptic Judge Richard Posner begrudgingly accepts that there is
knowable morality such as the inherent immorality of infanticide, at least of "normal"
babies. Hon. Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 IHARv. L.
REV. 1636, 1643-44 (1998). Nonetheless, Posner, predictably without attribution, rejects
the idea that we can glean from unquestionable moral norms ways to answer "interesting
moral questions." Id. That argument is incongruous; and it is hard to believe a mind as
intense as Judge Posner's does not recognize how illogical his assertion is. If as Posner
asserts, persons are able to discern one immutable moral point, such as the intrinsic
immorality of infanticide (at least, as Posner shrugs, when "normal" infants are murdered),
there is no reason to suppose that they likewise cannot grasp other moral truths which, as a
whole, reveal an entire fabric of moral precepts.
Nor does Judge Posner explain why, if we can, we ought not discern the entire moral
tapestry, except to suppose that, "given the variety of necessary roles in a complex society,
it is not a safe idea to have a morally uniform population." Id. at 1681. 1 can discern no
explanation for this remarkable idea except that we need "a variety of types," Id (discussing
judges), so that one paradigm does not unduly take hold, frustrating the recognition of better
paradigms. That might be sensible if Posner had not, as they say, "hedged his bets" by
denouncing abstract, impartial morality, but admitting at least in the instance of murdering
the wrong class of children, that impartial morality exists. He never clarifies why that class
of immutable immorality is cognizable but other classes, by definition equally
reprehensible, are to be ignored.
Having acknowledged, as he should, that single instance where morality transcends
human partiality, Posner truly has "opened the floodgate," and rightly so. Yet, by trying to
dissuade scholars from leaning more about immutable morality as an entirety, Posner would
stop what must be the noblest pursuit of Humankind. That makes no reasonable sense,
especially since Posner does not and cannot really explain why "the variety of necessary
roles in a complex society" justifies some role-players to act immorally while others may
not.
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such things as heaps."'ll9 Likewise, uncertainty, if any, as to its definition
does not prove that there is no true, certain, single delineation of morality.
In sum, the anti-deontological assertions in judicial opinions, law
reviews, and similar sources embracing the consequentialist error are
remarkably, indeed excruciatingly lacking in both thorough reasoning and
basic analytical methods.
d. The Capacity to Reason --
In addition to the criticisms just discussed, skeptics assert that, even if
morality were deontological, human beings lack the capacity to perform
the neutral, unbiased reasoning required to discern moral truths.12 0 If so,
purported good sense and experience become the only bases to premise
some general theory of morality. In that case, Consequentialism -- morality
defined as that which produces the best outcome -- is the most reasonable
alternative to deontological analysis. After all, if there is no moral truth, or
if truth exists but we cannot discern it (or come sufficiently close for
practical use), then, we should adopt the next best paradigm which, as there
are no reasonable alterntives, must be that which enforces the best outcome
thereby engendering the greatest possible happiness with the least possible
sadness.
Professor Carlson summarized the contention bluntly, "The problem
is that I never know whether my acts are from the moral law or from some
pathological inclination."I2 ' A more thorough analysis comes from
Professor Simon:
The classical articulation is that government must be of law and not of
rulers. This articulation embodies an ideal that is far from attainable,
however, for its full implementation presupposes that all positive law
is logically deduced from the nature or edicts of an authoritative outside
source. These edicts, however, will lose their objectivity when they
suffer the inevitable manipulations by humans. Even in societies in
which law is fervently believed to be wholly deducible from religious
119. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 310 n.120; see also, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural
Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 312 (1985) (distinguishing the realist
from the skeptic); see also Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1109
(1982) (discussing factual and moral belief).
120. E.g., David Gray Carlson, Hart avec Kant: On the Inseparability of Law and
Morality, I WASH. U. JURIS. REv. 21, 35 (2009).
121. Id. at 81.
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or supernatural concepts, it is clear at least from an external perspective
that the process of deduction requires human interpretation of the
resulting concepts and human administration of the resulting positive
laws.1 2 2
Consistent with much anti-Deontology critique, Professor Simon
offers scant proof, but merely asserts that even should extra-human abstract
morality exist, "it is clear" that "[t]hese edicts, however, will lose their
objectivity when they suffer the inevitable manipulations by humans." 123
Doubtless human beings have limited intellectual capacities. "Immanuel
Kant, perhaps the most celebrated of the deontological rationalists,
understood that 'human beings are not fully rational beings; they are,
rather, creatures of limited knowledge and self-restraint."'l 24 If perfection
were the only acceptable standard, then, as Simon avers, we could never
prove a theory of morality. Nor, however, could we prove many things in
many realms that we take for granted.
In that regard, it is worth again emphasizing that, for example, even
after millennia of study, Humankind's understanding of mathematics and
science remains incomplete, and possibly faulty in that some of the
precepts currently believed to be true may be wrong, at least in part.125
Nonetheless, applying what we know of science and mathematics, absent
corruption or negligent construction, buildings do not routinely collapse,
dams do not habitually burst, and bridges do not customarily crumble. We
could build things better and we continually strive to do so; but, we have
learned to build well enough to support an urbanized, industrialized
society.
The above-mentioned logic does not apply solely to the "hard
sciences," but as well to the social sciences and the Humanities. To cite a
classic example from law and law practice, the Supreme Court constantly
122. Simon, supra note 63, at 1521-22.
123. Id. at 1521.
124. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 306 ("Kant concedes that neither the actor nor an observer
can be sure if the action proceeds out of [rational, unbiased] duty alone."); see also infra
Section 3-a-2 (discussing Kant's philosophy). .
125. LEWIS WOLPERT, What Lawyers Need to Know About Science, in LAW AND SCIENCE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 289, 289 (Helen Reece ed., 1998) ("Science ... is progressive ...
approach[ing] closer and closer to understanding the nature of the world.") ; see also, e.g.,
Robin Cooper Feldman, Historic Perspective on Law & Science, I STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
3 n.6 (2009) ("describing tenets of critical realism including that there is an objective truth
and that science undergoes continual revision towards a better, although imperfect,
understanding of it").
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cautions that a judge or jury must "judge a case, as due process requires,
impartially, unswayed by outside influences."'26 Such has been the
presumed human facility since the earliest days of American law, inherited
from our British forebears. 127 The faith in judges' and jurors' abilities to
apprehend and effectively nullify their personal prejudices and preferences
is a subset of the Courts' accurate, if curt, shorthand, "[A person] is entitled
to a fair trial but not a perfect one."'28 Through procedural and evidentiary
rules, and other offshoots of "due process of law," we attempt to reach the
correct legal and factual conclusions. We do not capitulate to our
imperfections by claiming the quest for fairness and justice is futile,
therefore "anything goes" -- any conduct is self-justifying. Rather, we
believe that the harder we try, the better we can do. Moreover, experience
and research confirm the foregoing.129
As these examples evince, "Despite infirm or incomplete
comprehension, we successfully can fulfill tasks and projects while trying
to avoid past errors. With proper effort, we do well enough."'30
126. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2913 (2010); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) (2006) (stating that ajudge must disqualify him/herself "in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129
S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) ("All judges take an oath to uphold the
Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this
promise."); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Judges
must be impartial, and they put their impartiality at risk - or at least might appear to
become partial to one side - when they provide trial assistance to a party."); United States
v. Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d 380, 385 (1st Cir. 2015) ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury"); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907) ("The theory of our [trial] system is that the conclusions to be reached in a
case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print").
127. See generally, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821).
128. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); see also, McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984); see also, United States v. McBride,
656 Fed. Appx. 416, 425 (10th Cir. 2016); see also, United States v. Haldar, 751 F.3d 450,
459 (7th Cir. 2014).
129. E.g., Justin D Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
And Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 345 (2007) (explaining and suggesting methods
to mitigate "implicit memory bias in legal decisionmaking"); Jennifer McNulty, Sociologist
Testifies About How to Overcome Racial Bias in Jury Selection, U.C. SANTA CRUZ
CURRENTS (March 3, 1997), http://wwwl.ucsc.edu/oncampus/currents/97-03-
03/fukurai.jury.htm; J. Stephen Welch, When Doctors Push Pain Pills, AM. Ass'N OF JUST.:
TRIAL (May 2014),
http://trial.justice.org/publication/?i=205696&p=&=&m=&ver-&view-&pp=# {"issue id
":205696,"page":44};Lyn A. Pruitt, Overcoming Jury Bias: Trial Advocates Must
Understand It and Cope with It, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 331(2002).
130. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 311.
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Accordingly, whatever they may be, our inherent or self-imposed
intellectual limits do not refute the actuality that principles of science and
reason -- including moral precepts -- exist prior to and are independent of
Humanity."' That is why, Deontology is not religion, it is
comprehension.'32 Of equal urgency, that is why our imperfections in no
manner "absolves us from understanding as fully as possible what morality
requires."'33
As mentioned, Professor Simon opined that arguably neutral "edicts
... will lose their objectivity when they suffer the inevitable manipulations
by humans."'34 It is worth noting in passing the rather odd conclusion
Simon thereby draws: that true objectivity would result in despotism:
The growth of modem political theory became both possible and
necessary because of the demise of the supernatural view of law. When
positive law was believed to have its source in a divine or infallible
agent or a natural order, or rulers were believed to rule by divine or
natural right, the authority of government was based on attitudes of
individuals toward those wider belief systems. From its inception,
modem political theory has attempted to discover and articulate a
theory about authority that can serve as an acceptable substitute for the
belief in the authority of an outside entity or order, religious or
otherwise. Id. at 1522."13
I frankly do not understand Simon's logic except that, as noted in
earlier discussion, morality is despotic in that there is no choice but to
131, See, supra notes 113-17, 122-23 and accompanying text.
132. See, BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: ITS NATURE AND JUSTIFICATION at 6 (1998)
("[E]very feature of morality must be known to, and [can] be chosen by, all rational persons.
No religion is known to all rational persons, and all religions have some feature that could
not be chosen by all rational persons"). The human potential fully to understand morality,
then, is not akin to a claimed human capacity fully to understand God which is impossible
because, most religions claim, one must be God to understand God in all ways.
Accordingly, religious practices often eschew actually naming "God," but rather designate
words or phrases to denote their respective deity. Such designating identifies when God
has acted, thereby allowing adherents some practical understanding of their statuses and
duties while acknowledging that the designation in no manner signifies that God is fully
comprehendible. E.g., Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals,
Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 995 (1991) ("[N]aming God only through
prohibition and negation, [] affirm[s] our inability to name God at all, giving us knowledge
of our finitude.").
133. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 310.
134. Simon, supra note 63, at 1521.
135. Simon, supra note 63, at 1522.
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follow the moral path wherever it leads, no matter how terrible is the
ultimate destination. But, that reality does not result from the dictatorship
of one human being against others. Rather, the despotism of morality arises
because human statutes cannot amend the laws of nature, such is the
tyranny of the natural order of things,
Indeed, instead of confounding oppression, Profs. Simon's and
Carlson's logic leads to desperation -- to an attitude of, "Why bother? Who
cares?" If we truly cannot escape our personal prejudices, inclinations and
preferences, and, thus, if perfect moral knowledge leading to complete
moral comportment can never be ours, then some may conclude there is no
point in even attempting to be moral if that means foregoing our selfish
preferences for the sake of attaining either the greater good or the right
result. One researcher rightly summarized, "Voluntary individual rational
action requires a particular value criteria to justify the act and separate it
from random behavior. Complete moral skepticism leads to chaos."'36 As
Simon and Carlson do not so advocate, one must presume that, despite their
skepticism, they accept the belief if not the reality that, if we try hard
enough, we can be moral enough.
F. Why be Moral? The Challenge of Threshold Deontology --
At this juncture, one might reasonably ask, "Why be moral?" If
following the moral path leads to horrific consequences -- outcomes -- that
any rational person would hope to avoid, what good is such morality, why
not just defy what is "right" to promote what is "good?" A reasonable
person might suggest that, at least to avoid the most catastrophic outcomes,
one might embrace Consequentialism and set aside Deontology which,
respecting only moral principles derived from impartial reason, is blithely
unconcerned with the extraordinary harm and pain deontological
136. Randolph Marshall Collins, The Constitutionality of Flag Burning: Can Neutral
Values Protect First Amendment Principles? 28 CRIM. L. REv. 887, 900 (1991); see also,
e.g., Stephen L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
233, 237 (1994) ("Relativism appears identical to nihilism. Postmodemism -- with its
rejection of meta-narratives, deconstruction of meaning, and decentering of the self -- looks
like a radicalized version of skepticism that threatens a frightening descent into intellectual
and moral chaos"); Allan C. Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical
Deconstruction, 94 YALE L. J. 209, 211 (1984) ("[Philosophers] Descartes, Kant, and Locke
... wanted to ground truth and knowledge on an ahistorical and universal foundation,
unconditionally valid for all persons at all times. Without such an objective grounding,
knowledge would become prey to a radical skepticism, behind which lurks the spectre of
social chaos and madness").
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comportment may engender. Indeed, there is such a theory, known as
"Threshold Deontology."
The attractiveness of Threshold Deontology is clear and undeniable.
"[E]ven Kantians typically believe that moral rules can be subject to
consequentialist override if the consequences are sufficiently serious. If
total catastrophe really would ensue, judges should not rule as they believe
that principle requires."l3 As one commentator succinctly put it,
"threshold deontology [holds that] rights serve as trumps to a point, but
consequentialism kicks in if the consequences of protecting the right are
sufficiently dire."' 38  In light of these apparently common sense
propositions, Threshold Deontology proposes that:
At some extreme points, one cannot avoid some consequentialist
analysis that would require a departure from the absolute prescription.
Threshold deontology responds to the accusation that pure deontology
would allow catastrophic outcomes for the sake of moral narcissism.
For this school, the debate is no longer about the permissibility of
lesser-evil calculations, [it is] only about the terms and conditions for
its application ... 1
Usually, Threshold Deontology presumes that some moral principles
of high importance, such as the prohibition against torture, may be
sacrificed for the greater good of avoiding catastrophic outcomes such as
the detonation of a nuclear bomb in the heart of a city. By contrast,
Professor Kramer envisioned a reverse cost-benefit approach yielding ,i
form of Threshold Deontology that would sacrifice minor moral precepts
for the greater good:
When a deontological obligation (such as a minor promissory
obligation) is not formidably stringent, and when a breach of that
obligation can avert a very substantial detriment, or bring about a very
substantial benefit, and when the non-occurrence of the breach would
not involve any contraventions of deontological duties, the situation can
137. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, 60 STAN. L. REv. 155, 165 (2007).
138. Note, Rights in Flux: Nonconsequentialism, Consequentialism, and the Judicial
Role, 130 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1443 (2017); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Interpreting
Presidential Powers, 63 DuKE L. J. 347, 368 (2013) (citing philosophical accounts); EYAL
ZAMIR & BARAK MEDENA, LAW, EcoNOMICs, AND MORALITY 51-55 (2010) (critiquing
threshold deontology).
139. Blum, supra note 35, at 43.
512017]
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
be such that a breach of a deontological obligation -- despite its
wrongness -- is better in the circumstances than so such breach at all."
Arguably, if both forms of Threshold Deontology were merged -- use
consequentialist theory when the stakes are very high and when the stakes
are rather low -- the result would be Consequentialism, the logical premises
of which have been disproved above.'4 1 Moreover, even assuming moral
precepts are not all of equal status (and that assumption is wrong),'4 2 the
very concept of Threshold Deontology is flawed. The infirmity of
Threshold Deontology is not that its proposition, "that we can never truly
know exactly when the invitation to evil is strong enough to permit
consequentialism to overtake deontology."l4 3 Similarly, considering
Professor Kramer's variant, it may be true that we can never truly know
when a moral obligation is sufficiently "not formidably stringent" that it
should fall to forestall an outcome that is "substantially detriment[al]."
As accented regarding the "consequentialist error" and equally
applicable to Threshold Deontology, of necessity, most theories of law and
morals are based on concepts that may be "deeply but not completely
understood."'" One need not have a formal legal education to appreciate
Justice Felix Frankfurter's admonition applicable certainly to law,
philosophy and its offshoots that "the task of scrutinizing is a task of
drawing lines."145 Indeed, "the capacity to 'draw lines' -- to make
meaningful, appropriate distinctions even among nearly equivalent things
and ideas -- is the hallmark of legal decision-making." 4 6 We may never
know where the exact legal line -- boundary -- lies demarcating lawful from
non-lawful conduct. To cite a classic example, we usually are unable to
140. Kramer, supra note 35, at 233.
141. See, supra notes 59-78, 83-123 and accompanying text; see also, Bayer 11, supra
note 17, at 293-96.
142. See, supra notes 59-78, 83-123 and accompanying text; see also, Bayer II, supra
note 17, at 293-96.
143. Id. at 320 n. 176.
144. Id. at 320.
145. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
146. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 895 n. 121 (citing, Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S.
Ct. 2073, 2083 (2012); Perry v. Perez, 132 U.S. 934, 941 (2012) (discussing relevant
considerations to enable line drawing); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 220 (1845)). Ellis v.
United States, 206 U.S. 246, 260 (1907) (Justice Holmes explained the necessity of drawing
lines: "As in other cases where a broad distinction is admitted, it ultimately becomes
necessary to draw a line, and the determination of the precise place of that line in nice cases
always seems somewhat technical, but still the line must be drawn."). .
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define with final precision negligent from non-negligent behavior, but,
rather set specific enough criteria so that we know when the metaphysical
line has been crossed even though we cannot discern where that line exactly
is.17 Therefore, Threshold Deontology's weakness is not that we might
never be able to determine definitively when a portending catastrophe is
sufficiently catastrophic to annul deontological morality and trigger
threshold deontological morality.' 48
The true infirmity of Threshold Deontology is that it eschews
Deontology's core precept, namely, morality's immutable, a priori,
transcendent commands must be obeyed. Moral comportment is not a
choice-it is not an option--even when the moral way causes appalling harm
to entirely innocent parties. 149 The reason Deontology must prevail -- the
reason why "justice [must] be done even if the world should perish"' -- is
that morality does not exist to slake our passions, nor to satiate our desires,
even desires that appear unselfish if not utterly compelling. Were it
otherwise, morality would be consequentialist, predicted on, one hopes,
magnanimous motives, but regardless, measured by the aggregate
happiness of some individual, group, or social order.
Accordingly, Threshold Deontology is neither a fitting compromise
nor a discovered moral truth; rather, as two astute observers explain, it is
wholly unprincipled:
147. O'Malley v. Jegabbi, 12 A.D.2d 389, 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) ("the Supreme
Judicial Court of [Massachusetts], while admitting the inherent impossibility of defining
'gross negligence' with the utmost precision ... has given to it a meaning of sufficient
distinctness to be applied usefully by courts and juries to particular facts before them")
(quoting Shaw v. Moore, 162 A. 373, 374 (Vt. 1932)).
148. For instance, again using a trite but popular example, reasonable minds might differ
regarding how many people must be endangered before authorities may deliberately torture
a suspect reasonably believed to have useful knowledge regarding the location of the
"ticking time bomb." See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 81 (2006) (mentioning the ticking time
bomb scenario among others). But, we can set some arbitrary but basically reasonable
threshold.
149. See, supra notes 59-78, 83-123 and accompanying text; see also, Bayer 11, supra note
17, at 293-96. This is not to suggest, of course, that morality per se permits "appalling harm"
against culpable persons. Punishment and other acts against deserving individuals must not
exceed that necessary and appropriate to accomplish amoral goal. THOMAS E. HILL, JR.,
DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY 160-84 (1992) (punishment is
legitimate to vindicate liberty, not to provide a quantum of misery to the offender to match
the quantum of misery the offender inflicted on the victim).
150. KANT, supra note 57, at 102 n.16.
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"Put crudely, once principles have a price all that is left is the bargaining
... Threshold deontology does not avoid this embarrassment, but merely
pretends it does not exist."
There is nothing incoherent in maintaining that quantitative changes
in the number of people saved as a result of an act of torture may change
the moral status of the act. Yet, quantitative concerns of the type
described by threshold deontology seem to be in tension with its
aggregation proscribing rationale. Such quantitative concerns appear on
their face to be much more congenial to consequentialist reasoning.
Thus, while threshold deontology is a coherent position, it is also an
unprincipled one--an unprincipled concession to pragmatism and
moral intuitions that is hard to square with the deep normative (anti-
aggregationist) commitments of deontology.i5
Having established the infirmities of Threshold Deontology, we may
return to the pivotal query that opened this subsection: if morality does not
exist in the natural order of things to make us happy, then why be moral?
Indeed, what does morality do? Why does morality exist? What purpose
does it serve for the sake of Humankind's span in Eternity?
The combined answer is, because "any type or instance of human
conduct is permissible if and only if it is not wrong,"l5 2 morality exists to
keep us from doing wrong which means to keep us from doing evil. In that
regard, let me repeat what I concluded in my first exploration of the subject,
that deontological moral comportment is its own reward:
[W]e are not morality's master, but its servants; and, beyond question,
morality is harsh and unsympathetic, demanding that we do what is
right whatever the consequence because, by definition, acting
immorally is wicked. Consequentialists are correct that deontology's
"damn the consequences" approach sometimes requires persons to do
things that can cause tremendous harm, particularly to innocents.
Perhaps sadly, or perhaps not, keeping faith with morality does not
promise freedom from sorrow. Indeed, only the mentally infirm,
incorrigibly villainous and woefully uninformed would act immorally
if morality engendered no serious costs. ... [Mlorality's sole promise is
that the moral are upright and honest, fulfilling faithfully their duty to
humanity even if others do not -- even when the morality of the moral
151. Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, Dignity, Emergency, Exception, 64 IUS Gentium 101,
105-06 (2018) (emphasis added; quoting, Kutz (2007), 256).
152. KRAMER, supra note 35, at 4.
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enables the immorality of the immoral. If the, perhaps, sad result of
adherence to morality is harm to those who, through no fault of their
own, become embroiled in a moral confrontation, then suffering
becomes the test of commitment to leading an upright existence. ...
While utilitarian rewards often flow from moral acts, morality itself
must be its own reward. These are the duties of a noble [-- moral -- ]
life.'53
To some, Deontology may seem appallingly constraining, hampering
and defiant of human freedom because it utterly disregards preferences and
outcomes in favor of discerning an abstract, pristine moral code for which
obedience is compulsory. 154  Moreover, morality promises neither
happiness, nor wealth, nor security, nor other understandably desired but
nonetheless indulgent pleasures. Rather, as just explained, a moral life is
its own reward. That reward, then, is not inevitably happiness -- not the
bliss of la dolce vita,"' but it is the satisfaction of la vita morale, a life
untainted by doing evil -- a life uncorrupted by betraying both oneself and
fellow human beings. The integrity of moral comportment, as I
emphasized in earlier writings, renders Deontology the most liberating of
all philosophies in two vital ways:
First, [by replacing partisan preferences with unbiased reason,] it frees
us from the methodological distortions that socialization may instill.
Second, even if socialization fortuitously inculcates proper moral
principles, deontology provides an impartial process through which
adherents can strive to prove that their morality is true and not merely
the product of even profound and momentous happenstance.
Deontology frees us from the enslavement of our life experience.' 56
153. Bayer 11, supra note 17, at 316-17 n. 154.
154. That certainly is a prime contention of Judge Richard Posner, one of Deontology's
most ardent foes. See Posner, supra note 120, at 1641-44, 1678-84.
155. "La dolce vita is a borrowed Italian phrase first used in English in the 1960s. ... La
dolce vita describes a way of life that is easygoing, enjoying things to the fullest. Usually
la dolce vita involves luxury and pleasure of varying degrees. It may be considered
hedonistic, shallow and materialistic or simply carefree. La dolce vita literally translates as
'the sweet life'. The term is derived from the title of a film by Frederico Fellini, which
debuted in 1960 and was quite popular in the English-speaking world." Grammarist, La
Dolce Vita, https://rammarist.com/phrase/la-dolce-vital (visited, January 15, 2019).
Of course, one may pursue and attain la dolce vita in a moral fashion; but la dolce
vita is not by definition a morally upright existence.
156. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 296.
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g. The Infirmities of Quasi-Consequentialist Theories --
Given that it justifies anything and everything that maximizes
aggregate happiness including slavery, mass murder, indeed all
indisputable depravities, it is hardly surprising that adherents attempt to
constrain unadulterated Consequentialism. The obvious problem is that so
long as moral uprightness ultimately is defined by some person's or some
group's selfish preferences, Consequentialism can never be anything but
an apology for gratifying what makes the dominating person or group
happy -- feel good. As we now understand, a moral system predicated on
indulging selfish predilections is unmoored from any objective proof that
the favored predilections indeed are just.
Accordingly, when pressed, consequentialists will seek some
deontological basis to prove that a given consequentialist outcome is not
simply a fascade illegitimately vindicating some immoral preference. But,
rather than forthrightly admitting that only a deontological basis will prove
the correctness of a moral proposition, "A well-known strategy for
defending consequentialism is to adopt a complex conception of the good
with a view toward imitating deontological constraints.""' Likewise,
Profs. Zamir and Medina noted, "There can be great disputes among
consequentialism regarding the values or indices of 'well-being,' whose
'well-being' matters in given situations and what particular factors or
considerations are relevant or irrelevant towards discerning optimal well-
being.""' Indeed, aware of the basic definitional problem, theorists have
tried to salvage consequentialist theory from the reductio ad absurdum"'
it so compellingly invites.
For example, some scholars urge that the related theory Utilitarianism
might provide the plausibility unalloyed Consequentialism lacks:
[Bloth consequentialism and utilitarianism agree that right actions or
right rules -- normally, the law. . . -- are those that maximize, from an
impartial point of view, the moral value brought about or preserved.
The two views differ, however, in terms of their definition of what
exactly is 'the good.' Utilitarians are concerned with happiness,
157. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 65, at 340.
158. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 142, at 20.
159. Reductio Ad Absurdum, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/ (last visited
Jan 22, 2016) ("the refutation of a proposition by demonstrating the inevitably absurd
conclusion to which it would logically lead").
56 [Vol. 43:1
PART I- ORIGINALISMAND DEONTOLOGY
whether understood in terms of the balance .of pleasure over pain,
preference satisfaction (whether informed or uninformed), or welfare.
Consequentialists accept other moral reasons as also shaping the good
that is to be maximized. Utilitarians are thus a subset of
consequentialists. 6
Not surprisingly, utilitarians are not all of one mind regarding how to
assess aggregate happiness and unhappiness. "Jeremy Bentham, for
instance, defines happiness as any 'pleasure' or 'avoidance of pain,'
whereas John Stuart Mill distinguishes between types and degrees of
pleasure. For a Mill-Utilitarian, the 'standard of morality' is that action
which creates a set of lives 'as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point
of quantity and quality."'" 6 ' This has led to a Utilitarianism that strives to
promote the good for all society, not simply to declare that whatever
maximizes happiness for some group in some context per se is the morally
correct state of affairs. As Professor Leigh Raymond put it:
The whole system of utilitarianism is based on an attitude of
generalized benevolence or the disposition to seek happiness for the
residents of the world . . . Ethical actors should maximize the total
human happiness of the world through all of their actions. . . . For the
utilitarian, the principle of utility is the ultimate definition of the "good"
to be sought by human society. 16 2
Similarly, many consequentialists attempt to augment crude theory
with seemingly sophisticated intricacies designed to eliminate
Consequentialism's intrinsic fallacy of simply equating what people want
with what is good. 163 Some propose differentiating act-consequentialism
from rule-consequentialism,' some embrace incrementalist rule-
160. Alec Whalen, ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced, Retributive Account,
76 LA. L. REv. 355, 403 (2015).
161. Peter C. LaGreca, Separate and Unequal: The American Dream Unfulfilled, 16
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 183, 194 (2015).
162. Leigh Raymond, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and Justice, 23
EcoLoGY L.Q. 577, 580, 583-84 (1996).
163. Bayer 11, supra note 17, at 322-28.
164. "Blum, supra note 35, at 45; see also, Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archivestspr201 1/entries/consequentialism-rule
[http//perma-cc/4QH-N-Q5XJ] ("The former assesses the outcomes of every particular act; ...
The latter weighs the effects of having a particular rule in place (and therefore the average
outcome of acts that follow the rule)"); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN.
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consequentialism, 16 5 others follow indirect consequentialism,1 6 6 while still
others urge crosspollination to produce "what we might call incrementalist
cosmopolitan rule-consequentialism assesses possible moral rules and
policies in terms of the expected value of their acceptance (not just by one
individual or by one society but) by all societies simultaneously."'6 7
All of these sub-strata suffer from ambiguous defining,16 s which may
not be enough to condemn them if their strictures are precise enough for
reasonable persons to apply them with reasonable certainty.169 More
importantly, the decent efforts of Professor Raymond and others to import
humanity and nuance into Consequentialism and Utilitarianism are futile
so long as some measure ofaggregate happiness remains a necessary, even
if not a sufficient component of analysis. Like Professor Hooker, Professor
Sagoff, for instance, seeks a "cosmopolitan" vision of Consequentialism
that imports true and humane moral theory:
A cosmopolitan moral perspective ... depends upon critical judgment,
ethical intuition, and human sympathy, rather than upon a system of
philosophical abstractions, such as the one deontological liberalism
provides. We can rely to some extent on a general sense of moral
progress ... [revealing] a notion of goodness not of any particular time
and country. Grounding the good in a historical and cultural
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sep. 27, 2011), https://plato.stanfordedu/entries/consequentialism/ (cited
in, Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age ofProportionality, 124 YALE L. J. 3094,3167
n. 344 (2015); Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies ofInterpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 607,
627 (2005)).
165. Brad Hooker, Griffin on Human Rights, 30 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 203 (2010)
(that approach requires "abid[ing] by the policies in the currently accepted morality unless
and until we can calculate to a reliable degree of probability which changes to this morality
would result in a net increase in value in the long run").
166. Id. ("[W]hich rules and rights are the ones whose establishment would have the best
consequences in the long run, impartially considered"); see also Larry Alexander, Pursuing
the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 317-19 (1985).
167. Hooker, supra, note 169, at 204 ("The best forms of indirect consequentialism focus
neither on the consequences of one individual's accepting and following policies nor on the
consequences of one society's accepting and following policies. The best forms of indirect
consequentialism are more 'cosmopolitan').
168. Scott Woodcock, When Will Your Consequentialist Friend Abandon You for the
Greater Good?, 4 J. ETHIcs & Soc. PHIL. 1, 2 n. 3 (2010) ("Indirect consequentialism, is
tainted by an unfortunate ambiguity in the literature. Some philosophers use the term to
refer to forms of consequentialism that employ a division between a criterion of rightness
and decision-procedures that indirectly lead to the long-term satisfaction of the criterion.
Others use the term to refer to versions of consequentialism in which a criterion of rightness
tracks goodness indirectly via indicators such as rules rather than acts").
169. See supra Section 2-d.
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perspective can save us from both [deontological] over-abstraction and
utilitarian reductionism...
... The self has a moral identity only within the political and social
world it inhabits. . . . We develop our identities in communities ...
within which we share aspirations and a sense of the meaning or the
fitness of things. 7 0
However, as his own text admit, Sagoff's claim of sophisticated
analysis still relies on choosing a history and a culture among competing
histories and cultures that somehow have revealed not a, but the correct
"sense of the meaning or the fitness of things." The immediate and obvious
objections include: whose concept of "fitness," from what "history,"
regarding which "communities," based on what "sense of moral
progress?""' Every community has dissenters, every epoch knows
dissention, and every definition of progress acknowledges a counter-
explanation. Examples are neither scarce nor difficult to access. It was not
very long ago that "critical judgment, ethical intuition, and human
sympathy" counseled the inferiority of non-White races. Even less in the
past, judgement, intuition and sympathy advised the dominance of men
over women. It is barely two decades that the prevailing sentiment
arguably recognizes the dignity of the LGBT community that once was
derided as unnatural if not inherently perverse, vile, and an inherent danger
to the health and welfare of Society.'7 2
170. Sagoff, supra, note 72, at 1068.
171. Bayer 11, supra note 17, at 327.
172. E.g., Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY
BIL OF RIGHTS J., 89, 123-29 (1997); Dov Berger, Separating Civil Unions And Religious
Marriage--A New Paradigm For Recognizing Same-Sex Relationships, 6 CARDOZA PuB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 163, 169 (2007) (footnote omitted) (student note arguing, inter alia, "The
history of homosexuality is a long and unfortunate one, filled with significant bigotry and
danger."). Margaret Bichler, Suspicious Closets: Strengthening the Claim to Suspect
Classification and Same-Sex Marriage Rights, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 167, 168 (2008)
(note) (citing, Michel Foucault, I The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, 42-43, 97-101,
105-06 (1990)).
Likewise, only recently has the law has acknowledged the respect due to LGBTQ
individuals. See, Bayer Part II, supra note 23 at Section 6-c-6. Just a half-century ago, the
Supreme Court upheld federal immigration statutes identifying "homosexuals" and "sex
perverts" as "psychopathic personalit[ies]" who may be refused entry into or deported from
the United States. Boutilier v. I.N.S., 387 U.S. 118 (1967); see also, e.g., Quiroz v. Neelly,
291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1983)
(homosexual individual is ineligible for naturalization); LaVoie v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970)
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In sum, no matter how much conceptual plastic surgery is applied,
Consequentialism and its first-cousin Utilitarianism retain their original
features so long as their definitions of moral comportment require some
measure of human preference, predilection and subjective inclination.
Indeed, the earnest attempts noted above to salvage consequentialist theory
reveal, or at least strongly suggest, those theorists to be closet deontologists
seeking a deontology - some neutral, overarching, and a prior definition to
constrain the excesses of defining Morality in terms of good or bad
outcomes.17 3
Even accepting the above conclusion, the abrupt question arises: What
does reason reveal the definition of morality to be? The answer will come
from the celebrated Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant's theory of
human dignity.'7 4 Before that topic, however, this writing needs to explain
one final aspect of general Deontology, the concept of value monism.
(foreigner deportable for being homosexual). See generally, Robert Foss, The Demise of
The Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for Gay and Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 439 (1994). Similarly, although subsequently overruled and replaced
with a morally competent jurisprudence regarding "homosexual" legal issues, barely three
decades ago the Supreme Court held unequivocally that states may criminalize homosexual
sodomy, thereby permitting Government to declare homosexual individuals and their
supporters if not immoral, then misguided believers in the rightfulness of what the Court
deemed depraved, indeed dangerous sexual conduct. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192-92 (1986), o., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
The Court rejected arguments that it should review and assess States' -- in that
instance Georgia's -- determination that homosexual sodomy in fact is immoral conduct.
Bowers accented that sodomy had been a widely accepted criminal offense during colonial
and early post-Revolution years, through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
well into Twentieth Century America. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Condemnation
of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.").
Bowers ruled that states may exercise their authority under the Constitution's Tenth
Amendment to imprison and otherwise sanction homosexual sodomy as a crime. Indeed,
Chief Justice Burger quoted the now shameful text of Blackstone that sodomy is, "'the
infamous crime against nature,' [] an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act
'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be
named.'." Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
173. For instance, the earlier mentioned "indirect consequentialism" would determine
"which rules and rights are the ones whose establishment would have the best consequences
in the long run, impartially considered." Hooker, supra note 169, at 203 (emphasis added).
The highlighted term "impartially considered" arguably imports a controlling overlay of
Deontology in that impartial connotes judgment based not on personal preferences or
prejudices, but rather on unbiased factors. In the realm of morality, the only possible
unbiased factor is reason; therefore, Professor Hooker's estimation of indirect
consequentialism either is Deontology or falsely labels determining "best consequences in
the long run" as an impartial endeavor.
174. See infra, Section 3.
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H. Value Monism --
Any particular deontological system comprises a synchronization of
discrete maxims, beliefs, principles, and edicts.1 7 5 Of course, these maxims
and edicts must harmonize; if they conflict the deontology becomes
incoherent because, due to conflict, there might be no single, correct moral
resolution of the problem under review. 7 6 As Professor Kuklin noted,
"Qualified moral maxims.. . must satisfy the coherence requirement. That
is, the set of adopted moral maxims must be consistent with one another,
so that a person is able to satisfy them all simultaneously." 77 Certainly, it
is uncontroversial that the proper moral resolution may change depending
on the discrete facts of the given moral dilemma. Indeed, a single fact can
make the difference between moral and immoral comportment."' The easy
exemplar comes from criminal law: killing a person to foster an ongoing
robbery is homicide; killing a person to prevent her from immediately and
wrongfully killing you is self-defense.
"That the moral resolution of a particular dilemma depends on unique
facts accords with, rather than negates, the reality that for every moral
inquiry there is a correct answer, which must be based on eternal principles
of right and wrong." 7 9 But, as just indicated, discerning the "correct
answer" requires that all discrete moral maxims exist in harmony.'s
Accordingly, there must be a single fount from which all moral norms
emerge and to which they all adhere. The "one overarching, unifying
concept that serves as the pivot for resolving any moral quandary"'i is
what Professor Wood denoted as "value monism," one basic principle --
the meta-concept -- morality's "Big Bang," if you will -- producing all
more specific moral norms and precepts:
175. Kuklin, supra note 39, at 501-02.
176. Id. There may be many moral ways to accomplish a moral goal. For example, there
are many ethical ways to become wealthy if wealth is the goal. However, regarding any
given moral dilemma, there is one and only one correct resolution. If moral precepts
conflicted, it would be possible that a moral dilemma might have no clear moral answer.
177. Id.; see also, Wood, supra note 33, at 165.
178. Id. at 67-68, 162-65 (Kant discussing morality offered some provocative examples:
"[w]ide or imperfect duties [that] succumb to strict or perfect duties; for example, the wide
duty to aid a stranger is overridden by the duty not to let my parents starve ... and you must
testify truthfully in court even if a lie would help your benefactor (and thus fulfill a wide
duty of gratitude). "); see also, Kuklin, supra note 39, at 501-02.
179. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 304.
180. Kuklin, supra note 39, at 501-02.
181. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 304.
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An ultimate plurality of values leaves us not only with
incommensurable values but also with a plurality of values between
which there is in principle no way of establishing any priorities ...
Value monism is necessary to provide even a context for making
comparisons between different values, however the comparisons may
come out.1 82
Accordingly, expressing the belief of many, Professor Dorf simply is
wrong by asserting that "The most general level of a principle is essentially
empty."" Rather, "The most general level of a principle," when properly
182. Wood, supra note 33, at 59, 67-68 (discussing how Kant and Mill agreed that moral
theory requires value monism, explaining that, "a moral rule or principle may very well be
conditional in other ways without affecting its categorical status. The supreme principle of
morality admits of no conditions or exceptions, of course, because there is nothing higher
by reference to which conditions or exceptions could be justified.").
183. Dorf, supra note 46, at 140; Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 537, 547 (1982) ("arguing that the principle of treating like kinds similarly offers no
guidance absent moral conception of what characteristics are alike").
Dorf is hardly the only critic of value monism. There is a large but, I think, mistaken
thread of commentary embracing "value pluralism," the idea that there is no single moral
value. Professor Gregory Alexander, for instance, argues, "A main, perhaps the main,
objection to value monism is that it is implausibly reductive. Monists attempt to reduce all
moral goods to some single irreducible evaluative standpoint, such as pleasure or desire.
This attempt simply does not square with our everyday experiences. As Elizabeth Anderson
states, 'Our evaluative experiences, and the judgments based on them, are deeply
pluralistic."' Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORD. L. REv. 1017, 1035
(2011) (quoting ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNoMics 1 (1993)).
Alexander's and Anderson's critique fails along the same lines as does Holmes'
earlier references to purported logic and experience to disprove the existence of Natural
Law. See, supra Section 2-d. Of course, we all weigh any number of competing, often
incompatible, ideas and interests when making decisions of all kinds. But, even if
imperfectly due to time constraints, lack of complete information and limited intellects, we
make decisions -- we choose courses of action. To make these decisions we must find some
unifying concept or theme from which to determine what particular choice is most pleasing
or, if a moral dilemma, which choice is mandated, even if we are not completely happy with
that ultimate decision.
For instance, suppose we have $10 which is enough to do one, but not both, of two
perfectly moral things we really would like to do at this moment: have a full hamburger
lunch or go to the movies. While both projects involve pleasure - we enjoy hamburgers
and fries, and, we like movies -- the sensibilities of those pleasures are different; and, sadly,
we cannot satisfy both sets of sensibilities given our limited financial resources. Presuming
it would be senseless to choose a third, even less attractive alternative to avoid the
aggravation of compromising by choosing only one of our top two possibilities, we must
find some unifying idea that will let us decide whether, right now, we would rather have the
hamburger lunch or see the movie. We use value monism to house and, more importantly,
prioritize our competing values until we find the overarching desire that induces us to
choose one option over the other.
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expressed, is meaningful and essential to understand all sub-principles
which spring from that unifying, "general level ... principle." In that
regard, this writing now turns to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as the
source for determining morality's "general level ... principle[s]."
III. KANTIAN MORALITY --
a. Kant's Importance --
If indeed Deontology is the only proper philosophy of morality and if,
as we will see,' the Founders and the Reconstruction Congress rightly
instructed their successors to enforce the Constitution by applying the best
available moral precepts even if they are discovered subsequent to and
confound the Founders' beliefs. The question then becomes, among
competing theories, what is that best available deontological approach.
That question, as we also will learn, is not simply essential to the
philosophy of morals but as well to the jurisprudence of constitutional
morality. 85
In that specific regard, I have urged that, "Few philosophers have
provoked the imagination and engendered the respect of modern legal
theorists as has Immanuel Kant. Perhaps more than any other post-
Hellenistic thinker before him, Kant provided a workable articulation of
the abstract moral base below which human behavior and the laws
regulating human behavior cannot go."i" Kant remains a primary source
for commentators seeking a theory of morality that precedes the advent of
Humanity and transcends human imagination, meaning its premises can be
envisioned and understood, but not altered by human intellect. While many
have used Kant's precepts to espouse fascinating, perhaps useful variants
of deontological morality,18 7 for me at least, Kant's basic and remarkably
184. See, Bayer supra note 23, Part II, Sections 2 and 3.d
185. See, id. at Sections 2 (the deontological philosophy of the Framers) and 4 (the
deontological philosophy of the Reconstruction Congress).
186. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 346 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
187. Among the most important is John Rawls whose work, particularly A Theory of
Justice, attempted a workable Kantian approach. One discerns the Kantian influence, as
well, in the works of Ronald Dworkin. For instance, in his pivotal Freedom's Law wherein
he expressed his theory of moral originalism, supra note 12 and accompanying text,
Dworkin urged that the Constitution "commit[s] the United States" to abide by several
moral precepts including, "treat[ing] all those subject to subject to its domain as having
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profound principles remain the best building blocks to premise theories of
moral comportment under law.
Certainly, the importance of abstract moral philosophy, particularly
Kant, to the very concept of Enlightenment-inluenced law is obvious yet
should be continually re-emphasized,"8 particularly in light of the alarming
trend of American anti-intellectualism, even within the Academy.18 9 As a
distressing example of modem legal anti-intellectualism, recently the
present Chief Justice of the United States scoffed, "Pick up a copy of any
law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the
influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century
Bulgaria, or something, which I'm sure was of great interest to the
academic that wrote it, but isn't of much help to the bar." 190
Over a century earlier, in apt and stirring contrast to Chief Justice
Robert's tired, uninspired, and crabbed perspective, theorist and jurist
Oliver Wendell Holmes explained with his characteristic verve Law's debt
equal moral and political status; it must attempt in good faith, to treat them all with concern;
and it must respect whatever individual freedoms are indispensable to those ends" Dworkin,
supra note 12, at 7-8 (evoking a mild Kantian sense of respecting human dignity by treating
persons as "ends," not merely as "means" to attain one's desires); see infra notes 516-38
and accompanying text.
188. A November 5, 2017, Westlaw search of "Kant" within "Law Reviews & Journals"
revealed 8,873 articles. Admittedly, this search presents a very rough estimate in that, given
his prominence, authors may be apt to drop at least one or a few "obligatory," cursory
Kantian references if, for nothing else, to give articles the panache of abstract philosophy
implying thorough research. Still, a substantial number of these articles offer significant
analysis of Kantian theory, surely underlying Kant's importance to legal theory.
A similar search of "Locke" revealed an even more impressive 9,973 journal articles
referencing philosopher John Locke. Given Locke's pedigree linked directly to the drafting
of America's founding documents, that he received 1,100 more references than Kant is not
surprising. Indeed, it may make the 8,873 Kant "hits" all the more impressive as Kant is
not directly associated with either America's founding or American legal theory, yet,
comparing the two numbers, Kant eamed only 12% fewer journal references than Locke.
189. E.g., Tamara R. Piety, In Praise ofLegal Scholarship, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J.
801, 820 (2017) ("Populism and anti-intellectualism do seem particularly prominent in
American society right now"); Marc J. Randazza, Ulysses: A Mighty Hero in the Fight for
Freedom ofExpression, 11 U. MASS. L. REv. 268, 268 (2016) (An "anti-intellectual spirit [|
runs through modern American jurisprudence").
190. Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-
Century Bulgaria, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 251, 251 note 1 (2015) (quoting Interview with John
G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, at Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Annual
Conference (June 25, 2011), www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-
roberts).
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to philosophy.19 1 Then a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in his historic essay The Path of the Law,' 9 2 a transcription
of his famous January 8, 1897, address celebrating the opening of a new
building at Boston University School of Law, Holmes ended his lecture
with insights enthusiastically romantic yet wholly pragmatic:
As Hegel says, "It is in the end not the appetite, but the opinion, which
has to be satisfied." To an imagination of any scope the most far-
reaching form of power is not money, it is the command of ideas. If
you want great examples ... [r]ead the works of the great German
jurists, and see how much more the world is governed to-day by Kant
than by Bonaparte. We cannot all be Descartes or Kant, but we all want
happiness. And happiness, I am sure from having known many
successful men, cannot be won simply by being counsel for great
corporations and having an income of fifty thousand dollars. An
intellect great enough to win the prize needs other food beside success.
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give
it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great
master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a
hint of the universal law.1 93
In that fascinating and brilliant passage, Holmes insists, inter alia, that
the study of Kant is, if not integral, then exceedingly helpful toward
acquiring deep, meaningful, and, indeed practical understanding of law. In
fact, according to Holmes' words, command of Kant, as part of a broad-
based appreciation of abstract philosophy, "not only [empowers you to]
become a great master in your calling," but enhances personal "happiness"
by enabling "you" to, "connect your subject with the universe and catch an
echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the
universal law." While he certainly did not agree with Kant's belief in
deontological morality,' 94 Holmes knew that absent a genuine facility for
191. True, only a few pages ago this article resoundingly criticized Holmes' essay on
natural law. See, supra notes 83-123 and accompanying text. Such criticism does not
negate the fact of his brilliance in other areas of legal analysis; and, certainly does not
preclude me from extolling Holmes when he was correct.
192. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path ofLaw, 10 HARv. L. REv 457 (1897).
193. Id. at 478 (emphasis added; quoting, Hegel, Phil. des Rechts, § 190).
194. See, supra notes 83-123 and accompanying text.
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abstract philosophy on the part of both individuals and their greater
Society, neither law nor lawyers can flourish.19 5
Holmes was a crusty, cynical legal realist. 9 6  But, despite his
skepticism, Holmes saw Law as discerned not simply by human intellect,
but likewise by human imagination, maybe as well, by the human heart,
thus rendering individuals both aware and appreciative of their connection
to an infinite reality that, Holms dared to imagine, perhaps has spawned a
"universal law." If idealistic, Holmes' concept of law and lawyering is
ennobling and inspiring -- it is the way lawyers (and laypersons) should
appreciate Law because it demands the best we can and ought to be, even
when we strive only to satisfy our selfish goals. Thus, Holmes offers a
vision -- a dream -- of Law that contrasts favorably against Chief Justice
Robert's arid pragmatism.
This writing, while emphasizing Kant, is well aware that, like many
others deep thinkers including the Framers themselves, Kant's
presentations are incomplete and somewhat vague, looking to others to
provide specifics. Professor John Lawrence Hill well expressed that
concern, "Kant's moral theory is deep and yet gossamer; it is subtle and
complex but leaves the details unresolved."197 Even so, what holds true for
American constitutional law applies as well to Kantian morality: the
paramount concern is not detailed applications of abstract principles, but
understanding the essential meaning of those abstract principles. Regading
metatheory,198 Kant's "dignity" precept, and the three "categorical
imperatives" that enforce it, are as complete, elegant, evocative and
accurate an encapsulation of meta-ethics as the human mind has so far
195. Another judge of essentially equal stature, Learned Hand, expressed very similar
sentiments that great lawyers appreciate the Law's integral relation to abstract philosophy.
See IRVING DILLARD, LEARNED HAND, SOURCES OF TOLERANCE, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY,
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1974) (quoted at
length infra at note 1226 and accompanying text.). [IS THIS HAND QUOTE IN PART II?]
196. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., with Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 Law & Hist. Rev. 661,
686 (2012) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (June 14,
1925) wherein Holmes described his dissent to the Court's affirmance of Gitlow's
conviction for speech constituting "criminal anarchy" under New York Penal Law as "an
expiring kick on the [Court's] last [term] day (Brandeis was with me) in favor of the right
to drool on the part of believers in the proletarian dictatorship.
197. Hill, supra note 31, at 227.
198. See supra note 21.
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perceived.19 9 Kant's edicts provide sufficient bases for logical application
to specific problems.20
B. Kant's Noble Vision of Humanity --
As a deontologist, Kant sought to discern absolute moral truth;
accordingly, "Kant's project was to render morality undogmatic - to ground
it in the fact of reason." 201 As we will see, Kant viewed emotions as
inevitably corrupting reasoned analysis; 2 02 and, once discerned through
unemotional reason, individuals and their various groupings have no choice
but to follow moral comportment wherever it may lead.20 3 In that regard,
there seems little left to the imagination. But, the Kantian explication of
morality discerned through reason is not a cold endeavor rendering ethical
precepts unromantic and the human beings who must abide by them stony,
chilly automatons. Kant's deontology is not simply the moral persons'
"users' manual." Rather, it is a bravura declaration of the nobility of
Humankind -- a vision that Humanity, as both discrete individuals and as
part of many and varied collectives, can and perhaps will discard selfish
predilections, even seemingly sensible preferences to avoid pain and to
protect life itself, if that is what moral conduct requires. Kant's belief that
individuals, at least to some degree, can choose doing right over doing
199. As one scholar enthused,
There is perhaps no thinker whose work embodies, and even glorifies, the
most salient themes of this tradition more than that of Immanuel Kant. The
influence of his thought has been deep and far-reaching throughout the West. He
is one of those thinkers about whom it truly can be said that nothing was ever the
same after he wrote. While no one can deny the immense influence of John
Locke, direct and incomparable, upon the Framers of the United States
Constitution, it is arguably Kant's thought that best elucidates and provides the
most gripping justification of the fundamental themes of classical liberalism.
These themes are underscored in his critical philosophy as well as in his later
political writings. As time goes on, his giant shadow lengthens, ...
L. Scott Smith, "Religion-Neutral" Jurisprudence: An Examination of Its Meanings and
End, 13 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 841, 849-50 (2005).
200. That is why modem commentators distinguish between "Kantian eithics" and
"Kant's ethics." The former is the overarching moral framework Kant espoused. The latter
is the panoply of Kant's specific ethical principles steeped as they were in racism, sexism
and similar untoward prejudices and misperceptions. See Bayer II, supra note 17 at 347-
48. See also, infra Section 3-c.
201. Carlson, supra note 124, at 10.
202. See infra notes _ [EMOTIONS] and accompanying text.
203. This rigidity, of course, is not unique to Kant but rather a requisite of Deontology
as the previous discussion debunking Threshold Deontology and quasi-deontological
modifications of Consequentialism show. See supra notes 141-78 and accompanying text.
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good bespeaks an abiding respect in the human capacity to rise above
selfishness.2 0
Thus, although grounded in emotionless logic, Kant's theory of
Humanity has not only depth but true beauty.205 Kant presents human
beings as deeply flawed, yet capable of the magnificence in every-day life
that one would expect from those who alone have been endowed by God21
with the capacity to comprehend and to honor the harsh sacrifice attendant
to the moral life. Even though this sacrifice may require forfeiting the self-
indulgence of the "good life" referring to what "most philosophers equate
[with] happiness." 2 07  For Kant to believe that individuals at all were
capable and agreeable to "good will," 20 8 that is, to follow the barbed path
of moral comportment not for personal gain but because such is the
absolute duty of Humanity, is the highest accolade one can pay for, as
Deontology proves, there is no nobler behavior than to do what is right,
particularly when what is right is not what is good. 20
204. Jack Russell Weinstein, On the Meaning of the Term Progressive: A Philosophical
Investigation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 21 (2006) (noting "For Kant, progress
contributes to the realization of human potential. At the core of his account is a glorification
of the human capacity. Enlightenment for Kant is the point where humankind can finally
do whatever it was that it was intended to do."). Ben A. McJunkin, Rank Among Equals,
113 MICH. L. REv. 855, 867 (2015). ("Kant claimed that dignity exists in the human capacity
to subordinate bestial impulses and to follow self-crafted rules of reason.").
205. Lisamichelle Davis, Epistemological Foundations and Metahermeneutic Methods:
The Search for a Theoretical Justification ofthe Coercive Force ofLegal Interpretation, 68
B.U. L. REV. 733, 743 (1988) ("Kant is one of the greatest philosophical systematizers,
deserving attention for the beauty of his work if not for its truth."). True, Kant's prose
generally is considered "clumsy and irritating." Id. at 743 n. 35 (quoting, W. WALSH,
KANTS CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS vii (1975)). Nonetheless, I agree that "Kant's
work is beautiful in substance if not in form." Id.
206. For Kant, "God, freedom, and immortality become 'regulative ideas' -- postulates
that help us to make sense of our mortal experience, though we cannot prove they exist."
Hill, supra note 31, at 226.
207. Jerome J. Shestack, Pursuit of the Good Life in Professionalism, 28 STETSON L. REV.
271, 271 (1998). Not surprisingly, there are competing visions of "the good life." See
Daniel M. Haybron, Well-Being and Virtue, 2 J. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 1, 6-7 (2007) ("While
we do sometimes use 'the good life' to denote well-being, the most natural understanding
of the expression concerns a life that is desirable or choiceworthy, not just for the
individual's benefit, but, all things considered: good. ... The good life, on such a view,
involves both well-being and, distinctly, virtue."); see generally Robin L. West, Liberalism
Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition ofthe Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 673 (1985)
(discussing various theories of "the good life").
208. Hill, supra note 31, at 227 (discussing, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2012)).
209. In that regard, judges noted over a century ago the importance of Kant's metatheory,
especially as it relates to law,
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Kant's skepticism about persons' capacities to discern moral truth and
their willingness to suffer the pain of moral fidelity is well known. Kant
did lament, "[F]rom such crooked wood as man is made of, nothing
perfectly straight can be built," 2 10 a sentiment he likely meant.211 Yet,
Kant's theory is premised on a gift from a higher power, specifically, the
dignity innate within every human being. We can accept that such dignity,
exercised in its fullest capacity, renders each of us sufficiently capable of
both discerning abstract moral precepts and applying them correctly to
guide our interactions with other persons. Faithful to such rational
capacity, Kant boldly and audaciously explained not only why morality is
greater than any person or even Humanity itself, but further, why each
person and Humanity itself must be willing to sacrifice all to remain
faithful to the paramount duty of moral comportment.
Kant was neither hyperbolic nor impaired when he expressed his
ultimate conclusion, "Let justice be done even if the world should
perish."212 Moreover, because Kant's ethical theory encompasses not only
Not less wondrous than the revelations of the starry heavens, and much more
important, and to no class of men more so than lawyers, is the moral law which
Kant found within himself, and which is likewise found within, and is consciously
recognized by, every man. This moral law holds its dominion by divine ordination
over us all, from which escape or evasion is impossible. This moral law is the
eternal and indestructible sense of justice and of right written by God on the living
tablets of the human heart ...
Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S.E. 274, 277 (W.Va. 1899) (quoting JUDGE JOHN
F. DILLON, COMMENTARY ON THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA
BEING A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE YALE UNIVERSITY (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1894)); see also J.W. Simonton, On the Origin and Nature of Law, 11 YALE L.J.
195, 207 (1902) (quoting Dillon).
210. IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF
VIEW (John Scott & John Taylor ed., 1824) (1784).
211. Interestingly, perhaps as a concession to the inevitability of human frailty, Kant
posited that some immoral acts are so innately linked to self-preservation that while they
may be criminalized, punishments should be mild if not utterly proscribed. Raef
Zreik, Notes on the Value of Theory: Readings in the Law of Return-A Polemic, 2 LAW &
ETHIcS HUMAN RIGHTS, 2008, at 1, 27 (noting "Kant recognizes that there are cases of
necessity when the life of one person is endangered, and in order to save his own life he
might sacrifice the life of another. Kant believes that there is no point in imposing
punishment in such a case, not because what the perpetrator did was justified, but simply
because no penalty could deter someone whose life is in real danger from sacrificing
someone else's life. In this sense the act is excused but not justified, and the act is treated as
if it were right although it was not. What Kant is suggesting is that in such cases of necessity,
an existential threat, we face a situation in which there is a suspension of norms, and we
momentarily suspend our attempt to morally judge these actions.").
212. KANT, supra note 55, at 102 n.16. As a deontologist, Kant's unremitting views
makes perfect sense, as do many of his specific precepts that scholars find unreasonable and
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individual behavior but that of human groupings, particularly governments,
Kant's advocacy of Morality's supremacy above all other considerations
expresses a duty of nations, not merely individuals.2 13 Accordingly, Kant's
assertion "if justice goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on
excessive. To cite a few prime examples, Kant famously argued that persons must never
break even trivial promises although doing so might save lives, and, similarly, that lying is
never moral no matter what the circumstances even if lying would save innocent lives or
prevent the innocent from suffering unearned pain. Jeremy Waldron, Kant's Legal
Positivism, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1996); Kuklin, supra note 39, at 499-500. While
extreme, we know that Deontology permits no compromise; therefore, Kant's admonitions
are apt even though, under tragic circumstances, the outcomes may be terrible. Of course,
if all persons became enlightened enough to follow Kant's philosophy, no one would lie, no
one would break a promise and we would be comfortable with such a social fabric because
no one would commit evil acts that would induce us to consider lying or breaking promises.
Moreover, Kant logically explicated that the duty not to lie does not necessarily
entail a corresponding duty to tell the truth. Under certain circumstances, one may accept
the consequences of outright refusing to answer. Thus, in response to the familiar rejoinder
to Kant, if the Gestapo asks you where the Jewish family is hiding and you know the answer,
as a moral matter you cannot lie, but neither need you reveal the truth because you know as
a virtual certainty that the Gestapo will use the information for immoral purposes. Rather,
you may refuse to answer which, almost certainly will cause you great harm likely including
arrest, torture and execution. But, defiant silence under such circumstances is a rightful
alternative to the truth, as commentators have emphasized:
Using a hypothetical situation in which a murderer comes to the door and asks for
one's friend, Kant argues that, while it is acceptable for one to respond with silence,
one must not lie to the person planning to commit the murder. Kant rejects the idea
that one is justified in lying for any good cause including saving the life of another,
because in telling the truth one cannot be held responsible for negative
consequences.
J. Kevin Quinn, Nancy K. Kubasek, and, M. Neil Browne, Resisting the Individualistic
Flavor ofOpposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 GEORGETOWN J. LEG. ETHICs 901, 935-36 (1995)
(discussing, Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in
IMMANUEL KANT: CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHy (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1949); other citations omitted); see also Oren
Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience,
88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1513 n. 120 (2004).
213. Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM., L. REv.
53, 64 (1992) ("[T]he constitution of the state, an artificial creation to serve human needs,
must embody and incorporate [human morality]"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2610 (1997) ("Kant predicated his
understanding of international law not on Benthamite utilitarian concerns, but on a vision
of international law as a purposive system dedicated toward securing peace, and built on
the cornerstones of justice, democracy, and a liberalism focused on the centrality of human
rights"); AMANDA PERREAU-SAUSSINE, IMMANUEL KANT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
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the earth" 2 14 is particularly poignant because, as we will learn, "justice"
arises from society, not from individuals. Therefore, I join those who
reject, or at least moderate, the image of, "the stiff, inhuman, moralistic
Prussian ogre everyone knows by the name Immanuel Kant." 2 15 Instead,
one must deeply admire the Kant who perceived each member of
Humankind, and the societies they form, as capable enough to discern
moral truth and noble enough to die for the greatest conceivable cause, the
vindication of that truth. That each of us has perhaps hidden in our souls
the substance of divinities, and that each of us has the capacity, perhaps
equally hidden, to act accordingly, is, I think, as gratifying a compliment
as one can pay and one can receive.
C. Not Kant's Morality but Kantian Morality
Granted, however exquisite Kant's moral theory is, many of his
particular views of Humankind are repellant. In particular, "Kant
considered non-Caucasians intellectually limited, which he attributed in
large measure to those races having developed in unsuitable climates and
environments. In later writings, Kant appeared to have modified, but not
fully repudiated, his racial theories which may have had a substantial
influence on racist models of the 18th and 19th Centuries."2 16 Sadly, and
not surprisingly, Kant espoused as well the intellectual and physical
superiority of men over women. 2 17 That is why modern scholars -- perhaps
appropriately denoted as neo-KantianS218 -- embrace "Kantian ethics",-but
not "Kant's ethics."
214. Waldron, supra 217, at 1540 (quoting, Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical First
Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in The Metaphysics of Morals 33, s 49(E)(1), at 141
[Ak. 312] (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797)).
215. WOOD, supra note 33 at xii; see also Hill, supra note 31 at 225 ("[Kant] is reputed
to have been a man of lively wit, debonair charm, and preternatural regularity. A common
story relates that he was so consistent in his daily habits that his neighbors could set their
clocks by his four o'clock stroll through town").
216. WOOD, supra note 33 at 7; see also, e.g., Reginald Leanon Robinson, Teaching from
the Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-Text a Critical Essay, 19 WEST. NEW ENG. L. REV.
151, 154 n.13 (1997) ("Kant, citing with approval David Hume's likening of learning by
'negroes' to that of parrots, insisted upon the natural stupidity of blacks").
217. WOOD, supra note 33 at 8-10; see also, e.g., ROBIN MAY SCHoTT, COGNITION AND
EROS (1988).
218. Neo-Kantianism, "celebrates the concept of autonomy, or moral self-rule via the
individual's rational generation and acceptance of binding normative principles." Janet
Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler's Move Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 1025, 1032 (2013) (citing, ANDREWS REATH,
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Kant's ethics are his specific moral applications and discrete moral
conclusions. "Kantian ethics, on the other hand, is an ethical theory
formulated in the basic spirit of Kant . . . ." A proponent of Kantian
ethics enthusiastically adapts Kant's broad principles to form what she
believes is either a more accurate, pertinent meta-theory or a better
application of such to precise circumstances.219
Such an approach, of course, is perfectly acceptable220 and, indeed,
reminiscent of the common practice among courts and commentators to
respect the broad principles the Framers preserved in the Constitution while
rejected specific applications the Framers themselves embraced that
modem sensibilities rightly perceive as bigoted or otherwise
indefensible.2 2 '
C. The Kantian Moral Metatheory --
I have explicated Kant's theories elsewhere, 22 2 and, for the purposes
of this article, only a reiteration is necessary to provide the applicable,
workable structure.
1. The Rational Capacity of Each Person to Discern a "Metaphysics of
Morals" --
As indicated above, the first step in Kant's analysis is his conception
of human beings. Kant's crucial idea is that each of us has been given an
"autonomy of the will" -- the ability to understand ideas and thus to make
AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 137-38 (2006)).
David Thunder, Can a Good Person Be a Lawyer?, 20 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS &
PUB. POL. 313, 318 (2006) (footnote omitted) (offering that neo-Kantianism is, "the tradition
of moral thinking whose broad themes, ideas, and vision of morality have a close affinity
with the broad themes, ideas, and moral vision of Immanuel Kant, and whose existence
would be difficult to imagine without Kant's intellectual legacy.").
219. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 347 (discussing and quoting, WOOD, supra note 33, at 1).
220. Wright, supra note 81 at 274 ("[one can] make no claim to have arrived at the
understanding that Kant intended . . . . [a justifiable] goal is to construct a useful
understanding of Kant's formula .. . rather than one that would have met with Kant's
approval").
221. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV.
402, 407 (1976).
222. See generally Bayer 11, supra note 17, at 293-370 (discussing Kant's theory of
dignity, which explains why obeying morality is more important than life itself); see also,
Bayer I, supra note 13, at 896-909.
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thoughtful choices -- because we are endowed with "practical freedom,"
meaning,
a capacity to follow determinate laws given by the faculty of reason. .
. the capacity to recognize rational nature as an end in itself as a reason
for acting in certain ways, and to act in those ways on the basis of that
reason ... the capacity to act for reasons, rather than only on the basis
of feelings, impulses, or desires that might occur independently of
reasons.2 23
The practical freedom secured from the autonomy of the will
engenders individuals' capacity to discover the "metaphysics of morals." 224
Kant's metaphysics are predicated on his belief that due to Humankind's
singular capacity to discover the metaphysics of morals, "the innate worth
of all persons is equal, and such worth is immeasurable." 225 Importantly,
that worth is not attendant to any particular acts -- good or otherwise --
performed by any particular person. Rather, each person's inestimable
worth arises from the innate dignity bestowed by a generous deity upon
each of us as human beings. 226 Dignity is manifested by that which, asjust
accented, distinguishes Humanity from the most intelligent of other species
based on individuals' "rational capacities to surpass their sensibilities -- to
escape the grip of their desires and preferences and employ reason to
discern and to apply a priori moral precepts."227
Their inestimable worth is further manifest by, "the ability of humans
to appreciate the implications or 'universality' of their actions."228
general, each of us are capable of detaching ourselves, at least to a
sufficient degree, from our desires, preferences and prejudices, to
223. WOOD, supra note 33 at 127.
224. Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 575-
76 (1987).
225. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 294 (citing WOOD, supra note 33 at 3).
226. From a neo-Kantian perspective, one can embrace the innate dignity of Humanity
not necessarily as a gift from a "supreme being," but rather, inherent in the natural order of
existence as likewise are natural rights and natural law emanating from the deontological
understanding of morality. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 340. See supra Part. 2 discussing
Deontology and Bayer, supra note 23 Part II, Sections 2-3 discussing the natural law -
perspective of the Declaration of Independence.
227. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 348-50 (citing Wright, supra note 81, at 274-75).
228. John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 Wis. L.
REV. 655, 678 (2008); see also Ernest J, Weinrib, Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory:
Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 479 (1987) (citing IMMANUEL
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Cambridge University Press, Ist ed., 1998).
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understand the transcendent, extra-human principles of morality as they
apply to Humanity. Based on their rational capacities, human beings can
develop several reasonably reliable senses or perceptions such as (1) a
sense of self (that is, comprehension of their own individual identity
including who they think they are and what they think they want to make
them happy); and (2) a sense of the individual selves -- identities -- of
others. 2 2 9  These perceptions, in turn, allow individuals to be
"purposive,"230 since individuals can accurately perceive their own desires,
and then "through thoughtful deliberation, determine whether to pursue
those desires; and, if they choose to do so, select among possible courses
of [probable] attainment." 2 3 1 Kant summarized the foregoing under the
heading practical reason, as earlier quoted, "the capacity to follow
determinate laws given by the faculty of reason ... the capacity to act for
reasons, rather than only on the basis of feelings, impulses, or desires that
might occur independently of reasons. "232 Through the capacity for
practical reason/practical freedom, human beings can apprehend
deontological truths and are not simply fated to indulge consequentialist
solutions of moral problems. 23 3
Practical reason fosters "practical judgment" which is, "the capacity
to descend correctly from a universal principle to particular instances that
conform to it"234 -- to use the abstract to understand and to solve real life
matters. Accordingly, human beings' innate dignity allows the full panoply
of moral discernment: the capacity to use neutral, unbiased reason to
229. Additionally, individuals can strive to understand how they are perceived by others.
See generally, G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY 162 (C. Morris ed. 1937).
230. Benson, supra note 229 at 569.
231. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 898 (citing, WOOD, supra note 33, at 67).
232. WOOD, supra note 33, at 125 (referring to the concept as "practical freedom."); see
also Weinrib, supra note 233 (referring to the concept as "practical reason").
233. Weinrib, supra note 233, at 484; Hill supra, note 215 689 ("[P]ractical reason, not
conscience, is the fundamental source of moral knowledge. When confronted with doubts
about our initial moral assumptions, we can make our best moral judgments only by thinking
critically, using our rational capacities in consultation with others and with due regard for
the many potentially relevant facts (including facts about the feelings, welfare, and
relationships of the people who may be affected"))
234. WOOD, supra note 33, at 152; see also Wright, supra note 81, at 278 (discussing
Kant's recognition that the duty owed to others cannot be determined by a universal rule);
e.g. Thomas Hill, supra note 215, at 689 ("Principles of practical reason remain the basic
standard but individuals must use judgment to determine how these apply to particular
contexts").
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discover all levels of abstract moral principles plus the competence to apply
those theoretical precepts correctly to resolve particular moral dilemmas.2 35
Individuals make use of their reasoning capacities because individuals
are "purposive," they adopt personal goals and select means to attain those
goal by exercising practical reason and practical judgment. Human
purposiveness, animated by the "autonomy of the will," allows individuals
to enjoy what Professor Arthur Ripstein identified as Kant's "innate right
of humanity," meaning, the "right to be free, where freedom is understood
in terms of independence from another person's choice. The power to set
and pursue your own conception of the good is Kant's right to
independence: you, rather than any other person, are the one who
determines which purposes you will pursue."236
That same "autonomy of the will" enabling human beings to be
purposive yet appreciate morality, means that they likewise can grasp.and
obey what Kant called the "universal principle ofjustice," which sanctions,
"individuals' freedom to form and pursue their own life plans subject only
to the constraint that others be allowed a similar freedom." 237 Thus, the
"universal principle ofjustice" constrains exercise of the "innate right of
humanity" by requiring every individual to respect every other individuals'
right to exercise the "innate right of humanity." This became core to
Kant's specific moral precepts, various formulations of the Categorical
Imperative.
Of course, the capacity for moral comportment does not assure the
actuality of moral comportment for two reasons. First, and obviously,
people knowingly may choose to act immorally, thereby deliberately
violating their duty to discern and to abide by moral precepts. Second, and
equally obvious, people may either negligently or otherwise inadvertently
act immorally. Despite their best and honest efforts, people may either
misperceive abstract ethical requisites, or mistakenly determine how
properly discerned moral precepts apply in a given scenario, or both. As
235. Bayer It, supra note 17, at 348-50 n. 335 ("Through 'practical judgment' individuals
can both derive [all levels of] moral precepts ... and discern how to apply such precepts to
discrete scenarios").
236. Arthur Ripstein, Symposium: Contemporary Political Theory and Private Law:
Essay: Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1399
(2006).
237. Thomas Hill, supra note 215, at 680; see also ARTHUR RIPSTE[N, FORCE AND
FREEDOM 288 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (indicating individuals are free to prioritize their
personal interests over the interests of others); see also Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and
Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582 (1987).
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Professor Ernest Weinrib summarized, "[T]he inability of the concept of
right to predetermine hard cases is merely the unavoidable concomitant of
... being an idea of reason." 238
2. The Effect of Emotions --
Professor Weinrib's statement evokes one of Kant's most contentious
suppositions of human beings' intellectual capacity: human emotions
distort, distract and otherwise impede the ability to reason impartially. 239
As I noted in an earlier piece,
[Kant believed that] emotions threaten disorder because they stimulate
personal inclinations, enticing individuals to satisfy their purely
internal, selfish desires regardless of whether doing so promotes or
confounds their moral duties to others. Worse yet, emotions can make
us delusional, mistakenly believing that our choices were grounded in
rational morality rather than sentiment.240
The debate over the purportedly corrupting influence of emotions
arguably is academic because physical sciences and modem philosophy
have demonstrated that it is impossible for human beings to derive the
meaning, or the significance, of any idea or event absent emotions. 24' For
example, assuming that a business owner may unemotionally apply proper
accounting methodology to prepare her financial accountings, what those
accountings actually mean to her arises from the interaction of emotions
and reason. 24 2  Roughly two decades ago, I explicated the process of
238. Weinrib, supra note 233, at 507.
239. Carlson, supra note 124, at 38-39 ("Kant concedes that neither the actor nor an
observer can be sure if the action proceeds out of [rational, unbiased] duty alone") (quoting
George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 533, 538
(1987)).
240. Bayer It, supra note 17, at 307 (citing Carlson, supra note 124 at 35-39); see also,
JESSIE J. PR1Nz, Ti-E EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 20 (Oxford Press 2007)
(discussing Hila Karen, Guilt-Free Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, and
Emotions, 2016 BYU L. REv. 427, 460, n.134 (2016)).
241. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 307-09.
242. Suppose, for instance, through proper accounting methods, a merchant, Smith,
concludes that she made a profit for the month of $10,000. If reason alone can confirm if
Smith's calculations are correct, reason alone cannot reveal the meaning -- the significance
-- of that profit, that is, whether the profit makes Smith happy, sad, both, and, to what extent.
Possibly, Smith might at once feel happy and depressed. She uses reason to discern why
she feels two seemingly contradictory emotions and then tests the cogency of her reasoning
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emotions melding with reason as a necessary tool for individuals to discern
meaning. 24 3 1 concluded that in this respect, the theories of philosopher
David Hume, who concluded that reason essentially is meaningless absent
emotions, is correct, while admitting some truth to Kant's theory that
emotions inevitably distort the reasoning process. 2" With regard to
discerning moral truth, for example, Hume concluded:
The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and
actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blamable; that which
stamps on them the mark of honor or infamy, approbation or censure;
that which renders morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue
our happiness, and vice our misery: "It is probable, I say, that this final
sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has
made universal in the whole species."24 5
by whether she feels positive emotions, indicating her reasoning is correct, or negative
emotions, cautioning that her reasoning is infirm.
Perhaps Smith reasons that she feels happy because, thanks to her business income,
she was able to pay all her business and personal necessity expenses while earning a profit
allowing her the pleasure discretionary spending. Still, she feels depressed -- anger directed
at herself -- because she made a few business mistakes which prevented her from earning
an even higher profit that month. Smith now feels happy which she reasons to mean that
she drew the right conclusions about why she feels at once both pleased and sad about her
$10,000 profit. Absent the interplay of reason and emotions, Smith could not have ascribed
meaning to that profit.
243. Peter B. Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding - The "Russian Dressing" Theory of
Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with
Suggested Related Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L.
REV. 1033, 1034 (2001).
244. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 308 (discussing DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, BOOK It 155-56 (Pall S. Ardal, ed., Fontana/Collins 1972)); see also MART1-A C.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: TIE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 68 (Cambridge
Free Press 1995) ("Intellect without emotion is, we might say, value-blind").
There is a plausible strain of interpretation averring that, "In some writings, Kant
more explicitly argues that emotions and inclinations are formative of - not simply hostile
to -- autonomy and reasoning capacity, but that such emotions and inclinations must be
mastered by reason." Joseph J. Fischel & Hilary R. O'Connell, Disabling Consent, or
Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & LAW 428, 453 (2016) (citing,
LARA DENIS, Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent, in SEX & ETHICS 42-46 (Raja Halwani
ed., 2007). This explication makes perfect sense given Kant's understanding of human
nature coupled with our earlier realization that while they must be unmoored from moral
judgments, personal preference and predilection are the essential starting points of moral
inquiry. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
245. DAVID HUiMfE, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 5 (Tom L.
Beauchamp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1777) (placing emotions on a higher plane than
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Furthermore, regarding whether we can ever fully rid ourselves of
personal biases and prejudices,2 46 even assuming that emotions to some
extent unavoidably warp unadulterated reason, people are capable of
recognizing their emotional responses and, can compensate by discerning
with reasonable precision if, and to what extent, emotions are interfering
with and distorting our conclusions. As for escaping our predispositions,
if we cannot perfectly elude our emotions, at least, with effort and self-
awareness, we can do so well enough. Therefore, "human imperfection
cannot be the justification for knowingly rebuffing the quest for morality,
thus indulging every form of depravity. Our duty is to try to understand
morality and to act from that understanding."247
3. The Inestimable Worth of Human Beings as "Ends in Themselves" --
We now begin to understand why Kant is so comfortable with the
proposition that people must walk the moral path, even if it takes them and
their society into the abyss. Since each individual is endowed with innate
dignity, thus the capacity for moral comportment, "the worth of every
human being is absolute, the worth of all persons is fundamentally equal"248
regardless whether such persons actually abide by the moral principles that
they are obligated to know and to practice.24 9 As to what exactly the
"absolute" worth shared by all persons is, "Kant posited logically but
notoriously that the value of humankind's innate dignity is priceless,
indeed greater than life itself because '[t]he value of the [person qua
person] . . . must have existed already prior to [one's] rational choice."'250
Of course, it could not be otherwise because the duty to obey moral edicts
invoking the reason of slave to emotions); Bayer supra note 248 at 1057-58 (disagreeing
arguing that both are of equal urgency, combining to form meaning).
246. See Bayer II, supra note 17 at 306.
247. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 898 n.136. See also, supra Section 2-d (discussing the
"consequentialist error").
248. WOOD, supra note33, at 3.
249. Wright, supra note 81, at 275; LESLIE A. MULHOLLAND, KANT'S SYSTEM OF RIGHTS
314 (Columbia Univ. Press 1990); see also WOOD, supra note 33, at 91 ("[E]ach person's
rational capacity "must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself"); see also
Hill, supra note 215, at 689 (arguing that the rational capacity of even those who act
unethically is an end of itself).
250. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 351 (quoting WOOD, supra note 33, at 92); see also Bailey
Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, 51 U. OF SAN FRANCISCO L. REv. 173, 176
(2017) (According to Kantian ethics, "every moral agent has a priceless dignity that
commands equal respect.").
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is absolute and paramount over everything else. 25 1 Thus, if the unique
defining aspect of human beings is their capacity to be moral, then the
worth of each person whose singular facility is the capacity for moral
comportment must be as great as is the duty of moral bearing itself, which
is priceless.2 52
Of course, the fact that all persons share equal innate worth cannot
and does constrain Society from treating persons differently based on their
respective conduct. Society may reward those who morally accomplish
great things, and, as is the case with crime, punish those who act immorally.
Rather, due to persons' equal, invaluable innate worth, Society and the
individuals therein must treat all persons, including criminals, in a morally
correct fashion. Consequently, the natural corollary to the pricelessness
of each human being is that all persons must respect the innate dignity of
all other persons, and do so by strict moral comportment in out interactions
with others.253
Borrowing from my earlier efforts, we might, then, designate the
following as the value monism 254 of Kantian morality: persons are "ends in
themselves," meaning, they are not and "may not be degenerated into
objects -- may not be treated as one might use and discard equipment,
furniture, tools, or other things that have neither consciousness nor the
capacity to discern morality through reason. To do otherwise would
deprive persons of that which is theirs by birthright -- their very
humanity."2 55 This greatest moral duty of treating all other persons as
"ends," "mandates that every person must respect the dignity of every other.
person at all times and under all circumstances."256
Likewise, and logically, at all times, in all circumstances, every person
may demand to be treated by every other person as an end in oneself --
not due to any good works such individual may perform, but rather due
to one's innate rational capacity. ... [In sum,] innate dignity allows
251. See supra Parts 2-a,-f.
252. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 351-53.
253. WOOD, supra note 33, at 94; Bayer II, supra note 17, at 350-51.
254. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
255. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 899.
256. Id at 899-900 (citing Wright, supra note 81, at 275 and WOOD, supra note 33, at
94).
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individuals to demand moral treatment from others while
simultaneously requiring those individuals to treat others morally.257
Importantly, individuals owe an identical duty to themselves; that is,
one must respect one's own dignity as one must respect the dignity of
others. Kant called this corollary the "duty of rightful honor," which states,
"Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an
end for them."2 58 For example, suicide is immoral because the self is
treating the self not as an "end," but as a disposable object with no inherent
worth.2 59 Similarly, while surely one may contract one's labor even for a
relatively small fee, one may not voluntarily enslave oneself to others. One
must be one's "own master,"260 that is, "Kant [] understood that freedom
does not only consist in making one choice, but it also consists in being
able to at least try to undo that choice."26 ' As a logical explication of the
257. Id. at 900 (citing Thomas Hill, supra note 215, at 204 and Bayer II, supra note 17,
at 350-51).
258. Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System ofRights, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 795, 811 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib 11] (quoting KANT, supra note 57, at 392).
259. Bharat Malkani, Dignity and the Death Penalty in The United States Supreme Court,
44 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 145, (2017) (citing KANT, supra note 57); see also Kristin
Loveland, Death and Its Dignities, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279, n.67 (2016) (citing Jyl Gentzler,
What Is a Death with Dignity?, 28 J. MED. & PHIL. 461, 462 (2003)); see also Thomas Hill,
supra note 215, at 51, 203.
260. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 812 (citing KANT, supra note 57, at 394).
261. Bradford W. Short, More History "Lite" in Modern American Bioethics, 21 IssuEs
IN LAW & MED. 3, 10 (2005) (emphasis in original). Short debunks the somewhat
widespread misconception that in his lectures Kant approved of Roman Senator Cato the
Younger's decision to kill himself rather than be captured by Julius Caesar against whom
Cato had helped lead a civil war in the hopes of restoring the Roman Republic. Having
successfully evacuated his troops from Utica but unable to escape himself, Cato reasoned
that he would be unable to withstand the tortures that Caesar likely would impose and, thus,
would betray his cause thereby lessening the possibility that the civil war might yet succeed
in whole or part. Although some commentators have read Kant to declare Cato's suicide
moral because Cato rationally believed he could no longer be Cato, Short's more complete
review of Kant's statements show that he deemed Cato's act noble, but nonetheless an
immoral betrayal of his duty of rightful honor. Id. at 5-9.
In his analysis, Short artfully linked the moral infirmity of suicide and voluntary
slavery.
[A]ny mature understanding of liberty, says Kant, demands that suicide never
be allowed. Suicide is a choice to end all choice; it is a liberty to destroy liberty.
Viewed under this light, suicide looks much like the act of one who voluntarily
sells himself into slavery. Kant is pointing out that these acts actually result in the
perpetual negation of liberty, and therefore cannot be justified by an appeal to the
right to liberty. When these acts occur liberty exists for only one instant. It exists
only in the instant when one sells oneself into bondage or when one destroys
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"duty of rightful honor," some commentators argue controversially that
Kant did not discount the morality of noble sacrifice such as in contexts
such as war or scientific research, endangering, perhaps even forfeiting
one's life to save others. In such cases, the martyr is treating herself as an
"end" and not simply objectifying herself as an inanimate instrument with
no innate dignity.262
4. The Categorical Imperative Formulations One and Two -- The Moral
Duty ofIndividuals and Private Groups --
The premise that due to their rational capacities to discern morality,
yet regardless of their actual conduct, the inherent worth of individuals is
invaluable, leads to the next aspect of Kant's moral theory: principles to
enable practical reason, that is, instruct how to treat both others and
ourselves in a moral fashion as we interact in a world of others to pursue
our personal happiness. To assure moral comportment, Kant posited three
"categorical imperatives" ("CI"), the first two constrain individual human
behavior as well as the behavior of groups large and small. The less widely
discussed third CI explains why creating societies administered by formal
governmental structures predicated on moral norms is not simply useful,
convenient or efficient, but, more importantly, an un-waivable moral
necessity. "In Kant's view, all other laws of morality derive from the
categorical imperative."263
The first Categorical Imperative ("Cli") holds: "Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become
a universal law.",26 As explained by Professor Wood, C 11 inquires,
"whether you could will it to be permissible (under the moral law) for
oneself. It is permanently negated thereafter because, first, the person who made
the sale then becomes a slave who by definition has no liberty, and second, because
the suicide, after committing the lethal deed, then has jumped into oblivion forever
and also by definition has no liberty.
Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
262. Wright, supra note 81, at 313 n.203.
263. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 777. Thus, the Cls comprise Kant's "supreme principle of
morality," discerned through "pure practical reason," expressed as "a universal law that all
rational beings can make and act upon for themselves as free, self-determining agents whose
actions are morally good." See also Tes6n, supra note 218 at 64; WOOD, supra note 33, at
68 (The Categorical Imperative is Kant's "supreme principle of morality [that] admits of no
conditions or exceptions, of course, because there is nothing higher by reference to which
conditions or exceptions could be justified").
264. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 777.
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everyone to act on the maxim. In other words, "one ought not do X
unless one believes that all other persons under like circumstances may
morally do X." 21 While perhaps a bit of an oversimplification, Cl1 may be
described as Kant's restatement of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you. 2 67 Thus, Cl1 does not address the moral
substance of any performed or contemplated behavior under review.
Rather, it outlaws the hypocrisy of: I can do X to you but under like
circumstance you cannot do X to me. Accordingly, Cl1 alone cannot
confirm the moral rectitude of a proposed course of conduct. 2 68 Cl1 is a
necessary initial step to begin the process of escaping personal preferences
-- detaching from personal yearnings and proclivities -- to assure that actors
act consistently with their pure duty to respect the dignity of others.26 9
However, the first Cl is inadequate because, without more, it sustains
immoral conduct so long as all similarly situated persons are allowed to
engage in that immoral conduct.
What next is needed is a formula to determine whether any particular
goal a person chooses, plus the means she determines to attain that goal,
are themselves intrinsically moral. To fill that gap, Kant presented the
renowned second categorical imperative, CI2 : "Act in such a way that you
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."270
Indeed, the only way to assure moral comportment is to treat others as
"ends in themselves," which means respecting their innate dignity. 2 7 1 By
highlighting that persons may not regard other persons "simply as a
means, " Kant sensibly acknowledged that pursuing means to attain
265. WOOD, supra note 33, at 70.
266. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 901.
267. Kuklin, supra note 39, at 498; see also, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The Principles of
Justice, 75 NOTRE DANE L. REv. 1859, 1867-68 (2000):
Whether understood as "love of neighbor as oneself," the golden rule, or Kant's
categorical imperative, the supreme principle of morality in natural law theory, in
both its conception of human good and its conception of the equality of persons,
stands in direct opposition to the supreme principle of morality in utilitarianism,
which was given its most explicit expression by Jeremy Bentham.
268. "For example, Smith might honestly believe that any person who insults another, no
matter how slightly, deserves to be executed. Although his principle certainly is immoral
on its face, Smith may satisfy the [first] Categorical Imperative so long as he is willing to
be executed should he forget himself and insult someone." Bayer II, supra note 17, at 901
n. 152.
269. Fletcher, supra note 244, at 540.
270. Tson, supra note 245, at 64 (quoting KANT at 96).
271. Tes6n, supra note 218, at 64.
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selected goal requires social interactions, that is, engaging the talents,
experience, knowledge, skills and offices of disparate individuals, all of
which requires using those others as "means" to get what we want.272
Likewise, to attain their desired goals, other persons correspondingly use
our experience, abilities, products, and, similar resources. We use others
as means and others use us as means, such is a system of the exchange of
goods and services. By respecting the dignity of those we use, we treat
those persons morally, just as others' use of us is moral if they respect our
innate dignity.
In logical contrast, "you treat someone as a mere means whenever you
treat him in a way to which he could not possibly [rationally] consent."2 73
As we now understand, rational consent does not mean that, subjectively,
the possibly misused person has no personal objections to her apparent
mistreatment. That is because, pursuant to the duty of rightful honor, "just
as one may not use another solely as a means, neither may one deliberately
sacrifice one's dignity by allowing oneself to be used exclusively as a
means." 274 For instance, Smith cannot rationally condone slavery even
though Smith personally would like to own slaves and, aware of Cli to
avoid hypocrisy, is willing to run the risk of being a slave rather than a
slave owner in any society that allows slavery. Although her personal
tastes and preferences lure Smith into condoning slavery, if she freed
herself from that subjective predilection by employing reason, Smith would
understand that no rational person could deny that slavery offends the
innate dignity of human being because slavery treats slaves merelymas
means, not as ends in themselves. 275
Thus, treating persons "in a way to which [they] could not possibly
[rationally] consent" means that, evaluating their particular situations
through neutral reason wholly detached from their personal preferences
272. See WOOD, supra note 33, at 87; see also Wright, supra note 81, at 277.
273. CmsTNE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 295 (1996).
274. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 903; Weinrib 11, supra note 263, at 811 (quoting Kant,
"Do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.");
supra notes 263-67 (discussing the duty of rightful honor).
275. Of course, the so-called humane treatment of slaves such as good food, comfortable
housing, reasonable work hours, no physical discipline, respecting the integrity of slave
families and the like, cannot salvage slavery's immorality. While "humane" treatment is
better than complete savagery, the very status of slavery offends human dignity because
slaves have no appropriate say in their treatment and status in Society. Thus, it enhances
but does not change the inherent immorality of slavery that "masters" can revoke "humane
treatment" at will without any meaningful participation in that decision by the slaves
themselves.
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and predilections, affected individuals would not consent, but rather,
conclude that they were being used only as "means" with no regard for
their right as dignified persons to respectful treatment.
C12'S quite esoteric formulation can be reduced judiciously to this: we
treat human beings as "ends in themselves" by remembering that "persons
are not inanimate objects" 27 6 to be used at the owner's whim and pleasure,
and, when no longer useful, discarded. This is because persons are self-
aware, thinking and sentient beings possessed of innate dignity, not
insensible, inert things existing solely for our pleasure such as machines,
tools, furniture and similar instruments.277  "Therefore, tactics such as
coercion, deception, intimidation, and confounding are classically
unethical because, under such conditions, persons cannot give meaningful
consent. Either they do not really know to what they are consenting or their
informed consent is the product of extortion."2 78 Thus, such persons are
reduced to mere "means" to fulfill the goals of those who so reduced them
to "means." If I may continue to quote my earlier work, an apropos
example from law illustrates this point:
Smith, a rational person, would will a system of due process of law
allowing meaningful participation of suspects in any criminal process
brought against them. Such meaningful participation assures that if
Smith is investigated, arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced, the
State at each phase respected her as an end. Although unhappy to have
been so treated, Smith can have no moral objections to the process and
its outcome, even if she is innocent. By [requiring reasonable
investigatory and trial procedures including] allowing a meaningful
defense, the State did not use Smith only as a means to obtain some
State goal related to her imprisonment[, but rather, made Smith an
276. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 355. See also Tes6n, supra note 218, at 64 (quoting Kant's
recognition of intrinsic human value).
277. Donald J. Beschle, Kant's Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in
Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 949, 965 (2004) (exlaining"The
foundation for [C12], indeed for Kant's entire Categorical Imperative, is his sharp distinction
between persons and things. Persons can be distinguished from both animals and inanimate
objects in that they have freedom to autonomously choose their actions.") (citing,
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40 (James W. Ellington
trans., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter "Kant II"]).
278. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 902 (citing, Korsgaard, supra note 278, at 295). Beschle,
supra note 259, at 965 n. 103 (explaining, "Things can be recognized as having a 'market
price;' they can be 'replaced by something else as its equivalent.' ... Persons, in contrast,
have 'an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity."') (quoting KANT II, supra note 282 at 40).
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active and meaningful part of the criminal justice process, capable, to a
proper degree, of controlling her own destiny] .279
CIs one and two present the standards for individual conduct and, of
necessity, the conduct of groups for, as noted in the general discussion of
Deontology, if individuals can evade their moral responsibilities by acting
collectively, then moral precepts would have scant practical effects on any
given social order. 28 0 Even so, Kant recognized the need for a special third
CI to explain the formal formation of a social order -- the transition from
uncivil to civil society.
5. The Categorical Imperative's Third Formulation: The "Kingdom
ofEnds" --
A. The State of Nature --
The well-known Enlightenment theory of the "social contract"
recounts, "the ascent of humankind from the viciousness of the state of
nature to the elegance of social orders governed by law."281 In the state of
nature there are essentially no formal societal controls over human
behavior. Rather, the state of nature lacks a rightful controlling order,
therefore, each person has the discretion to act on her own whims and
caprice. As noted scholar Jeremy Waldron summarized, "[I]ndividuals
fight in the state of nature, and the consequent war of all against all can
only cease when people submit to a unitary sovereign."2 82 The common
279. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 902 n. 158 (discussing how the criminal justice example
reminds us as well, "that using others in ways that they rationally would will themselves
and all others to be used does not necessarily mean that such use will make persons happy.
The project is not consequentialist to maximize contentment; rather the goal is moral
comportment."). Even if the process entirely comported with moral procedures, Smith, in
our example, surely is unhappy to be investigated and prosecuted, especially if she is
innocent but nonetheless convicted. Her unhappiness is understandable, even condonable,
but no proof that she was treated immorally even should she be wrongly convicted because
she cannot expect more than moral treatment by those who investigated and brought her to
trial. That is why the legal adage is true: a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, but not a
perfect trial. U.S. v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n. 9 (2004); Burton v. U.S., 391
U.S. 123, 135 (1968); U.S. v. Mrquez-P6rez, 835 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2016).
280. See supra Section 2-a.
281. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 896 (footnote omitted).
282. Waldron, supra note 217, at 1545 (discussing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86-90,
117-21 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651)). Mark C. Niles, Ninth
Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis ofPersonal
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account, perhaps most notably espoused by John Locke, of why people
would give up the unadulterated freedom of the state of nature
understandably accents the desire for personal security, meaning,
protecting one's life, one's family and one's possession from being taken
or destroyed by those whose justification is that they are powerful, clever,
and ruthless enough to do so.2 83
Certainly theorists such as Locke recognized both the moral
imperatives underlying human conduct28 and that greater society must
obey moral norms. 2 8 5  It was Immanuel Kant, however, who more
Autonomy Rights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85, 111 (2000) (quoting, John Locke, Two Treatises
of Government 116, 121 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993) (1689) ("[John] Locke
characterized the state of nature as "a state of perfect freedom [for men] to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man." In
the state of nature, all men have equal authority to govern their own lives and to prosecute
transgressions against them. Locke acknowledged the obvious problems that this level of
freedom fostered and agreed with Hobbes's conclusion that the duty of civil government is
to limit much of this freedom.")).
283. "Thus, Locke described the development of the civil society as the process of each
individual vesting his natural right to complete personal autonomy into the hands of the
government so that it may protect his "life, liberty, and estate." Id., at 112.
284. Locke, "viewed the principles of natural law as the commands of God, dictates of
the divine will, rather than expressions of divine reason. ... [Thus, m]oral truth was not only
outside human nature, it was binding upon us by compulsion, rather than because of its
reasonableness." Hill, supra note 31, at 212.
285. For example, Locke averred that, "legal institutions must satisfy certain conditions
of justice required by the democratic ideal, which Locke articulates in terms of a
hypothetical contract whereby persons retain certain inalienable rights, including the right
to conscience. Democratic theory must distinguish those conditions of justice that are
conditions of moral obligation from those that are not, ... " David A.J. Richards,
Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Challenge to the Obligation to Obey the Law,
18 GA. L. REv. 771, 781 (1984). Locke urged as well the now familiar second moral
requisite, "express or implied consent to abide by the laws in question, a moral undertaking
like a voluntary promise that binds one in the future even when one disagrees with the merits
or even justice of the law in question, excluding the injustices that release one from
obligation." Id. For Locke, these two moral conditions satisfy Government's obligation to
respect, "the moral sovereignty of the people. The condition ofjustice insures respect for
the basic inalienable rights of the person constituting moral sovereignty, and the condition
of agreement insures fair consent to bear whatever burdens cooperative political life may
involve, including occasional mistakes of policy and errors ofjustice." Id.
Critics note weaknesses in Locke's formulation. Locke did not extrapolate essential
"universal political rights" to protect against authoritarianism, an infirmity that can be
corrected by augmenting his general standards with a litany of such rights. Id. at 782. More
profoundly, the "social contract" metaphor was never satisfactory because, "We do not
freely choose our legal institutions by any express or implied act analogous to the way we
invoke the institution of promising by the use of 'I promise.' ... [A]s [Enlightenment
philosopher David] Hume observed in his classic criticism of social contract theory, being
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sublimely perceived that civil societies are not, "simply devices for a more
efficient and peaceful coexistence among persons who unavoidably bump
into each other while vying for scarce resources to fulfill chosen
pursuits."28 6 To the contrary, creating and fostering civil society is much
more -- it is a moral imperative essential to every individual's duty of moral
comportment in all ways, at all times, regarding all endeavors. As Kant
understood, to ensure that individuals respect others' innate dignity by
complying with the Categorical Imperatives, all persons must accept the
dominance of some controlling social order -- a government -- validly and
exclusively authorized to monitor its citizenry and guests through "a
uniform system of laws vouchsafing dignity among social actors. "287In
this way, "Kant's overarching emphasis on the pursuit of moral decency
accords the social contract nobility and virtue exceeding Lockean concepts
of pure security and the protection of possessions (although those latter
considerations surely are relevant to liberty)."288
B. The Kingdom of Ends
The moral necessity to form civil society is the basis of Kant's third
Categorical Imperative ("CI3 "), known popularly as the "Kingdom of
Ends," describing the society -- the "Kingdom" -- wherein all persons, due
to their innate dignity, are treated pursuant to Cl1 and CI2 with proper
respect as "Ends." 289 C1 3 admonishes, "Not to choose otherwise than so
that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it
in the same volition as universal law." 29 0 To explain Cl 3 , one must begin
in a state is for many no more voluntary than being in a ship in mid-sea." Id. at 782-83
(citing, D. HUME, Of the Original Contract, in THEORY OF POLITICS 193-214 (F.
Watkins ed. 1951)).
Kant's answer will be that just as Society and the governmental institutions that
manage it must act morally -- comply with the CIs -- correspondingly, individuals have not
simply a practical need but indeed a moral duty to form societies regardless whether, as a
matter of personal penchant, they prefer the complete freedom of self-indulgence allowed
in the state of nature.
286. Bayer t, supra note 13, at 896.
287. Id. at 903. See Ripstein, supra note 241, at 1417 (addressing Kant's position that
individual rights are meaningless unless they are accompanied by an established system of
order that subjects each individual to the same rights and obligations).
288. Bayer 11, supra note 17, at 361.
289. KANT, supra note 57, [4:400] (quoted in WOOD, supra note 33, at 66-67).
290. KANT, supra note 57, [4:400] (quoted in WOOD, supra note 33, at 66-67 (quoting
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Cambridge Edition of the
Writings of Immanuel Kant 4:400 (1992)).
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with the obvious, aside from the very few who live as hermits, residing in
caves or coves, scavenging for necessities and otherwise disconnected from
human beings and their commodities, for each of us, human interactions
are both necessary and inevitable. This means we need to have systems of
sufficiently shared meaning so that others know what we want and we
know what they want.29 '
If we are persons of good will, we understand and are prepared to
abide by moral precepts assuring the rightful -- moral -- creation and use
The prevailing opinion seems to be that indeed Kant espoused, "three such
formulations of the categorical imperative." Jeffrey K. Gurney, Crashing into the
Unknown: An Examination of Crash-Optimization Algorithms Through the Two Lanes of
Ethics and Law, 79 ALBANY L. REv. 183, 218 (2015-16). Specifically, as noted, Cli
proscribes hypocrisy, C12 requires that all persons treat themselves and each other as not
simply means, but as "ends in themselves," and C13, setting the moral imperatives of the
social order or "Kingdom of Ends." Some, however, aver that the third formulation actually
comprises two categorical imperatives. In that regard, the formulation of a social order
derives first from a C13, "the principle of autonomy," that states, "that we should always act
as if we are making universal rules: Act as 'a will legislating universally through all its
maxims[.]"' Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers' Rights As Natural Human Rights, 71 U. Miami
L. Rev. 565, 611-12 (2017) (quoting, Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals 50 (Allen W. Wood ed. trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1795) (emphasis in original).
CI3 is augmented by C14, addressing the "kingdom of ends," instructing, "us to act as if we
were the legal official of some universal law-making body: 'Act in accordance with maxims
of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends .... '" Id. at 612
(quoting, Kant, Groundwork, at 56 (internal citations omitted)).
Whether viewed at one or two categorical imperatives, the important point is, as
next explained, Kant sought to expound how and why governments must act in conformance
with Cli and C12.
291. The quest for and problems confounding such shared meanings long has been the
fodder of language theoriests and jurisprudes. For example, the brilliant expositions of
Ludwig Wittgenstein aver that, "language must be shared to have meaning ... " Kimberly
A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 213 note 93 (2004) (citing, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations para. 355 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1967); see also,
e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the
Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1988)
("Does Wittgenstein's deconstruction which recognizes the individual's inevitable
participation in the perpetuation of shared meaning as well as in the reactivation and
expansion of the range of interpretation mean that her involvement is merely subjective?).
To offer one instance, if I actually want to buy a newspaper (rather than access one
online), I need to know how the society in which I find myself identifies what I understand
to be newspapers, how newspapers are made available to the public (for instance, stores,
vending machines or other outlets), and what process is appropriate to obtain a newspaper
(likely using currency to purchase from a willing seller).
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of such systems of shared meaning.292 Certainly, on their own respective
initiatives, discrete individuals can both discern relevant moral maxims via
impartial reason and construe how those maxims apply to their various
dealings with others. Nonetheless, persons of good will might find
themselves disagreeing about the substance and application of moral
precepts, and unable to reach cordial agreements. If so, as an alternative to
the anarchy of the state of nature, individuals must establish legitimate
government to, "put[] an end to [such] conflict by replacing individual
judgments with the authoritative determinations of positive law."293
Through rational communal commands of formal government offices,
individuals know how to manage interpersonal relations. Government's
public purpose, then, is maintaining the pursuit of happiness for all
individuals -- Kant's "universal principle of justice" -- in ways consistent
with Kant's dignity principle. 294 Thus, "Rather than have a war of discrete,
individual wills -- each 'the judge of his or her own entitlements, doing
what seems right and good in his or her own eyes,' -- we need the external
control of a State." 295
Although the foregoing certainly is sensible, the sublime depth of
Kant's explanation clarifies that potential conflicts -- disagreements --
among individuals regarding moral duties is not the sole nor crucial
justification for Government. For example, upon conferring as part of
initiating dealings, individuals happily might find that they not only share
identical moral maxims, but also agree on those maxims' applicability to
transactions -- formal or informal, business or pleasure -- in which those
individuals jointly participate.2 96 Or, if initially disagreeing, they may be
able to reach some accord informally, volitionally and calmly. Further,
they might decide to abide by that accord in future dealings and even
convince similarly situated others to do so as well. Indeed, every one of
the various points where interacting parties either initially agreed or came
292. Of course, regardless of good will, all persons are obliged to respect the innate
dignity of themselves and others by comporting with the moral requisites encapsulated in
and derived from the Categorical Imperatives. See, supra Section 3-d-4.
293. Waldron, supra note 217, at 1545.
294. See, supra Sections 3-d-1, 2, 3.
295. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 905 note 172 (quoting, Weinrib, supra note 233, at 808
(citing Kant, supra note 57, at 455-56 [6:312])). See also Ripstein, supra note 241, at 1414-
27.
296. To state obvious examples, individuals might initially accept that, to reach
agreements, they should bargain rather than engage in physical combat and that, if thereafter
one claims a breach of agreement, they should resolve the dispute peacefully rather than
hold a duel.
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to an eventual peaceful agreement may be morally sound. That is, whether
the relevant actors knew so or not, all aspects of their individual dealings
might comply fully with the Categorical Imperatives;2 97 thus, these actors
not only accomplished what they wanted, they sought to and indeed
performed in a moral fashion.
At first blush, it seems difficult to fault these actors who, through
peaceful means, resolved their disagreements both amicably and morally,
and, who extrapolated from their experiences so that their future dealings,
and those of others who know these actors, likewise will be peaceful,
productive and moral. Nonetheless, Kant explained that while such
peaceful coexistence is better than violence, these individuals relied upon
their best judgments but not upon corroborative, external authoritative
basis to discern if, indeed, their mutual agreements comport with moral
strictures. Without binding neutral authority, such accord is simply the
product of individual wills, each "the judge of his or her own entitlements,
doing what seems right and good in his or her own eyes."2 98
297. One might argue, contrarily, that a person who fortuitously acts morally is acting
immorally because she is obligated to understand to some reasonable extent why her acts
are moral. Therefore, in the above example, only those who chose their actions based on
properly apprehending and applying moral reasoning actually acted morally. By contrast,
those who acted intuitively or consequentially, but nonetheless happed to conform with
deontological precepts, did not take into account the dignity of those with whom they
interacted; therefore, due to impure motives, they acted immorally.
298. See Weinrib II, supra note 263, at 808 (citing Kant, supra note 70, at 455-56
[6:312]). See also Ripstein, supra note 241 at 1414-27. Accordingly, that persons in a state
of nature act morally neither legitimizes any given act nor repeated identical interactions.
As respected jurisprude John Finnis explained,
Morally good dispositions can lay claim to dignity, just because they and only
they afford to rational creatures participation in giving universal laws and thus
fit such creatures to be members and legislators in a possible kingdom of ends.
The maxims of rational choosers (i.e., their rationales for their choices) have
dignity only when those maxims could harmonize with a possible kingdom of
ends, by treating not only other persons but also each of the choosers
themselves (i.e., their own rational nature) as no mere means but also an end.
J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of"Duties to Oneself': Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 433, 441 (1987).
Thus, the capacity of individual actions legitimately to be embraced by the Kingdom
of Ends is necessary but not sufficient to a social order. Rather, such legitimate actions
must be part of an actual Kingdom of Ends, commemorated and confirmed by the good and
proper legal formalities set forth by the given Kingdom -- that particular government --
thereby replacing the fortuitous moral happenstance of discrete, independent individual
wills with the formalized general will, united to exert proper coercive authority on unwilling
others.
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Thus, even in situations of pure uprightness, "there must be a process
through which all can come to an accord -- the formation of a united
rational will -- resulting in codification of rational impositions and
implementing a system of societal-wide enforcement." 29 9  Absent that
uniform, "united rational will," human interactions, no matter how serene
and productive, comprise ad hoc agreements of what are the applicable
moral standards and how those standards should be applied. Even if correct
in all regards, such agreements cannot be proven correct without the honest
imprimatur of a neutral, formal regulating system un-swayed by biases
either in favor of or against any of the respective individuals involved in
the given interactions. That is because moral bonafides are impossible to
prove if those espousing them operate as well as their own advocates,
judges and juries. We form governments, then, with the sole lawful
authority to discern and enforce through violence if necessary, moral
standards throughout the given State for two reasons. First, to resolve
disputes among those who cannot agree. Second, and equally if not more
importantly, only a neutral, formal societal structure can reliably discover
moral standards; anything else is simply the battle of individual wills that
have no inherent right to impose themselves on others as binding authority.
Even if those individual wills agree and even if they properly discerned and
applied relevant moral precepts, their agreement alone is no proof of
rightness, absent the imprimatur of neutral society through laws enacted
and enforced by formal government.
Needless to say, like the people it governs, government itself must
conform to the Categorical Imperatives lest its structure and operations
offend the innate dignity of those who come under its jurisdiction. To
preclude despotism and thereby vindicate the legitimacy of government,
the morality constraining individual behavior likewise constrains the
State." "Just as individual free will is constrained by 'practical reason' -
299. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 904 (footnote omitted).
300. Benson, supra 229, at 565-67; see also, e.g., Samuel Freeman, Frontiers ofJustice:
The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism Frontiers of Justice: Disabilities,
Nationality, Species Membership. by Martha C. Nussbaum. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard
University Press, 2006 Pp. 487. $35, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 385, 406 (2006) ("A Kingdom of
Ends for Kant is a society in which sincere and conscientious moral agents unanimously
agree to and legislate the moral principles that govern moral relations.") (citing, Immanuel
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 39-41 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1981) (1785)); Anthony Paul Farley, The Dream ofInterpretation, 57 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 685, 709 (2003) ("Hierarchy produces logic and reason and duty as its obstacle
and its vehicle. This vehicle, logic and reason and duty, takes us to the edge of a place where
fair is fair and all are equal, and tells us to transform the world in the name of this
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- the capacity to understand a priori morality -- and must be exercised
pursuant to the Categorical Imperative, so too must the collective will --
the law -- be bound." 301  As Professor Ripstein explained, government's
primary and exclusive authority, "the use of force needs to be rendered
consistent with the independence of each person from others. Mandatory
forms of social cooperation -- notably the State -- are justified only if they
serve to create and sustain conditions of equal freedom in which ordinary
forms of social cooperation are fully voluntary."302  Comparatively
Professor Benson aptly summarized, "according to Kant, there is a
metaphysics of morals because both law and morality are grounded in one
supreme principle, autonomy of the will."303
In that regard, Kant proved the counterintuitive proposition that, when
rightly configured, government is not coercive even though it is the sole
lawful societal authority to demand compliance and to use violence to
enforce its edicts. 30 To legitimately fulfill its function ensuring any and
transcendental ideal, this kingdom of ends.); Dr. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, In Defense of
Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 NYU J.L. & Liberty 548, 591 (2008) (([T]he kingdom of
ends is for Kant a moral ideal.") (footnote omitted); generally, Finnis, supra note 303; but
see Fletcher, supra note 244, at 534 ("While the prevailing view today treats law and
morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view treats the two as distinct
and nonintersecting."); see also Id. at 542-43 (discussing the Kantian distinctions between
law and morality). Given the principles described both above in the text and in the
immediately following text, it is difficult to agree with Professor Fletcher, at least from a
pragmatic perspective of how a legitimate government would have to function under a
Kantian system.
301. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 907 n. 175 (citing, Benson, supra note 229, at 568-77).
302. Ripstein, supra note 241, at 1437. See also, Weinrib II, supra note 263, at 797
(explaining how private law such as property and contract must respect the dignity
principle).
303. Benson, supra note 229, at 575. Thus, Government as a discrete entity -- a person,
albeit arguably an "unnatural" person -- shares natural persons' moral duties and
expectation of moral treatment. Of course, further proof of Government's duty of moral
comportment arises from the logical proposition that individuals may not escape their moral
duties by forming "unnatural" persons such as corporations and governments, and,
committing through those humanly-created entities acts that, as individuals, they could not
morally perform.
304. Kant, then, calls into question Jefferson's seemingly logical but hasty calculus of
morality, "What is true of every member of society individually, is true of them all
collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of
individuals." 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 115, 116 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895)
(quoted in Greg Sergienko, Social Contract Neutrality and the Religion Clauses of the
Federal Constitution, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1263, 1283 n. 98 (1996). If only social order
formalized through Government - official, authoritative process and laws that may originate
from no other societal person, natural or artificial - can legitimize individuals' attempts to
enforce through specific performance or restitution violations of moral precepts, then there
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all governmental conduct comports with the Categorical Imperatives,
"Society and its laws are legitimate only when consistent with the dignity
principle, the product of a universalized will -- something to which all
rational persons would consent -- that respects innate dignity by treating
each person as an end rather than as a mere means." 30 ' Because abandoning
the state of nature to form a legitimate Government is not a choice but
rather a moral requisite,3" forming a legitimate society -- one that enforces
moral precepts -- is not coercive because "every rational will, equally our
own and that of other rational beings . . . in obeying the objectively valid
moral law, [may] regard[] itself as at the same time giving that law."307
Along this line, commentators argue that, although many of the
processes are the same, Kant really did not embrace the idea of a "social
contract." Because forming a proper -- moral -- social order is not
discretionary, it is not a contract in the sense that persons volitionally agree
for their mutual benefits; rather, it is compulsory.308 Even if we somewhat
carelessly use the convenient term "social contract," we nonetheless
understand that because forming proper social orders is compulsory if
are certain "rights" attendant with the use of force that inure to governments but not to those
over whom governments exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, the obverse is true in that there
are a small class of moral duties incumbent on governments that do not constrain others.
See, infra note _ discussing Government's "perfect duty" to expend funds to feed the
destitute.
305. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 905.
For example, law rationally may require that certain professionals be
licensed, including mandating educational requirements, special examinations, and
fees not imposed on other workers. While such laws use licensees as means in
that, prior to offering their services, they must prove their capabilities, when other
types of workers need not, one could rationally mandate that persons who would
engage in highly technical, often dangerous occupations first satisfy Society of
their apparent competence to perform such work. After all, a person who without
training nonetheless chooses to engage in a highly skilled profession is so
dangerous that she is treating her clients purely as means, even if she informs them
that she has insufficient education,
Id. at 905 n. 171.
306. Ripstein, supra note 241, at 1417. Here again we see how Kant has found a deeper
meaning than did Locke. While moral concerns play a role, Locke concluded primarily that
individuals give up the freedom of the state of nature to protect their rights from
encroachment by those whose justification for doing so is that they can. By contrast, "The
core of Kant's argument is that the right to enforce rights cannot be enjoyed in the state of
nature. The right that Locke imagines people trading away is one that can only be enjoyed
through the rule of law." Id
307. WOOD, supra note 33, at 76; see also Thomas Hill, supra note 215, at 58-59.
308. Mulholland, supra note 231, at 278-81, 289-90 (discussing Kant's view of property
and why Kant was not really a "social contractualist").
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people are to fulfill their unalienable duties under the first two Categorical
Imperatives, leaving the state of nature is not wrongfully coercive even if
some individuals are made to do something they do not want to do.
C. Perfect and Imperfect Duties --
Interestingly, some scholars aver that Kant did not actually conceived
the State as enforcing moral duties, although individual human actors
holding official offices must obey the Categorical Imperative lest
governmental action be illegitimated.3 * Professor Fletcher argued that
"[w]hile the prevailing view today treats law and morality as intersecting
sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view treats the two as distinct and
nonintersecting"i 0 thus commentator ought not "conflate" the two, as Kant
did not believe that a person has a "right" to enforce another person's moral
"duty." 31
Professor Benson, among several others, strongly disagrees, urging as
especially persuasive Kant's assertion that the Government must offer
formal legal process through which parties can sue to enforce contracts.
Such, of course, is based on the principle that because, as a moral
command, promises must be kept, individuals correctly believe that they
have the right to obtain performance or restitution from those who breach
their promises. As we now know, even if complicit with moral precepts,
ad hoc individual dispute resolution lacks the legitimacy of civil
governance because law "must be the product of the common will, not
simply the ad hoc wills of the particular contracting parties whose dispute
happens to be under judicial review."3 12 Therefore, individuals turn to
greater Society to provide offices and procedures for the peaceful, impartial
resolution of such disputes based on laws of generally applicability. 313
309. Fletcher, supra note 244, at 552
310. Id. at 534, 542-43 (discussing the Kantian distinctions between law and morality).
311. Id. at 543-45, 553-58; see also, e.g., JACOB WEINRIB, DIMENSIONS OF DIGNITY: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29-31 (2016) (although Weinrib
offers in subsequent chapters some reimagining of Kantian principles that substantiate many
of the propositions presenting in this article.)
312. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 907 (discussing, Benson, supra note 229, at 565-67).
313. Such, naturally, comprehends nearly the entire spectrum of personal interactions
involving contracts, property and even tort as intentional and negligent civil wrongs offend
the innate dignity of the victims. For example, causing an automobile accident through
speeding treats the victims not as ends in themselves whose safety is protected by reasonable
traffic laws, but merely as means, that is, objects that got in the way of the speeder who
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Laws, legal process and official offices, of course, must themselves be
moral because, as we have learned, commensurate with individual free will,
any collective free will, including government, must comport with
"practical reason," which is the capacity to understand a priori morality as
effectuated by the Categorical Imperative.314 Thus, while some of Kant's
writings may be taken otherwise, it seems incorrect and illogical that
Kantian moral theory separates law and morals. As Professor Benson
summarized, "According to Kant, there is a metaphysics of morals because
both law and morality are grounded in one supreme principle, autonomy of
the will."315 At the very least, a sensible neo-Kantian perspective finds the
Benson approach authentic and steadfast.3 16
Governmental power, of course, is not limitless. With regard to
legitimate exercise of governmental authority, Kant argued that the law
may only address "perfect" or "juridical" duties, rather than compelling
individuals to obey "imperfect" duties or "duties of virtue." Imperfect
duties urge us to maximize "[o]ur own perfection, and the happiness of
others"; but such is volitional under Kantian morality." Accordingly, a
"duty is imperfect if no one is in a position to demand by right that it be
complied with."' Indeed, "we may live selfish lives, acquiring for
deliberately or carelessly did not consider obeying the speed limit to be a moral requisite
under law.
314. Benson, supra note 229, at 568-77.
315. Id. at 575.
316. Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C.L. REv. 837,
891 (1990) ("In his attempt to overcome the muddle of natural law theory, Kant had
separated law from morals and had limited it strictly to the regulation of external acts. Thus,
Kant had defined law as the conditions under which the freedom of one individual can
coexist with the freedom of other individuals.") (emphasis added; citing I. KANT,
METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN 230-31 (Akademie Textausgabe 1902) (1797)). Weinrib II, supra
note 263, at 797 (noting "As a philosopher working within the tradition of natural right--
indeed, as perhaps its greatest expositor -- Kant gives a detailed non-distributive account of
the principal features of private law, especially of property and contract. Developing
corrective justice in terms of his own metaphysics of morals, Kant portrays private law as a
system of rights whose most general categories give juridical expression to the coexistence
of one person's action with another's freedom under a universal law.").
317. WooD, supra note 33, at 166-67; see also Korsgaard, supra note 278, at 20
(distinguishing between nonobligatory duties of virtue and duties ofjustice, which are strict
obligations that require particular actions).
318. Murphy, supra note 39, at 34-35. For instance, we may pursue happiness by leading
selfless lives, depriving ourselves for the sake of charity, and dedicating our waking hours
to worthy pursuits. From a consequentialist perspective, such actions embody a good life.
But, one could not rationally will an immutable duty to ensure the happiness of others
because such violates the "duty of rightful honor." See, supra notes 263-67 and
accompanying text discussing the duty of rightful honor. An immutable duty to make
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ourselves as much as we can with no thought of sharing so long as ... the
pursuit of happiness as selfishness [does] not denigrate anyone's innate
dignity." 3 19
Imperfect duties, then, are discretionary, create no rights enforceable
by others, and, therefore, are illegitimate subjects for formal legal
commands, but rather, "are to be fulfilled through inner rational
constraint."320  After all, forcing a person to meet an imperfect duty
infringes her innate dignity by mandating that she do what she is not
morally required to do.3 2 '
In stark apposition, perfect duties, "are moral imperatives that must
be fulfilled because they 'spring from the very idea of external freedom: a
world in which everyone's rights are respected is a world in which
complete external freedom is achieved."'3 22 A perfect duty enforces the
Categorical Imperative.32 3 Therefore, as such duties are compulsory,
Government should, arguably must enact legally enforceable measures to
assure that persons satisfy their perfect duties.3 2 4 Indeed, there are even
others happy essentially enslaves us to the personal wills of those others who, in turn, are
virtual slaves to our personal wills -- simply, we would have to do whatever is necessary to
assure others' happiness and they would have to do likewise for us. Thus, there is no moral
duty either to perfect ourselves (such a duty would be self-enslavement) or to maximize
another's happiness. Bayer I, supra note 11, at 908 (citing, W WOOD, supra note 33, at 167;
Murphy, supra note 39, at 35 ("[N] o one can demand by right that I make him happy, can
regard himself wronged if I fail to make him happy."), and, Ripstein, supra note 241, at 288
(explaining how each person has their own private right to best accommodate their
purposes, and how publicizing such rights would "systematically cancel the effects that one
person's choices had on others ... [which] would preclude the exercise of private freedom").
319. Bayer II, supra note 17, at 364 (footnote omitted).
320. WOOD, supra note 33, at 220.
321. Murphy, supra note 39, at 36-37 (clarifying that "the [person] who is simply
unhappy has no... claim against me. I have not violated his freedom. I have merely exercised
my right to leave him alone.").
322. Bayer I, supra note 13, at 909 (quoting Korsgaard, supra note 278, at 21); see also,
e.g., Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. MAss. L.
REV. 68, 97-103 (2017) (explaining perfect and imperfect duties); Bailey Kuklin, Private
Requitals, 64 CLEVELAND ST. L. REv. 965, 971-72 (2016).
323. Murphy, supra note 39, at 35 (discussing the general duty to keep promises, "one
may not fraudulently enter into a contract because doing so treats the promisee purely as a
means; having been duped, the promisee cannot know either the promisor's true goals or
the actual nature of the bargain."). .
324. E.g., Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue's Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1202 (footnotes
omitted) ("Kant argues that the nature and justification of state law is to enforce perfect
duties to others, the duties of external performance that interfere with the rights of others. It
is the external act of a person that interferes with the freedom of another that justifies State
coercion."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 509, 519 (1987). As though anticipating the progression of American constitutional
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instances where Government qua government has perfect duties not
incumbent on individuals, groups and corporations. 3 2 5
The foregoing review of deontological morality and its Kantian
explications completes, as one might expect, the deontological aspect of
Deontological Originalism. Before applying that metatheory to American
constitution law, the project of this writing's Part II, we must turn to the
second element, Originalism. The next section, then, explains why
assessing the deontological aspect of our Constitution must be performed
in an originalist milieu; or, as that section is entitled, "Why Originalism?"
IV. WHY ORIGINALISM? --
Having shown that morality is deontological and having argued that
Kantian theory provides the most complete extent explication of
deontological morality, this writing now turns to the theory of
constitutional interpretation popularly called Originalism. I agree with
theorists who claim that Originalism is only proper framework to interpret
and to apply the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, this
section demonstrates why an originalist perspective is necessary for
legitimate constitutional understanding. However, as we will see,
prevailing, competing forms of Originalism, even those recognizing that
moral values animate the Constitution, are inadequate because they do not
recognize that the Constitution is predicated on the deontological morality
of natural law, and that Kantian morality fulfills the Framers' and the
Reconstruction Congress' intent that the best available moral philosophy
must inform the Constitution's enforcement of natural rights emanating
from natural law.
law, Kant saw separation of powers and due process of law as Government greatest perfect
duties. Bayer 1I, supra note 17, at 365-68 (discussing that Kant embraced the notion that
the republican state was based upon three main principles: freedom, due process, and
equality; and describing Kant's endorsement of the separation of powers).
325. Bayer 1, supra note 13, at 865 (while individuals have no inherent duty to care for
the poor and needy, there is a perfect duty upon Government to use its funds to feed and
otherwise help the destitute.)
972017]
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
A. Originalism's Core Precept --
Originalism is a metatheory which avers that the United States
Constitution, "should be interpreted according to its original meaning."326
Professor Keith Whittington likewise expressed Originalism's major
premise: "the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its
initial adoption [is] authoritative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation in the present."3 27 Such is the apparently agreed-upon core
of Originalism: loyalty to the originally intended meaning, usually
expressed as the intent of this Nation's founders. The rub, of course, is to
decipher what is the relevant original intent.
B. Originalism's Influence
As Professor Bret Boyce noted two decades ago, "Originalism ... has
gained increased prominence in recent years."328 Barry Friedman and Scott
Smith likewise observed with admirable understatement, "There has been
a great deal of talk lately in the circles of constitutional law and theory
about 'fidelity' to the Constitution."3 29 Indeed, "[t]here has been" and
326. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 83, 83 (2010)
(criticizing Originalism).
327. Whittington, supra note 15, at 599; see also, e.g., Ozan 0. Varol, The Origins and
Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1239, 1248
(2011) (footnote omitted) ("In simple terms, originalism is a method for interpreting a
constitutional provision by seeking to uncover its meaning at the time of its adoption.").
Prof. Varol explicated as follows:
At its inception, originalism focused on original intention. Prominent from
the 1960s to the mid-1980s, intentionalism sought to interpret the
Constitution by determining the subjective intentions and expectations of its
drafters. Intentionalism focuses on what the framers "intended -- or expected
or hoped --would be the consequence" ofthe language they used in a specific
constitutional provision. Intentionalism ... was one of the interpretive
presuppositions of the Constitution; the framers expected that their intent
would govern how their posterity interpreted the Constitution. Id. at 1248-
49.
328. Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
909, 910 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
329. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 3 (1989) (citing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
vii-xiii (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory,
47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 395 (1995) (proposing 'a theory to explain how new readings of the
Constitution may maintain fidelity with past understandings ofthe document's meaning and
purpose'); Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1247 (1997)
(presenting various articles and commentary on fidelity to the Constitution). See generally
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continues to be "a great deal of talk" -- vehement, adamant, impassioned
scholarly talk -- as we celebrate the two-hundred-thirty years since the
Constitution's original ratification.330 Few if any modem philosophies of
constitutional interpretation have captured the attention and imagination of
today's commentators as has "Originalism," or, perhaps more accurately,
the mix of partially compatible stances that fall under the rubric
"Originalism." Surely, Professor Richard Primus aptly observed,
"Originalism is a family of ideas and practices ... "3 One might cynically
expound that, in fact, Originalism is a somewhat feuding family,3 32
particularly notorious for the divergent nature of its many offshoots, all
claiming to best achieve Originalism's paradigmatic function: loyalty to
the intent of the Constitution's original meaning.
While the designation is relatively young within constitutional
jurisprudence,333 the concern raised by Originalism is as longstanding as is
Symposium, Originalism, Democracy, and the Constitution, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
237-531 (1996).
330. A Westlaw search conducted on December 28, 2016, revealed that from 1987
through 2016, law schools had published roughly 400 law review articles with the word
"Originalism" in their titles. This, of course, does not include articles that extensively
discuss and critique Originalism but do not incorporate that word into their respective
headings. By contrast, a similar search of the term "critical legal" found approximately 140
articles from 1982 through 2015 with that term in their titles, a search for the term "legal
realism" in titles disclosed 130 articles from 1941 through 2016, and, a search for the term
"positivism" in titles shows about 120 articles from 1951 through 2016. This set of
searches, doubtless at best quasi-scientific and surely incomplete, arguably evinces that as
of this writing, Originalism is filling the pages of current law reviews more so than other
theories of constitutional meaning.
331. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REv.
165, 186 (2008).
332. Cf, Thomas Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L. J. 239, 306
(2009).
333. "The origins of originalism are intriguing and in some ways surprising. The term
was first used by Paul Brest in an article that purported to be, and in some ways seemed to
be, devastating to the whole idea." Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1671, 1673 (2018) (citing, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)).
Some scholars trace Originalism to the jurisprudence of the Hon. Hugo Black
arguably the first Supreme Court justice to propose formally that,
the text of the Constitution means what it originally was intended to mean.
... Black's version of this philosophy was that the original meaning should be
found by looking at the text of the Constitution as it would have been publically
understood when written. ... Although earlier justices had occasionally used
historical materials to argue about the original meaning of this or that provision of
the Constitution, Hugo Black was the first justice to frame originalism as a
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the Constitution itself. Originalism's "question seems to be whether it is
sensible, or even possible, to remain faithful to a constitution written more
than 200 years ago and amended only sporadically thereafter." 3 4 Given
what is at stake -- the very meaning of the Constitution and whether its
original meaning is worth preserving -- it is not surprising that during its
relatively brief duration, Originalism and its offshoots' proponents and
decriers comprise as imposing a roster of formidable experts and aspiring
virtuosos of all shades and temperaments as one is apt to find in any
constitutional jurisprudence, fresh or hoary.
Therefore, anyone proposing an interpretation of the United States
Constitution, however modest, is now essentially obligated to offer some
stance, if only brief, on where Originalism fits as part of the proposed
framework for constitutional analysis. 335 That de facto obligation, of
course, becomes dejure when one seeks to confront Originalism directly
either on its own merits or as a necessary facet to support an argument of
substantive constitutional law.336 Accordingly, those attempting an enquiry
involving Originalism, especially for the first time, must proceed with
respect, humility and caution, as the volume and depth of material is
daunting to say the least; and, one cannot be expected to exhaust that
definitive constitutional theory and to explain how and why he was using it. In this
sense, Black was the inventor of originalism.
NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR'S GREAT SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 143 (Twelve, Hatchette Book Group2010) (footnote omitted).
Other scholars see Originalism as a disavowal of the "liberal" jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court under the chief justiceship of Earl Warren. Lee J. Strang, Originalism and The
Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1997, 2003
(2012) ("Originalism began as a scholarly movement in the 1970s, the aim of which was to
criticize the Warren Court's perceived excesses.") (citing, William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1976); other citations
omitted); see, infra Section 4-C.
334. Friedman & Smith, supra note 334, at 3 (footnote omitted).
335. "For the last several decades, the primary divide in American constitutional theory
has been between those theorists who label themselves as 'originalists' and those who do
not." Colby & Smith, supra note 337, at 241 (footnote omitted).
336. One commentator expressed that reality with laudable conciseness, "Originalism is
an important interpretive methodology, although many in legal academe have spent much
time assailing it." Brandon Simeo Starkey, Inconsistent Originalism and The Need for
Equal Protection Re-Invigoration, 4 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 1, 7 (2012)
(footnote omitted).
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material yet still find time to write.33 7 With what I hope is fitting deference,
I enter this scrimmage.
C. Originalism's Revolt against "Living Constitutionalism" --
1. Living Constitutionalism Defined --
As initially conceived, originalist scholarship boldly challenged the
apparently then-prevalent orthodoxy of "Living Constitutionalism,"
particularly inspired by Supreme Court jurisprudence under Chief Justice
Earl Warren during whose tenure, it is claimed, that doctrine took
especially strong and far reaching hold."' Living Constitutionalism
proposes that, regarding any discrete issue or matter, constitutional
meaning may be informed, but is never constrained by either the ostensible
intent of the Framers or stare decisis. Rather, while the past surely is often
informative, the Constitution can only be understood by and applied
through "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."339 Although initially espoused by a plurality, the
Judiciary has and continues to apply Trop 's "evolving standards of
decency" paradigm vigorously as controlling constitutional law.34 0 Thus,
Living Constitutionalism posits that the "dead hand" of the past,
epitomized by the prejudices, misperceptions and incomplete knowledge
of the Founders, must not restrain the Constitution's growth and maturation
when confronting both age-old issues in contemporary contexts and
337. Certainly, such may be asserted for virtually any field of law: there are too many
possibly informative sources and not enough hours to review them all. Deborah L. Rhode,
Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1339 (2002) ("According to most recent
scholarship on scholarship, the real problem is not that we have too much nonlegal or
theoretical work, but rather that we have too much work of all types that is of poor quality").
338. Strang, supra note 338, at 2003 (citing, inter alia, William H. Rehnquist, The Notion
ofa Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 696-97 (1976)).
339. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the "cruel
and unusual punishments" portion of the Eighth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. VIll).
340. E.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2274 (2015) (citing Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (execution of "intellectually disabled" persons
contravenes the "evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth Amendment)); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)(the prison conditions under review did not violate
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Hunt v. Warden, No.
16-16639, 2018 WL 4191016, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2018); Boyd v. Warden, Holman
Correctional Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 866 (11th Cir. 2017).
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modem issues essentially unfamiliar to the Framers.34 1 Professor Varol
explained,
Living constitutionalism envisions a constitution that evolves over time
to meet the changing norms and needs of a modem society. As
Professor [Jack] Balkin put it, living constitutionalists "fear that
chaining ourselves to the original understanding will leave our
Constitution insufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet the challenges
of our nation's future." Thus, living constitutionalists (or non-
originalists) advocate an evolutionary approach to constitutional
interpretation and recognize the permissibility of constitutional change
via judicial interpretation, not solely by constitutional amendment.342
With sweeping prose alluding to the very "human dignity" that we
will see properly animates the entirety of fundamental constitutional
rights,3 43 the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the aspirational focus of
the Living Constitutionalism that Professor Varol described:
To enforce the Constitution's protection of human dignity, this Court
looks to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." [Such] protection of dignity reflects the Nation we
have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be. This is
to affirm that the Nation's constant, unyielding purpose must be to
transmit the Constitution so that its precepts and guarantees retain their
meaning and force.3 "
341. Steven Semeraro, Interpreting the Constitution's Elegant Specifics, 65 BUFF. L.
REV. 547, 560-61 (2017) ("Critics, of course, argue that originalists would enable the dead
hand of an unenlightened and undemocratic past to dictate modem law."); Ethan J. Lieb,
The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 4 CONsT. COMMENT. 353, 359 (2007)
"Living constitutionalists are plagued by anxiety about the dead hand of the past -- and think
we need to update and affirm the document's underlying principles if it is to be binding on
anyone living today.").
342. Varol, supra note 332, at 1251 (quoting Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONsT. COMMENT. 291 (2007); other citations omitted).
343. See Bayer, supra note 23, Part II.
344. Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (invalidated Florida rule presuming
that any death row inmate with an I.Q. score of more than 70 is mentally fit for execution
and, thus, may not present any further evidence on that issue) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see also, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269,
2274 (2015) (death row inmate wrongly denied opportunity to present post-conviction
evidence that he is unfit for execution due to mental disability); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
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Accordingly, Living Constitutionalism accents that over the
intervening two and a half centuries, as inevitably it must, America has
changed significantly in almost all measurable regards. It is larger in
population and territory, intensely industrialized, the most powerful among
the small number of nuclear weaponized nations, extraordinarily wealthy,
and, remarkably culturally diverse. To remain relevant, while the basic
"meaning[s]" may persist, applications of constitutional law to discrete
issues must comport with the change the United States has and will
continue to experience. If maintaining relevance requires that the
resolution of constitutional issues change with changing times, so be it,
says Living Constitutionalism.
Importantly, Living Constitutionalism's paradigmatic precept, "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"3 45 is not understood to imply the existence of one immutably true
concept of "decency," but rather a panoply of competing ideas none of
which are inherently more apt than the others, although their societal
relevance and benefit may change as America changes. 3 4 Thus, as
Professor Prakash lately observed,
I suspect that most who endorse living constitutionalism do so because
it has been, in the recent past, a successful mechanism for imposing
certain aspects of their morality on the entire country. Should living
constitutionalism become a consistent means of imposing disfavored
moralities, most of its current champions would disdain, rather than
48, 58 (2010) (juvenile who did not commit a homicide may not be sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole).
345. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 59-64
and accompanying text.
346. A Westlaw search of "living constitutio!" /50 (Kant immut! deont!), conducted on
November 2, 2017, designed to find articles asserting immutable or deontological truth as
part of a living constitutionalist framework, found no assertions that living constitutionalists
embrace deontological morality. To the contrary, typical finds within this search include,
"Under one school ofthought, ours is a "living Constitution," the meaning of which changes
with the times. Under another, the Constitution sets forth immutable principles of
fundamental law that must never be altered by mere government officials." Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The War Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 113, 120 (2010). Robert E. Shapiro,
Whither the Supreme Court?, 36 LITIGATION 63, 65 (2010) (noting that constitutional
meaning "seems to be between, in today's vernacular, the so-called originalists and those
who believe in a living Constitution. The argument is often presented this way: Does the
Constitution state certain immutable principles that are to be applied to all issues, including
the seemingly new and complex issues of modem society? Or is it something meant to
change or evolve over time as society does? In the former case, what are those principles?
In the latter, according to what standards?").
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esteem, novel rights claims. Most living constitutionalists are of the
sunshine varietal.347
Nonetheless, as earlier quoted, proponents urge that, "the Nation's
constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that
its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force." 348 The word
"retain" certainly implies that there are originating "precepts and
guarantees" that constrain living constitutionalists from simply importing
into the Constitution's text any meaning they wish. In that regard, one can
sense an originalist foundation tempering Living Constitutionalism.
Living constitutionalists, therefore, often contend that their paradigm
actually is originalist in that, "historical evidence suggests that the Framers
in fact intended for future generations not to interpret the Constitution
according to their intent -- thus requiring the paradoxical conclusion that
the only way to follow the intent of the Framers is not to follow the intent
of the Framers."34 9 However, unlike the Deontological Originalism
espoused in this writing, living constitutionalists do not assert as part of
their originalism that the Framers' intended future constitutional
interpretations steadfastly to conform to immutable, a priori moral truth.
2. Living Constitutionalism's Postmodern Origin --
Living Constitutionalism's just discussed anti-deontological
metatheory is hardly startling because that doctrine emerged in large part
from the progressivism of Postmodernism, 35 0 specifically, utilitarian theory
347. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Fool for the Original Constitution, 130 HARv. L.
REV. 24, 35 (2016).
348. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Hurst
v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 72 (Fl. 2016) (Pariente, J., concurring).
349. Colby & Smith, supra note 337, at 248 (citing, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.204, 209-22 (1980) and H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 907 (1985)
(arguing that, "original intention is a self-defeating philosophy")); see also Varol, supra
note 332, at 1249.
350. Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REv.1319,
1320, 1328 (2008) ("The [living constitution] metaphor arose and gained initial force during
the Progressive Era and has been at the forefront of the debate on constitutional
interpretation ever since. . . The metaphor of a 'living' Constitution did not arise before
Darwin, despite the long history and influence of the concept of the 'living law.' When
living constitutionalism did arise, it was promoted by advocates like Woodrow Wilson, who
were heavily influenced by Darwinist evolutionary thought.") (discussing as well how
Living Constitutionalism differs from classic Social Darwinism); see also, e.g., Bruce
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reflecting the early Twentieth Century Progressive Era's skepticism against
the existence of moral truth."' Professor Scott Broyles provides a cogent
historical perspective:
Perhaps the most sophisticated and direct critique of the Founders'
natural rights understanding of the first principles of government was
made by Progressive-era thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century.
Prominent scholars and politicians increasingly came to embrace the
tenets of Progressivist theory and their concomitant rejection of the
Founders' natural rights philosophy. As Professor Thomas West
observed, "[t]he Progressives repeatedly repudiated natural rights and
natural-law as unjust, ignoble, and untrue."352
Advancements in science and technology coupled with the forces of
history and the progression of scholarship disputed "modernity," ihe
Enlightenment metatheory uniting deontological morality, liberal political
theory and unbiased reason... that the Founders originally galvanized into
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1794-1801 (2007); cf,
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood Relationship Between Originalism and Popular
Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUBn. POL'Y 485, 487 (2008).
351. "'[T]he twentieth century has seen a decline in the faith in natural justice that
sparked the Declaration [of Independence],' in favor of law unapologetically based on the
partiality of the American people arguably without regard to whether such preferences
conform with deontological moral principles." Broyles, supra note 96, at 353 (quoting,
THOMAS G. WEST, The Universal Principles of the American Founding, in THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FRAMEWORK 64 (Daniel N. Robinson & Richard
N. Williams eds., 2012) and generally citing, AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM (Ronald J. Pestritto
& William J. Atto eds., 2008); CHALLENGES TO THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: SLAVERY,
HISTORICISM, AND PROGRESSIVISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Ronald J. Pestritto &
Thomas G. West eds., 2005)).
352. Id.; see also, e.g., Charles W. Carey, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Declaration
of Independence, 3 AVE MARIA L. REv. 45, 67 (2005) ("Many of the contemporary
controversies surrounding the Declaration and its place within the American political
tradition are, to a large extent, due to the disparagement of the natural law, or even a denial
of its existence, that began seriously in the United States in the nineteenth century and
continued with increasing force throughout the twentieth.").
353. Timothy P. Lendino, From Rosenberger to Martinez: Why the Rise of Hyper-
Modernism Is a Bad Thing for Religious Freedom, 33 CAMP. L. REv. 699, 701 (2011)
(comment) (first quoting DAVID LYON, CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT: POSTMODERNITY 27
(University of Minnesota Press 1999); and then quoting Hunter Baker, Competing
Orthodoxies in the Public Square: Postmodernism's Effect on Church-State Separation,
20J. L. & REL. 97, 98 (2004-2005) (explaining that "in the beginning, '[m]odernity started
out to conquer the world in the name of [r]eason.' ... The period of modernity is commonly
referred to as the Enlightenment."). Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law:
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the Constitution.35 4 In modernity's place came postmodemity espousing,
"'incredulity towards metanarratives' that is, general accounts of human
nature and history that purport to be independent of time, place, culture,
and other contextual influences, and that determine how knowledge and
truth are constituted."3 55
Accordingly, postmodernism denies the actuality of metaphysical
truth, particularly objective moral reality:
When Enlightenment displaced Christianity, one grand account of the
world was substituted for another. When postmodemism dissolved
Enlightenment, it did not replace it with yet another grand account, but
with many, little accounts, because postmodernism rejects the
possibility of all grand accounts. The contemporary world -- or, at least,
the contemporary West -- is now characterized by multiple, local, and
irreconcilable accounts of truth. "Truth," in other words, has been
replaced with "truths."356
Especially influential on the Progressive Era was "social
Darwinism,"35 the attempted application of Charles Darwin's scientific
Towards A Postcolonial Mapping, 5 SANTA CLAEA J. INT'L. L. 525, 530 (2007) (recognizing
"the Enlightenment, as the animating motor of modernity").
354. Indeed, the entire gravamen of this article's forthcoming Part II, see supra note 23,
is that the Framers both circa 1787 and circa 1868 were right and Progressive Era anti-
modernism was and remains wrong.
355. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End
ofModernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1198-99 (2005) (quoting Stanley Fish, Postmodern
Warfare, July 2002, at 33, 34.). Lendino, supra note 358, at 703 (first quoting STANLEY
GRENZ, A PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM 42 (Eerdmans Publishing 1996)) and quoting,
Hunter Baker, Competing Orthodoxies in the Public Square: Postmodernism's Effect on
Church-State Separation, 20 J. L. & RELIG. 97, 97-98 (2004-2005)). (expounding that
"Postmodernism has been termed the 'anti-Enlightenment' because it represents a new way
of thinking, which calls into question the beliefs of linear progress, absolute truth, and the
standardization of knowledge. From the postmodern viewpoint, 'knowledge no longer
appears to be certain' and individuals are 'incapable of viewing the world objectively, but
instead live in a cage constructed of [their] own experiences, culture, language, and
temperament."').
356. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religions, Fragmentations, and Doctrinal Limits, 15 WM.
& MARY B. OF RTS. J., 25, 31 (2006) (citation omitted).
357. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 305, 314-15 (1993) ("During the 1950s and 1960s, American intellectual historians
heavily reified Social Darwinism in their writing about the Gilded Age and the Progressive
era.").
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principles of evolution -- "natural selection" 5 8 -- to societal phenomena.
Specifically, "The starting point for Darwinian analysis of the human
individual is the environment. Both the human organism and its behavior
are a product of the environment, shaped over many generations. The
organism's choices are determined by the situation around it.""
According to Professor Broyles, postmodernists, "maintained that
[America's] Founders' understanding was outdated, specifically because it
predated 'the theory of evolutionary development.' In particular, '[n]atural
rights being conceived of as eternal and immutable, the theory of natural
rights did not permit of their amendment in view of a change in
conditions."'36 0 Accenting that idea, Thomas West added, "The influential
scholar John Dewey ridiculed the natural rights thinking of the Founding
generation as follows: 'Natural rights and natural liberties exist only in the
kingdom of mythological social zoology."'361
In addition to its post-modernistic bent of denying deontological
moral norms, sad historical actuality teaches that many Social Darwinists
distorted whatever neutral scientific methods basic Darwinism espoused by
routinely promoting partisan political outcomes, typically premised on
asserted white-male Protestant superiority.3 62 Not surprisingly, a popular
358. Joan Vogel, Biological Theories of Human Behavior: Admonitions of a Skeptic, 22
VT. L. REv. 425, 427 (1997) (footnote omitted) ("The publication of [Charles Darwin, The]
Origins ofthe Species [by Means ofNatural Selection or the Preservation ofFavored Races
in the Struggle for Life (1859)] and Darwin's concept that all life evolved was a critical
advance in biology. Evolution is the major paradigm in modem biology."). 1
359. Hovenkamp, supra note 362, at 306 (explaining that "the central principle of
Darwinism is the theory of evolution by natural selection. Because nature produces many
more offspring than each niche in the environment can accommodate, individuals of a
particular species must compete to survive. Purely at random each individual acquires from
its parents a set of characteristics that are different from those of any other individual. Those
who inherit characteristics that give them a competitive advantage tend to live long enough
to have offspring of their own. They pass these characteristics on to future generations, who
then continue the struggle.")
360. Broyles, supra note 96, at 353 (quoting, FRANK J. GOODNOw, The American
Conception of Liberty, in AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM 62 (Ronald J. Pestritto & William J.
Atto eds., 2008)).
361. Thomas G. West, The Constitutionalism ofthe Founders Versus Modern Liberalism,
6 NEXUS 75, 86 (2001) (quoting, JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 27
(Prometheus Books, 2000) (1935)).
362. Hovenkamp, supra note 362, at 319 ("[Social] Darwinism engendered a right-wing
ideology ... that emphasized the individual in struggle with others for survival and that
regarded the outcome of that struggle as essential for the betterment of the human race.
Attempts to interfere in the struggle, such as through state redistribution of wealth, could
lead only to retardation of the evolutionary process or perhaps even to degradation.")
(footnote omitted); see also Vogel, supra note 340, at 427.
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strain of legal historical analysis claims that the worst of Social Darwinist
postmodernity strongly influenced early and mid-Twentieth Century law,
particularly constitutional doctrine striking labor laws and economic
regulations designed to protect workers and consumers. 3 63  Professor
Hovenkamp, by contrast, argues that Social Darwinism's sway has been
and remains overstated by commentators who fail to take into account the
influence of competing, possibly compatible theories, particularly
"marginalism" which posits "the human being" not simply as a leaf blown
by the combined winds of hereditary and communal inducements, but
largely, "as an autonomous decision maker."'" Even accepting that Social
Darwinism's influence has been overestimated by many analysts, 3 65 this
writing agrees with critics who urge that Postmodernism correctly accepted
the inevitability of science but mistakenly denied any corresponding
inevitability of moral truth, which provides a dichotomy contrary to the
Founders' Enlightenment-inspired philosophy.3 * Indeed, postmodernist
principles defy essentially all that the Founders circa 1787 and 1868
understood and embraced 367 because, "Postmodernity is the end of
Enlightenment. It is the end of modernity's promise of an objective
understanding of the world that would enable our control of it. History and
363. Hovenkamp, supra note 362, at 315 ("Social Darwinism is still the fashionable
paradigm for explaining liberty of contract and the Supreme Court's general laissez-faire
position after the turn of the century.") (footnote omitted).
364. Id. at 306 ("Each individual has a certain amount of wealth and a collection of
wants, but as his desire for some particular thing is fulfilled, his wish for more of that thing
diminishes. The individual then maximizes his satisfaction by purchasing goods in such
quantities so that, at the margin, the amount of satisfaction each gives him is precisely the
same.") (citing, WILLIAM S. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-2 (Oxford,
1871)).
365. Id. at 315 (footnotes omitted). ("[O]ne viewing mainstream legal writing during [the
early and mid-Twentieth Century] is struck by the absence of explicit references to Social
Darwinist rhetoric. Historians have been quite willing to assign Darwinism as the cause of
the legal revolution of the turn of the century, even though this theory has only the thinnest
support in the writings of the period's legal scholars themselves."). Samuel R. Olken,
Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the
Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RT. J. 1, 30 (1997) ("Neither laissez-faire
economics nor Social Darwinism was the principal basis of constitutional decision making
during the height of economic substantive due process." Rather, although arguably
misperceiving and misapplying relevant theories, purportedly Social Darwinist "judges'
more paramount concerns [sounded in] equality and the relationship between private rights
and public authority."). .
366. Broyles, supra note 96, at 353 (quoting Goodnow, supra note 342, at 62)
("maintain[ing] that the Founders' understanding was outdated, specifically because it
predated 'the theory of evolutionary development."').
367. See infra note 23, Part II, at Section 1.
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the social sciences have laid aside their pretense to objectivity and
universality."36 8
This article hopes that previous Sections 2 and 3 may help restore the
original understanding of the Founders by debunking postmodemist
skepticism averring that law and morality are merely and exclusively
partisan constructs -- a skepticism that permeates modem legal
scholarship.369 Therefore, I have strived to prove that "yes" is the answer
to the question, "perhaps the news of modernity's death, accompanied by
the supposed advent of postmodernity, has been greatly exaggerated?"37 0
3. Living Constitutionalism's Myth ofNeutrality --
Originalists quarrel not only with Living Constitutionalism's premise
that constitutional meaning evolves over time, but also with its
methodology. Living constitutionalists understandably claim that their
methods are strict, reliable and neutral. In that regard, the Supreme Court
has earnestly urged that apprehending "evolving standards of decency" 371
requires applying "objective factors,"3 72 typified by identifying applicable
contemporary community opinions concerning constitutional imperatives
such as the Eighth Amendment's ban against "cruel and unusual
punishments."3 73  Living constitutionalists claim to agree with judicial
rulings opining that faithful adherence to historical or scientific empiricism
dissuades judges from mistaking their personal sentiments for
constitutional law. Nonetheless,
368. Gedicks, supra note 360, at 1205. Gilnter Frankenberg, Down by Law: Irony,
Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. L. REv. 360, 372 (1989) (characterizing postmodernity as
"a revolt against institutionalized modernity and ... a radicalization of the linguistic turn.").
369. Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 415, 435 (1999) ("Very few contemporary
legal academics believe that there are internally-right answers to all moral-rights questions.
The majority ... claim that there are no internally-right answers to any moral-rights
questions. Indeed, ... [they] argue that there are no internally-right answers to moral-rights
questions whose answers are socially contested.").
370. Lendino, supra note 358, at 699 (citing JAMES K.A. SMITH, INTRODUCING RADICAL
ORTHODOXY: MAPPING A POST-SECULAR THEOLOGY 31-32 (Baker Academic 2004)).
371. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see also, e.g.,
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2274 (2015); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010).
372. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) ("those evolving standards [of
decency] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent."); see
also, e.g., U.S. v. LaFond, 892 Fed.Appx. 242, 245 (6th Cir. 2017); U.S. v. Reingold, 731
F.3d 204, 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2013); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 2010).
373. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 368 (citing cases).
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[L]iving constitutionalists insist that the legitimacy of the
[Constitution] cannot be fully defended if our first-order approach to it
draws exclusively upon the historical. This requires that at the first-
order level of constitutional interpretation and first-order derivation of
the document's underlying principles themselves much more than
history must be in play. The entire matrix of the various modalities of
constitutional interpretation is fair game to enable an authentic
dynamicism that can contribute to contemporary legitimacy.3 74
Consistent with Professor Lieb's assessment, the Supreme Court
recently admonished that discerning "evolving standards of decency" may
be informed by, but never depends on conformity with "a historical
prism." 375  Such apparent latitude prompts critics' now well-known
concern that the very idea of a "living constitution" coupled with Living
Constitutionalism's free-wheeling methodology invites judges,
consciously or inadvertently, to conflate their political partisanism and
subjective moral principles with objectively discerned evolving
community "standards of decency," thus implanting their personal
constitutional philosophy as abiding constitutional law.3 76 That propensity
becomes especially worrisome when, as often is the case, several plausible
principles compete for the prevailing "standard of decency."37 7 Indeed, one
incensed commentator lashed out that living constitutionalists and other
374. Lieb, supra note 346, at 360.
375. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (mandatory life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole imposed on persons who, when they committed their
crimes, were under 18-years-old, is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment); see also
U.S. v. Hunter, 735 F.3d 172, 174 (4th Cir. 2013).
376. E.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 742 (2016) (Scalia, J., with Thomas
and Alito, JJ., dissenting, complaining that the Court wrongly has, "empowered and
obligated federal (and after today state) habeas courts to invoke this Court's Eighth
Amendment 'evolving standards of decency' jurisprudence to upset punishments that were
constitutional when imposed but are "cruel and unusual," ... in our newly enlightened
society"); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., with Thomas, J.,
concurring, decrying what they perceived as a, "proliferation of labyrinthine restrictions on
capital punishment, promulgated by this Court under an interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment that empowered it to divine 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,' a task for which we are eminently ill suited."(citation
omitted)).
377. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quoting,
Hon. Patricia N. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983)) (critiquing the use of legislative
history by stating that "judicial investigation ... has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge
Leventhal's memorable phrase, an exercise in 'looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends."').
110 [Vol. 43:1
PARTI- ORIGINALISMAND DEONTOLOGY
"nonoriginalists actually have little respect for law, at least insofar as law
might be a genuinely operative constraint on the Court or on their own
arguments about what the Court should, must, or may do.""'
These emphatic, almost frantic complaints about Living
Constitutionalism's methods seem irrelevant. All theories, including
Originalism, may be corrupted by unfaithful adherents who abuse neutral
methodology. Regarding any jurisprudence, researchers can investigate
the bonafides of the relevant rationale supporting a particular outcome to
discern whether the given judge or commentator faithfully depicted the
factual record and reliably presented applicable legal theory. To be
credible and honest, judges and commentators cannot review the expanse
of theories and arguments to merely "pick[] out [their] friends" 3 7 9 without
considering the risk that diligent reviewers will discern such dishonesty,
thereby rightly tarnishing, possibly irrevocably, the particular judge or
commentator's reputation for veracity. Regardless, Originalism, with its
emphasis on respecting the Framers' original intent and meanings
discerned through supposedly impartial empirical and historical methods,
arose as a counterpoint to the perceived errors and excesses of Living
Constitutionalism, not the least of which is purportedly replacing "the rule
of law" with "the rule ofjudges."380
378. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 283, 287 (1996) (footnotes omitted) ("The hypocrisy of many of the
nonoriginalists' arguments, the deliberate masking of their real agenda, the lack of candor,
the absence of respect for (or even acknowledgment of) law as a constraint -- all of these
features exert a corrupting influence on the enterprise, on the very idea of law itself. Thus,
in response, an important function of Originalism is to exemplify, to enforce, and to sustain
the rule of law.").
379. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
380. Regents of the U. of Michigan v. Titan Ins. Co., 791 N.W.2d 897, 916 n. 11 (2010)
(Justice Young of the Michigan Supreme Court wrote, "and, as the public is no doubt aware,
'common sense' is not so common and [any given judge] has no greater fund of common
sense than anyone else. If for no other reason, that is why simply 'following the law' is the
best course for any serious jurist committed to the 'rule of law' rather than the 'rule of
judges."'); Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Assoc., 491 Mich. 200, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012); see
also, e.g., U.S. v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 410 U.S. 715, 727 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (the dissent's "argument ... has nothing whatever to do with the rule of law. It
exalts merely the rule of judges by approving punishment of an individual for the le se-
majeste of asserting a constitutional right before we said he had it.").
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D. Deontological Originalism Rightly Avers that the Constitution Is
Sacred Not Because of that Document's Status as a Constitution, but
Because the Constitution Duly Ordains Moral Comportment as America's
Highest Law
Despite their disagreements over methodology, Originalism and
Living Constitutionalism share a fundamental justification for existence.
Both philosophies hope to provide legitimacy in requiring and justifying
obedience to the Constitution.38 ' As Professor Lieb astutely commented,
"it is only our Constitution because it is suffused with and supported by
contemporary assent."3 82 Attaining "contemporary assent," in turn, has
become contentious because, as earlier noted, "the question, raised
persistently as we move further and further from the time of the Founding,
is whether we realistically can, or should, continue to remain faithful to the
Founders' written Constitution."3 83 Arguably, Originalism's answer to
Friedman and Smith's question, of course, is a resounding, yes.
As the previous discussion suggests, for living constitutionalists,
however, the answer is a qualified "yes." Professor Lieb encapsulated
Living Constitutionalism's stance nicely:
Living constitutionalism takes the threat of basic illegitimacy very
seriously. Although the document needn't be considered profane,
neither can it be treated as sacred. Our civic life together is not a
religious covenantal community that requires adherence to our
governing document just because it happens to exist and happens to
help constitute us as a people. The document and our life under it
always stands [sic] in need of moral, practical, and political justification
-- and living constitutionalism always requires us to ask for that
justification at the very moment when we ask for the meaning of the
document and its provisions. This is why living constitutionalists
381. Lieb, supra note 346, at 364; accord, Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONs'T. COMM. 427, 437 (2007) (quoting Lieb).
382. Lieb, supra note 346, at 360.
383. Friedman & Smith, supra note 334, at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
384. Not surprisingly however, although dedicated to venerating the Constitution, the
disagreements among various subcategories of Originalism concern each offshoot's claim
to have discerned which ideas, standards, or principles emanating from the Constitution are
inviolate, thus unconditionally binding on future generations. See infra Section 4-G.
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cannot give history pride of place and require a much more eclectic
approach to first-order inquiries in its interpretive mechanics.3 8 5
Nearly a century ago, Professor Howard Lee McBain expressed the
postmodernist perspective glibly: the Constitution "was not handed down
on Mount Sinai by the Lord God of Hosts. It is not revealed law. It is no
final cause." 386
Thus, according to Living Constitutionalism and similar paradigms,
although the Constitution technically is America's highest governing law,
constitutional meaning cannot be obdurate. Rather, as the Constitution's
text must be pliable to fit the needs of an ever-changing America, there are
neither unalterable textual meanings nor unalterable textual applications
even if research reveals that the Founders' original stances on such
meanings or applications effectively are beyond debate.387 Original
meanings, then, are worthy of both respect and apt consideration, but not
adoration because, under Living Constitutionalism, original meanings are
purely utilitarian. That is, original meanings are enforceable only to the
extent that, in the view of living originalists, they generate the best possible
resolutions of constitutional dilemmas. If the purportedly best resolutions
of such dilemmas arise from non-original meanings, then such new
meanings become the Constitution's meaning no matter how divorced or
disconnected such new meanings may be from the original understanding.
Deontological Originalism fully agrees that the Framers did not intend
that their collective beliefs, preferences and opinions, or those of their
greater communities, would be the sole legitimate basis upon which to
resolve any given constitutional issues. Such a position, as further
explicated in Part II, would ascribe to the Founders an implausible vanity,
arrogance and indifference to the best interests of the very nation they
founded. Even assuming meticulous research disclosed apparent
consensus among the Founders regarding any particular constitutional
385. Lieb, supra note 346, at 364 (emphasis added).
386. HOWARD LEE McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE
REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW 272 (1927) (quoted in Lieb, supra
note 346, at 364 n. 25).
387. Actually, living constitutionalists might agree that there are two unalterable
constitutional meanings. First, pursuant to earlier discussed theory, Living
Constitutionalism can be understood to hold that the Framers' operative original meaning
is that they imposed no original meaning; rather, the Constitution's meaning accords with
how contemporary interpreters would resolve contemporary issues based on contemporary
mores. Second, living constitutionalists very likely would agree that, unless amended, the
Constitution is America's highest law.
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dilemma, there is no convincing evidence that they wished to constrain
their successors. The Founders knew that they could not anticipate every
tribulation that would confront the United States, much less actually
discern correct solutions to every arising problem."' The Supreme Court
summarized the proposition well:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom. 389
That being said, Deontological Originalism does not agree with
Living Constitutionalism's proposition that the Framers intended the
Constitution's text to be open to any and all interpretations based on the
then-popular or prevailing "moral, practical, and political
justification[s]",3" even assuming such "justifications" are sincere, well-
intended and unselfish. Rather, Deontological Originalism recognizes that
the Framers' and the Reconstruction Congress' foremost, and likely
primary intent was to enforce through the Constitution, the natural law
principles set forth in the Declaration of Independence.3 91 Moreover, that
primary intent is not controlling merely because it emanated from the
Framers. Rather, Deontological Originalism avers that to be legitimate, a
constitution or similar charter of governance must be predicated upon --
must elevate as highest law -- deontological morality as defined earlier in
388. See Bayer, supra note 23, Part II, Section 3-C presents detailed arguments that the
Founders neither expected nor wanted the Constitution to be interpreted pursuant to an
originalist framework holding that the only correct outcome to any constitutional issues is
that which comports as closely as possible with how the Founders or their communities
would resolve the given matter.
389. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003) (states may not criminalize acts
of homosexual intercourse performed in private by consenting adults). See also, Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lawrence); Raich v. Gonzales, 500
F.3d 850, 865 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).
390. Lieb, supra note 346, at 364.
391. See Bayer, supra note 23, Part II, Sections 2-4.
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this writing.392 Therefore, regarding the Constitution, the Framers' primary
intent is enforceable as the framework for all constitutional meanings
because they rightly instructed that such meanings abide by the Natural
Law principles of the Declaration. Accordingly, the originalist aspect of
Deontological Originalism is limited to one and only one proposition that
the Framers and the Reconstruction Congress properly designated that any
and all meanings and applications of the Constitution must comport with
deontological principles. Therefore, all acts of American government, at
all levels and by all offices, must be moral.
In stark contrast, the infirmity of Living Constitutionalism is that by
rendering our national charter a device that can mean anything at any time,
the Constitution degenerates into a purely instrumental empty vessel. It
becomes a tool for promoting the possibly sincere, but consequentialist,
rather than deontological-based goals of living constitutionalists. In so
doing, Living Constitutionalism robs our Constitution of its most essential,
almost miraculous characteristic: the Constitution is not merely an
instrument, a means of attaining goals, but rather, the Constitution actually
is an end in itself an end that if attained, assures morality as America's
controlling law.
Therefore, obedience to the Constitution is an incontrovertible
obligation of all persons and offices under the jurisdiction of the United
States -- attaining the goals and purposes of the Constitution is itselfan end
and not simply a means to attain some other goal or set of goals. Ironically
then, Living Constitutionalism correctly understands that, in some extra-
human capacity, the Constitution is alive -- it is a living thing that
commands how the entire American order should exist. But what makes
the Constitution a living entity is not that its meaning can change as living
constitutionalists (or some other group) see fit. Rather, it is those principles
of the Constitution that are immutable -- that cannot legitimately be
changed even through the amending process -- that constitute the
constitutional life force. Ignore those principles in the name of living
constitutionalism (or of some other philosophy) and you have either killed
the Constitution or changed it into a different, inferior lifeform. In short,
like the morality it enforces, the Constitution rules us, we do not rule it.
392. See WOOD, supra note 279, at 302; supra Sections 2-a, b, c, d and Section 3
(explaining why morality is deontological and arguing that among deontological theories,
the philosophy of Immanuel Kant provides the best available precepts, thus, Kantian
morality must instruct, indeed regulate the behavior of individuals and governments alike.).
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Therefore, in one hugely significant aspect, Living Constitutionalism
as encapsulated by McBain is mistaken. The Constitution must be
considered "sacred" in a secular sense, because it properly mandates as
law the immutable principles of moral governance set forth in the
Declaration of Independence. In that regard, true constitutional
originalism does not perforce elevate as supreme law the Framers' answer,
if discernable, regarding any discrete matter. To the contrary, by
commanding governmental moral comportment at all times, from all
offices, at all levels, under all conditions, the only present effect the
Framers can mandate on contemporary America is that its Government
does no wrong. While reasonable minds might differ whether the particular
law or conduct under constitutional review reflects sound political,
economic or social policy, such policy disputes are immaterial to
constitutional challenges. Rather, if the challenged law or conduct is
moral, it is constitutional, thus, the Government in fact has done no
wrong. 393
Therefore, Deontological Originalism safeguards against the
corrosive effects of the Framers' "dead hands" while simultaneously
refuting Living Constitutionalism's erroneous anti-originalist premise that
the Framers' "original intent" must not dominate constitutional law.394 The
refutation of Living Constitutionalism leads us to the essential point of
Deontological Originalism: Originalism's emphasis on original intent is
correct not because the Framers 'original intent, whatever it may be, is per
se enforceable, but because by designing the Constitution to enforce the
natural rights principles of the Declaration, the Framers' original intent is
morally sound, thus a viable and appropriate basis upon which to judge
the legitimacy ofAmerican governmental actions ofall kinds, by all offices,
at all levels.
393. See supra notes 30-78 and accompanying text. A moral policy of some level of
American government might nonetheless be unwise policy. In that regard, the given policy
is not "good;" but, because it is moral, the bad policy is not wrongful. Such is the pivotal
distinction between the "right" and the "good" in moral theory.
394. It is worth re-emphasizing that while it avers that the right answer to any
constitutional dilemma is that which promotes the morally correct outcome, Living
Constitutionalism fails because it denies that morality is deontological. Thus, the
purportedly moral outcomes Living Constitutionalism promotes are based on human
constructs, not unbiased reason which is precisely how true morality is not constituted.
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E. IfMorality Is Deontological, Why Bother with Originalism at All? --
The foregoing proposition raises an important methodological
question regarding Deontological Originalism: if the Constitution's
legitimacy is based on whether it properly requires all offices of American
government to act morally, and if morality is deontological -- that is, moral
truths pre-exist and are unalterable by Humankind -- then why does
Originalism matter at all? According to this article's theory, the
deontological construction of the Constitution must prevail even if the
Framers circa 1787-1791 and 1866-1868 never intended their Constitution
to foster deontological morality, much less mandated, for instance, that
Government accord to same-sex marriage the same rights and privileges
accorded to opposite-sex unions."' If indeed a deontological Constitution
dominates all other interpretive methods of constitutional law, then a critic
might ask, "Why spend valuable journal space attempting the originalist
task of linking moral theory to the Framers' mindset? Why not just prove
that morality is deontological, find the proper moral precepts, and apply
those deontological precepts to discrete constitutional matters?"
Such questions are sensible because, after all, if the Framers did not
intend a deontological constitution, they were wrong; therefore, their intent
becomes completely irrelevant to what the Constitution actually should
mean and how it should be applied in discrete circumstances.
Alternatively, if the Framers intended a deontological constitution, that is
well and good, and speaks glowingly of their perceptiveness; but, arguably
tells us nothing urgent because any specific or particular viewpoints the
Framers held explicating moral philosophy in general or resolving discrete
constitutional dilemmas may be informative, but are not mandatory, and
certainly unworthy of actual enforcement if modern-day analysis reveals
their moral analyses to be infirm. That is, the rightness of any specific,
discrete moral judgments attributable to the Framers cannot be presumed -
- cannot be applied simply because the Framers held them -- but, rather
must be tested pursuant to the best moral theory currently available even if
such modern theories were unknown during the Framers' time.396 Because
395. See, supra note 23, Part Ll, Section 6-c-6 (explaining why the Supreme Court's
recent substantive due process jurisprudence predicate on "human dignity" and specifically
requiring all levels of American government to treat same-sex marriages equally with
opposite-sex marriages is eminently correct).
396. See supra notes 393-94; supra note 23, Part II, Section 3-c. Perceptive and
forthright, the Founders understood and accepted the proposition that their successors might
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any purported moral stance of the Framers would have to be verified and
not, as some strains of Originalism asserts, simply adopted as the right
answer to any relevant constitutional matter, one may wonder whether what
Originalism "brings to the party" is not profundity, but rather a facade of
jurisprudential and historical legitimacy through claimed but essentially
meaningless loyalty to original intent?
1. Without an Originalist Link, Constitutional Interpretation and
Application Cannot Be Legitimate --
Yet, there is an unmistakable allure -- an apt compellingness -- to the
fundamental idea of Originalism that makes us want to link to the Framers'
wisdom even if doing so were not essential to proving our theories. As one
of originalist theory's leading analysists, Jack Balkin, cunningly accented
in his pivotal volume, Living Originalism, "Most successful political and
social movements in America's history have claimed authority for change
... either as a call to return to enduring principles of the Constitution or as
a call for fulfillment of those principles."39 7 Such allure stems from the
significant, arguably critical truth of Originalism's most basic concept -- a
core idea upon which the entire family of otherwise often discordant
originalists agree: a viable, legitimate theory of the Constitution must be
grounded on the intent ofthe originators -- the Framers. That is why Profs.
Bennett and Solum aptly concluded, "We are all originalists now." 398
A dismayed Prof. James Fleming responded, "If we define originalism
inclusively enough, we might say that we evidently are all originalists now.
Indeed, we might just define originalism so broadly that even I would no
longer hope that we are not all originalists now!" 3 Professor Fleming is
discern more complete, more correct moral precepts than did the Founders themselves.
Therefore, rather than constrain the Constitution with their "dead hands," the Founders
expected that charter's provisions to be understood and enforced pursuant to the better moral
comprehension of ensuing generation.
397. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 11 (The Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 2011).
398. Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate,
CORNELL UNIV. PRESS, 360, 361 (2011).
399. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not, 91 TEXAS L. REV.
1785, 1781 (2013); see also, Prakash, supra note 352, at 32 (confirming Fleming's
concerns, during her confirmation hearings, then-Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Elena Kagan testified, "[W]e are all originalists.") (quoting The Nomination of Elena
Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 62 (2010),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111 shrg67622/pdf/CHRG-l ll shrg67622.pdf
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right that the label "Originalism" could subsume any theory of
constitutional meaning to the extent that such theory avers some bond to
the will of the Framers or the Framers' greater society. Accordingly, we
might all be originalists yet "persist in most of our theoretical
disagreements -- it is just that we would say that the disagreements are
among varieties of so-called originalism. And the debates concerning
interpretation and construction, thus recast or translated, would go on much
as before." 400
But, the possibility -- indeed the essential certainty that all but the
most radical constitutional theorists will seek to legitimize their paradigms
by appealing to the Founders does not render Originalism meaningless
because claiming is not proving. To win the war of competing theories,
any self-styled originalist is obliged to demonstrate that her brand of
Originalism truly comports with the intentions of the Framers; and, surely
not all such claims, particularly when incompatible, rightfully can be- so
attributed. Indeed, I hope to prove that Deontological Originalism is the
only reliable exponent of the originalist project.40 1 Therefore, it is crucial
that this writing's proposed deontological understanding of the
Constitution is consistent with the overarching intent of the Framers both
circa 1787 and 1868 when the Declaration's natural rights foundations
were formally applied as constitutional law applicable to the States. Were
it not, America would have to re-ratify that charter (or ratify some newly
drafted document) expressly linking constitutional mandates to the natural
rights principles of the Declaration.4 02
Intriguingly then, Originalism's first inquiry is not: What exactly was
the "intent of the Framers?" Discerning the specifics of original intent, if
indeed such is discernable," is not Originalism's first, but rather the
[https://perma.cc/2XDE-ZNBT] (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United
States)).
400. Fleming, supra note 404, at 1788.
401. I have proven that morality is deontological (and that Kantian morality best
explicates morality's deontology). See, infra Sections 2-3. 1 am about to prove that any
valid theory of constitutional meaning and interpretation must be originalist. Thus, by the
end of this writing's Part I, I will have proved that Deontological Originalism is the proper
originalist theory.
402. Thereafter, in the forthcoming Part II, see supra note 23, I will show that indeed the
Founders and the Reconstruction Congress embraced Deontological Originalism and that
such informs most, but not all, modem substantive due process jurisprudence. Accordingly,
such current due process analysis that denies Deontological Originalism is infirm.
403. Some critics argue that Originalism is a hopeless paradigm because there cannot
actually be a concrete, single shared intent among a divergent and political group as were
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second concern. The first concern of Originalism is proving why only an
originalist framework can verify the legitimacy of the Constitution to
vindicate our communally invested faith, trust and belief in that charter. As
Professor Balkin aptly noted, "Constitutional construction changes by
arguing about what we already believe, what we already are committed to,
what we have promised ourselves as a people, what we must return to, and
what commitments remain to be fulfilled."404
To that effect, Profs. Pojanowski and Walsh summed up
Originalism's major considerations of which the last is pivotal:
On normative grounds, many originalists claim that it is good, as a
matter of political morality, for courts to be originalist. This could be
because originalism reins in platonic guardians, promotes popular
sovereignty, maximizes liberty, or is good rule-consequentialism.
Others argue, on conceptual grounds, that a proper philosophical
understanding of legal authority or interpretation entails an originalist
methodology.405
While providing useful lists of legitimate concerns, Originalism's
core principle is what Pojanowski and Walsh described as, "a proper
the Framers of the Constitution. Colby & Smith, supra note 337, at 248 (arguing that "the
theory of original intent was met with savage criticism, focusing most prominently on two
fundamental weaknesses. First, it is nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent
of a large group of individuals, each of whom may have had different intentions.") (citing
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204,
209-22 (1980) and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 907 (1985)).
404. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 11.
405. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L. J. 97,
102 (2016) (emphasis added; citing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d Ed.
1977) and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1990)). Similarly attempting an encapsulation, Professor Lieb offered attributes that,
not surprisingly, infer that absent Originalism, constitutional interpretation lacks legitimacy.
Lieb, supra note 346, at 357-58 (emphasis added) (highlighting that the core attribute --
Originalism's sine qua non -- within Lieb's list:
"[Originalism] has all kinds of benefits, which is why originalism is attractive to so many:
It is parsimonious; it gives us ground to debate hard questions at some remove from our
personal political and moral preferences; it may keep judges in check so they don't impose
their preferences upon us; it may allow our confirmation battles to be less explosive
(assuming everyone bought in); and it may be the best way (or only way!) to get at the very
meaning of the text itself This is why some originalists think originalism is simply the
pragmatic choice: it is, perhaps, a lesser evil, there is no good and coherent competitor, and
democratic legislatures and social movements will function better if we embrace its elegant
minimalism.")
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philosophical understanding of legal authority or interpretation," and Lieb
denoted as the, "the best way (or the only way!) to get at the very meaning
of the text itself." They are correct because, absent an originalist
commitment, the Constitution has no grounding to accord its text any
meanings, basic or intricate. Without established meanings to gird it, the
Constitution becomes essentially a chameleon of delineations susceptible
to change depending on the sentiments, well-intended or otherwise, of
those who enforce it. Absent a valid foundation attributable to the original
authors, there are no underpinnings girding the statutes, regulations,
judicial decisions and governmental edicts purportedly based on and
consistent with constitutional provisions. Thus, theories such as Living
Constitutionalism when understood to purport that constitutional text
essentially means what subsequent generations -- or more likely, their elite
powers --prefer that text to mean might render the Constitution technically
enforceable but effectively meaningless for it conveys nothing timeless,
nothing compulsory, nothing from the past binding on the future, thereby
rendering the text itself ungrounded, unmoored, and unsubstantiated by
anything other than the egocentrism of the now.
Without such girding, constitutional meaning is ad hoc -- perhaps, as
Living Constitutionalism would have it, reflecting the best contemporary
understandings, possibly, as cynics respond, promoting the corrupt
preferences of elites who control of the modes of interpretation -- but
always subject to change based on the caprice of those individuals or
groups holding power enough to set the constitutional meaning de jour.
The Framers surely did not intend and the Constitution cannot be an
insincere shell, subject to constant redefining based on the political power
of whomever seeks to dominate the American soul. As Justice Antonin
Scalia properly concluded, "It does seem to me that a constitution whose
meaning changes as our notions of what it ought to mean change is not
worth a whole lot." 40
406. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 581, 594 (1989/1990).
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a. The Supreme Court's Affirmation, "We Must Never Forget, That It
Is a Constitution We Are Expounding" Expresses the Heart of
Originalism.
A reasonable person might respond: What if the Constitution is an
empty vessel? What is the harm in a fluid charter which, as Living
Constitutionalism urges, liberates the Constitution from the shackles of
uncritical application of original intent thereby allowing its extensive and
often necessarily vague provisions momentous contemporary meanings?407
First year law students, if not before, learn the answer from Chief
Justice John Marshall who, speaking for a unanimous Court, wrote one of
the most celebrated and imperative observations in the annals of
constitutional law, "We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.""o Marshall memorably explained the fundamental meaning
of his ambitious assertion: a constitution, "contain[ing] an accurate detail
of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the
prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human
mind." 409 The McCulloch Court's insight that, by its nature, a constitution
is something much more profound and significant than a common legal
code, surely is among the most critical of any proposition of American law.
Writing at the twilight of his remarkable career as scholar, teacher, lawyer
and Supreme Court justice, "[Felix] Frankfurter called Chief Justice
Marshall's admonition the 'most important, single sentence in American
Constitutional Law."'4 0 Frankfurter did not indulge hyperbole because,
indeed, there must be something unique about a constitution that
407. Joseph Grcic, The Supreme Court Decision: Consensus or Coercion?, 54 FED.
LAWYER 52, 54 (2007) (citing AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, 7-28 (New York:
Random House, 2005) and quoting Amar at 34)("Many have argued that the Constitution
must be vague and indeterminate in part to be relevant and useful in future unforeseen and,
to the framers, unforeseeable circumstances. Even Justice William Rehnquist stated, 'The
framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding
generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly unchanging environment
in which they would live. ... They [gave] latitude to those who would later interpret the
instrument to make that language applicable to cases that the framers might not have
foreseen."' Quoted from, William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 402 (2006)).
408. MCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
409. Id.
410. Alex Glashauser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1245 n. 7 (2005) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX
FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 166 (1960)).
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demarcates it from all other law -- something that, as Chief Justice Marshall
accented, requires it not to assume "the prolixity of a legal code."41 1
The demarcating principle certainly is no secret. Again quoting
McCulloch, under American theory, a constitution is Society's governing
charter, not designed as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, but instead,
commemorating the "great outlines" and "important objects" of that
society.412 As such, all other law is inferior to the Constitution and must
fall if incompatible therewith.4 13 Chief Justice Marshall explained that our
Constitution comprises, or perhaps better put by borrowing from its very
term, constitutes the supreme law 4 14 -- the overarching legally enforceable
framework by which all lesser law, no matter how important and profound,
is subordinated -- principles unsurprisingly still heralded by today's
Judiciary.4 15 One would expect no less from the document that comprises
the written embodiment of an actual "social contract," 416 commemorating
the essential principles underlying the social order that it governs. 417 It is
not surprising, then, that acknowledging and preserving constitutional
411. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
412. Id.
413. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (quoting, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803) (per Marshall, C.J.)) ("Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
'supreme Law of the Land."'); see also, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LL.C.,
136 S.Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594-95 (2015)
(referencing Art. VI).
414. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (the Constitution is -"the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
(holding that the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the United States).
415. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mkt'g, LLC., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) ("The
Supremacy Clause makes the laws of the United States 'the supreme Law of the Land; ...
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' U.S.
CONST., art. VI, cl. 2); Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623
(2013)("State legislation may not contravene federal law."); .
416. Simon, supra note 63, at 1484-85.
417. Lieb, supra note 346, at 364 (suggesting that, "admittedly, it is somewhat
unfashionable these days to believe that political obligation, our obligation to obey the law
of the Constitution, stems from any social contract theory of the traditional liberal form.
Still, underlying many versions of both originalism and living constitutionalism remains
some view that the Constitution's legitimacy as binding law derives, in part, from its role
as our organizing social contract.")
Consistent with the foregoing, we have learned thanks to Immanuel Kant that the
social contract is not simply a convenient heuristic device to explain why individuals would
wish to sacrifice complete liberty for the security of greater Society. Rather, entering into
what conveniently if not fully accurately may be denoted a social contract actually is a moral
imperative to justify how individuals routinely and consistently interact with one-another
under a communal system of laws. See supra, Section 3-d-5-A.
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supremacy is the primary reason Originalism dominates all other theories
of constitutional interpretation.4 18 The gist is worth repeating: a
constitution is not the supreme law unless the original understanding
controls lest the foundation of the given society be simply up for grabs,
changeable day-to-day based on political power.4 19 Supreme status is a
mere technicality if a constitution can connote anything at any time for, as
earlier stressed, absent some reliable, significant permanence of
constitutional meaning, the governed society has no intelligible principles
explaining its past, securing its present and guiding its future -- it is a
society completely adrift, subject to whatever political whims prevail at
any given moment.
To provide the stability of guiding principles -- to avoid government
predicated solely on political caprice -- the McCulloch Court further
explicated that our Constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."420
Two years after McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall explicated that if a
document so designated indeed is worthy to be a constitution, it deserves
perpetual life:
A constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its course
cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its
framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided it,
as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from
the perils it may be destined to encounter. 421
Marshall's construction, still vibrant today,4 22 led the early Twentieth
Century Supreme Court to agree that the quest for immortality does not
mean that a given constitution may be so vague or wanting in connotation
that it will endure not because its substance remains true over time, but
because it lacks substance at all. The Court explained:
418. Simon, supra note 63, at 1484-85.
419. Id. at 1484.
420. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
421. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821) (emphasis added).
422. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 149 (2010); Sw. General, Inc., v.
N.L.R.B., 796 F.3d 67, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting McCulloch's invocation of "the various
crises of human affairs" describes, "problems that arise when our Constitution confronts the
realities of practical governance.").
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In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot
be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a
constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little
value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas. 4 23
Professor Nelson correlated the foregoing understanding of an
enduring constitution with how the Framers obviated the objection that
their "dead hands" would unduly constrain the development and progress
of the young United States: 424
Their awareness of the "dead hand" problem, though, did not lead most
members of the founding generation to conclude that the Constitution's
meaning should continually be subject to reinterpretation. Instead, it
affected what the framers chose to put into the Constitution in the first
place. Except for a few provisions that were seen as temporary
expedients (and that therefore were drafted to expire of their own force),
the Constitution was seen as the home of "permanent" rules, cast in
terms that "would not need to be adapted flexibly to circumstances."
As Philip Hamburger has carefully demonstrated, "(r)ules that had to
be mutable" were not thought to belong in the Constitution. 4 25
Along similar lines, Professor David A. Strauss nicely captured the
Constitution's structural brilliance,
423. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Contemporary courts recognize
the wisdom of Weems. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus's of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 274 and note 19 (1989); United States v. Gonzales, 922 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2d
Cir. 1991); Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Ga. 2001); Williams v. Ragland, 567 So.
2d 63, 66 (La. 1990).
424. See supra notes 331-54 and accompanying text discussing, inter alia, Living
Constitutionalism's claim to resolve the problem of the Framers' "dead hands."
425. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 519,
542 (2003) (quoting, Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social
Change, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 239, 287, 275 (1989))("[B]oth Federalists and Anti-
Federalists distinguished rules whose formulation would need to change with the
circumstances (and that therefore were relegated to the domain of ordinary law)
from rules that were "immutable" (and that therefore were eligible for inclusion in
the Constitution). During the ratification debates, indeed, supporters of the
Constitution repeatedly used this distinction to explain why certain provisions
were or were not in the Constitution.").
2017] 125
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
The genius of the Constitution is that it is specific where specificity is
valuable, general where generality is valuable -- and that it does not put
us in unacceptable situations that we can't plausibly interpret our way
out of ... Edmund Randolph gave essentially this advice to the
Committee on Detail at the Constitutional Convention: "[T]he draught
of a fundamental constitution," he said, should include "essential
principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to
be accommodated to times and events."4 2 6
In sum, the Framers "proposed to solve the ['dead hands'] problem
not by inviting future generations to read new meanings into the
Constitution, but rather by writing a Constitution whose permanent and
fixed meaning would be 'calculated for all circumstances. "'27
Accordingly, by "adopt[ing] permanent, not evolving, values""'28 as
law4 29 supreme over all other law, our Constitution demarcates the "great
outlines" of the society it governs, and, simultaneously frees American
society to develop in ways unforeseen and possibly unwanted by the
Framers. The applications may change and vary, but to be constitutional,
they must be premised on the immutable meaning -- the moral meaning as
we now know -- of the Constitution. Such is America's very "framework
for governance.""3 0  That is how our Constitution attains legitimate
"immortality."
Indeed, Originalism exponent Justice Antonin Scalia accurately
accented that, "Originalists interpret the Constitution by reference to its
original meaning because the purpose of the Constitution 'is to prevent
change -- to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations
cannot readily take them away."'3 Therefore, as Justice Scalia rightly
concluded 170 years after the Court issued McCulloch, to last for the ages
426. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112
YALE L. J. 1717, 1736 (2003) (quoting SUPPLEMENT TO MAx FARRAND's THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987)).
427. Nelson, supra note 430, at 543 (quoting Eliot's Debates: Volume 2,
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ratification/elliot/vol2/newyork/ (last visited December
18, 2017).
428. Varol, supra note 332, at 1248 (emphasis added) (citing Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989)).
429. E.g., LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 14.
430. Id. at 35.
431. Varol, supra note 332, at 1248 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
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and to be applicable in an uncertain, unforeseen future, the meaning of the
Constitution must be premised on some understanding that withstands the
ebbs and flows of time.4 32 Professor Balkin echoed in almost spiritual tones
the sublime importance of Justice Scalia's insightful claim: the
Constitution, then, is "a repository of ideals morally superior to ordinary
law and towards which ordinary law should strive. It makes the
Constitution an object of political and moral aspiration and offers a
potential for redemption.'`33
The "redemption" of which Professor Balkin speaks is, I believe, the
earlier proven mandate that Government always must act morally. Indeed,
in the above quote, Balkin rightly sees our Constitution as "an object of
political and moral aspiration." Thus, in a very real sense, the Constitution
is "sacred."43 4
b. The Complementary Aspect of Originalism --
Originalism's legitimating process is additionally profound because it
is complementary, meaning, by defining the Constitution as the paradigm
for America, we, in turn, more completely define ourselves as individuals,
as members of respective groups, and, as the citizenry of a nation. Just as
"we endeavor[] to implement its scheme of governance and make it
successful in practice,"4' so too do we, both individually and as a society,
become defined by and understand ourselves to be living embodiments of
our Constitution's principles. Once again, in words worth quoting at
length, it was Professor Balkin who vividly recapped the formidable link
uniting a valid constitution, its effect on the people it governs, and, an
originalist perspective:
432. Scalia, supra note 411, at 596.
433. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 62.
434. Id. (claiming that the Constitution is "a repository of ideals morally superior to
ordinary law and towards which ordinary law should strive"). While passionate, Prof.
Balkin's conception is a tad off because, as we have learned, no truly moral idea is
"superior" to any other truly moral idea. See supra, Section 2. Under the Constitution, all
"ordinary law" must be moral; accordingly, what Balkin means, I hope, by "morally
superior" is that the Constitution's "ideals" are moral and, given their status as constitutional
mandates, "superior" in ranking to "ordinary law" that must, of course, comport with
constitutional morality just as constitutional morality must comport with deontological
morality.
435. Id. at 36.
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For the Constitution to be "our law," it must do two things
simultaneously. First, it must connect past generations to present ones
through a process of narrative identification. It must allow us to see
ourselves as part of a larger political project that stretches back to the
[past] and forward to the future. The Constitution succeeds as our law
when we can identify ourselves with those who framed it and adopted
it -- we [then] are able to see ourselves as part of them and them as part
of us.
Second, the Constitution must allow us to identify our present
principles and commitments with the principles and commitments of
those who lived before us. ... This understanding of the past frames our
present situation and explains how we should go forward into the
future. This identification between the past and present allows us to say
that we are continuing the work of those who came before us when we
apply the Constitution's text and principles in light of our current
circumstances."4 36
Addressing the famous words of the Constitution's Preamble,
Professor Bruce Ackerman conveyed those ideas in his energetic yet
slightly plaintive response, "to the question: Who are 'we the people of the
United States'? My proposal, and I certainly am not a constitutional
revolutionary, is [that] ... we are constituted in significant, if diminishing
part, by our constitutional narrative, and this is a very distinctive feature of
American identity.' My only disagreement is with Ackerman's wistful
assertion that "our constitutional narrative" is an ever "diminishing part ...
of [our] American identity." While the path to liberty is not and never has
been smooth, rulings such as Brown v. Board of Education4 38 and,
436. Id. at 63. Regarding what I bracketed in the quote, I believe the book's text
inadvertently printed the wrong words; thus, I offered in brackets what I take to be the right
substitutes. Specifically, I substituted the word "past" for "present," the word found in the
text, because the phrase "stretches back to the present" makes no sense as one cannot go
"back" to the present, except from the future, which is not what I take Balkin to be saying.
For the second bracket, the word in the text is "when" which clearly is a typographical error
for "then."
437. Fidelity as Synthesis: Colloquy, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1581,1581 (1997) (comments
of Professor Bruce Ackerman).
438. Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that mandatory racial
segregation of students in public elementary schools violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution).
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ultimately, Obergefell v. Hodges 4 39 evince the triumph of constitutionally
mandated moral decency over untoward prejudice. Ijoin those who believe
that, as important as they are, it is neither its territory, nor its wealth, nor
its power, but rather, its steadfastness to liberty not as largesse, but as
highest law, that has been and remains both the quintessential definition of
America and the quintessence of our identification as Americans.4 40 Seven
years ago, I tried to summarize these principles,
439. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that government must treat
same-sex marriages equally with opposite-sex marriages). See, Bayer supra note 23, Part
It at Section 5-e-6-F.
440. Cf Fowler Harper, American Demagogues etc, 64 YALE L. J. 620 (1955) (book
review) (explaining that this Nation's chronicled past and present evinces that while
claiming fidelity to liberty principles, American demagoguery tends to emphasize military
might, the accumulation of wealth, and adoration of symbols, particularly the Flag, while
castigating "excessive" free speech, "excessive" due process, "excessive" limits on police
powers and other purported constitutional excesses that shield radicals, criminals, traitors,
foreigners, and other "bad hombres" who desecrate "traditional American values.") Jacobs
v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (observing
that, "[Congress] authorized three years of investigation by a Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians. The Commission's conclusions, presented to
Congress in a December 1982 report called Personal Justice Denied, relied on hundreds of
thousands of documents and testimony from over 750 witnesses. Id. at vii, 1. The
Commission found unambiguously that Executive Order No. 9066 and the military orders
affecting Japanese Americans [during World War II including detention of law-abiding
citizens in 'camps ' were the products ofprejudice and demagoguery, rather than military
necessity. Personal Justice Denied at 4-6,27-46. But it also found that "no mass exclusion
or detention, in any part of the country was ordered against American citizens of German
or Italian descent," and that actions against German or Italian aliens were "much more
individualized and selective than those imposed on the ethnic Japanese."').
Very recently, in a different yet arguably related setting, the Hon. Stephen Reinhart
despondently observed while concurring in the Court's decision that the deportation at issue
was legal under prevailing statutes:
President [Donald J.] Trump has claimed that his immigration policies would target
the "bad hombres." The government's decision to remove Magana Ortiz shows
that even the "good hombres" are not safe. Magana Ortiz is by all accounts a pillar
of his community and a devoted father and husband. It is difficult to see how the
government's decision to expel him is consistent with the President's promise of an
immigration system with "a lot of heart." I find no such compassion in the
government's choice to deport Magana Ortiz.
We are unable to prevent Magana Ortiz's removal, yet it is contrary to the values
of this nation and its legal system. Indeed, the government's decision to remove
Magana Ortiz diminishes not only our country but our courts, which are supposedly
dedicated to the pursuit ofjustice. Magana Ortiz and his family are in truth not the
only victims. Among the others are judges who, forced to participate in such
inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as well. I concur as a judge,
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To be a true constitution, that which a society calls its constitution must
enforce values so imperative, so fundamental, that the constitution
comprises not only a way to live but more profoundly, a reason to die.
... Pursuant to the character of true and legitimate constitutions, the
Constitution of the United States defines who we are, what we are and,
most importantly, why we are. Our Constitution purports to set the
governing minima without which no society may be legitimate."
In that manner, the pursuit of immorality by memorializing as highest
law unchanging liberty rights based on "permanent ... values" is not only
the Framers' quest but our quest -- every American's quest for all
generations. "[I]t is not enough that the American Constitution serves as
basic law ... or as higher law ... It must also be our law.""2 Jack Balkin
again provides the explanation,
Treating the Constitution as our law today means that we adopt its plan
for governance and that we implement and build on it in ways that are
consistent with the plan, including any amendments authorized by the
plan. Fidelity to the Constitution as law requires that we view ourselves
as endeavoring to implement its scheme of governance and make it
successful in practice."3
While the Framers' quest becomes our quest, it is vital to re-
emphasize that our quest is not to promote the detailed minutiae the
Framers might have espoused in discrete laws, essays, speeches, letters and
other communications. Such particulars, as Chief Justice Marshall so ably
explained, are not what comprise constitutions. Rather, constitutions are
but as a citizen I do not. Ortiz v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 966, 967 (2017) (Reinhart, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted).
I will note in passing that, based on the vast bulk of his policies and actions, both alone
and in combination, Donald J. Trump as President presents the single greatest threat to
the principles of Deontological Originalism every inflicted by a sitting president. His
fascistic ways, unless fully repudiated, promise to replace the moral edicts of American
constitutional law with tyranny.
441. Bayer II supra note 17, at 289-90.
442. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 60 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Simon,
supra note 63, at 1486 (explaining that, "the United States Constitution is authoritative,
because major American institutional actors (e.g., legislative bodies, courts, and agencies)
and a large segment of the population have the appropriate attitude - that is, they regard
the Constitution as a source of legally controlling rules and norms.").
443. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
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metatheories, enforcing large ideas -- paradigmatic ideas444 -- as indeed
does our Constitution. Thus, again we see that America's quest cannot be
to follow uncritically "dead hands" -- how the Framers might have resolved
such-and-such specific, intricate, discrete constitutional problems. Rather,
we are guided by the Framers' still living hands when we enforce via the
Constitution, the bravura principles of liberty. Such is, I urge,
Deontological Originalism's straightforward premise, consistent with, as
shown above, the true validity of originalist theory.
F. To Be a Valid Constitution, Its Premises Must Be Correct --
It is therefore understood, indeed overt in the nature of our
Constitution, that its status as supreme law -- as the "legal text that
constitutes a framework of government" -- entails the concurrent
confidence that its strictures, at least in their largest sense, truly are
correct."' Regarding the uniqueness of a constitutional system of societal
governance, Professor Simon noted, "First, it might be claimed that it is
implicit in the concept of a written constitution (or at least ours) that the
original understanding provides the authoritative source of constitutional
meaning, and that this meaning can be authoritatively changed only by
amending the Constitution through the processes that are themselves set
out in the document."" Accordingly, "there is something normatively
special about the role, status, or institutions of the origination. "44' The
"something normatively special" to which Simon alludes cannot simply be
formalistic; the specialness of the Constitution inspiring, indeed
commanding obedience as the highest law cannot arise merely because we
have designated the document to be a constitution. Rather, the specialness
of its "origination" must be proven, that is, the given constitution must
444. See generally, Bayer II supra, note 7.
445. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 36.
446. By "correct," I mean, as explicated in this article's previous Sections, the provisions
of the Constitution are moral in that they require moral comportment at all times, of all
organs of government. See, supra Sections 2-3. While there is no single governmental
structure that alone ensures governmental morality, among the many alternatives, the one
adopted by our Constitution fulfills the duty of morality incumbent on Government.
447. Simon, supra note 63, at 1484-85 (emphasis in original) (noting that this idea
apparently is based on some aspect of contract -- contractarianism -- that by actual or social
contract it is understood that the originators' meaning must control.).
448. Id. (emphasis added).
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earn the respect, loyalty, and obedience attendant to "the role, status, or
institutions of' being highest law. It earns that respect by being correct.
This is not to deny, of course, that the Founders themselves
understood that their perceptions and understandings were incomplete,
even infirm in part." 9 Accordingly, future discrete applications of
constitutional bedrock might confound the susceptibilities of the Founders
themselves. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the Constitution depends on
our justified faith that the Constitution's foundational principles are
fundamentally correct, therefore proper bedrock upon which to build a
complete and intricate structure of civil and criminal law.450 Thus, honest
repudiations of the Founder's specific preferences and predilections in
favor of a better understanding of the Constitution's paradigmatic
principles reflect exactly what the Founders, as our metaphorical parents,45 '
449. See, supra note 23, Part II, at Section 3-c. Indeed, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578-579 (2003) accenting that "had those who drew and ratified the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom." See also, Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Looking
Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 329, 336 (2004) (quoting Lawrence).
450. I leave for another writing the problem of immoral constitutional provisions; that is,
how to deal with any discrete part of our Constitution that by its own terms is immoral.
There seem to be two possible outcomes for immoral constitutional provisions. The first is
to declare any immoral commands void and unenforceable. The second, one might say
"positivistic" method, is to hold even immoral provisions enforceable unless and until
rescinded or properly altered through the Constitution's formal amendment procedures.
Based on the Natural Law principles of the Declaration of Independence, the better
argument seems to be the former, although precedent implies the latter. To date, the
established standard is that a court, "as interpreter and enforcer of the words of the
Constitution, is not empowered to strike the document's text on the basis that it is offensive
to itself or is in some way internally inconsistent." New v. Pelosi, 2008 WL 4755414, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 374 Fed.
Appx. 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoted in Hassan v. Fed. Elections Comm'n., 893 F. Supp. 2d
248, 257 (D.D.C. 2012) (ratification of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause did not
impliedly repeal U.S. CONST., art II, sec. 1, cl. 4's proscription that the President of the
United States must be a natural bom citizen)); see also Hassan v. Colorado, 870 F. Supp.
2d 1192, 1200-01 (D. Col.) (Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses do not impliedly repeal or otherwise render unenforceable U.S. CONsT., art II, sec.
1, cl. 4's proscription that the President of the United States must be a natural born citizen,
nor is that proscription inherently too absurd to be enforced).
451. Town of Greece, NY, v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) ("[Tlhe line we
must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history
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sought and inspired.4 52 In that way, as Professor Balkin explained,4 53
constitutional meaning derives from our identification with the Framers
and, through that identification, we compose interpretations and
applications (proper, one hopes) of the enduring values -- the correct moral
concepts -- those constitutional meanings imbue in our national charter.
Thus, we now comprehend more fully the important truth of the
assertion that, if we cannot find legitimacy in the Constitution by linking
the present to the past, then constitutional interpretation and application
become simply a set of ad hoc determinations, purporting to, but actually
unmoored from binding, rightful principles set forth at the founding and
augmented by amendment. As James Madison fittingly wrote, "[if] the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation . .
be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent
and stable [government], more than for a faithful exercise of its powers."4 54
Accordingly, to fulfill sensibly its "immortality, "415 the Constitution's
assertion of supremacy is legitimate only because we can prove its
premises are legitimate.
In sum, Originalism, as an overarching matter, is correct while Living
Constitutionalism and similar theories are not because, although
"Originalism is a murky term," 456 and although it has fractured into a host
of competing, divergent sub-theories, 457 Originalism's paradigm -- the
and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers") (citing "School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
452. See Bayer II, supra note 17, at 342-46.
453. Supra note 441 and accompanying text.
454. Simon, supra note 63, at 1484 n. 13 (quoting 9 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-10)).
455. See supra, notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
456. Colby & Smith, supra note 337, at 241 n. 1.
457. Id. at 306 (quoting, Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 855 (1989)) (critiquing divisions between originalists, the authors opined:
[OJriginalism does not "by and large" represent a coherent approach. And because
the shared principles that can be said to animate all of its various iterations are
remarkably broad, it is an "agreed-upon point of departure" only in the way that
Chicago's O'Hare Airport is a point of departure: because there are so many flights
on so many airlines to so many different places, you can use it to get virtually
anywhere you want to go. ...
If all that originalism entails is agreement on a point of departure that can still
take judges wherever they want to go, then it surely fails to live up to its lofty
claims and promises.
Id.
Were sarcasm argument, Colby and Smith's positon would be unassailable.
Doubtless, Originalism may not fulfill each and every among "its lofty claims and
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basic concept upon which all its family members seemingly agree -- is
compellingly and fundamentally correct: as the Nation's highest law, the
United States Constitution, "should be interpreted according to its original
meaning. "458 Captivatingly then, Originalism's arguably most
controversial yet eminently correct premise is, "the notion that the
Constitution has a fixed meaning that does not change with the passage of
time.'N59
G. The Arc of Originalism --
A review of extant theories of Originalism is not absolutely necessary;
rather, this work could move to Part II, first verifying that the Founders and
the Reconstruction Congress embraced Deontological Originalism, and
second, reviewing the development of substantive due process
jurisprudence in deontological originalist terms. Nonetheless, I offer a very
brief review of some of Originalism's major strands to demonstrate a
perhaps unsurprising trend -- indeed, a conceptual arc -- starting from
uncritical adherence to the Framers' preferences but soon progressing
towards, but still falling short of the very deontological bent that, I think,
properly defines Originalism.'
promises;" but then, few paradigms do. However, insofar as it demonstrates why the
meaning and the very legitimacy of the Constitution must be traced back to its founding,
Originalism serves jurisprudence extremely well.
458. Shaman, supra note 331, at 83 (criticizing Originalism).
459. Id.; see also, e.g., Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party
Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FL. L. REv. 483, 486, 495 (2012); Nelson, supra
note 430, at 539-40.
460. Acknowledging the hearty scholarship to the contrary, I believe that the Framers
and the society they represented indeed shared meanings and ideas sufficiently that, albeit
imperfectly, we can say that they understood each other. Indeed, the historical record proves
that both the Framers of 1787 and the Reconstruction Congress of 1868 believed in the
deontological morality of natural law described in the Declaration of Independence and
incorporated into the Constitution. See, Bayer supra note 23, Part 11, Sections 1-2.
As a prelude to that historical analysis, I urged in this writing's discussion of
Deontology that the human capacity to reason permits individuals to escape their prejudices
and personal preferences imperfectly but sufficiently to conceive and to apply abstract
moral precepts. This capacity equally enables individuals to communicate their ideas not
flawlessly, but at least intelligibly to others. Likewise, the groups individuals form to
advocate and to advance their chosen goals can communicate their members' shared ideas
and opinions to other individuals and groups. See, supra Sections 2-c, e. Again, if
communications are imperfect, they are reliable enough so that both within and among
groups, individuals can grasp competing ideas sufficiently to either embrace or to reject
them in whole or part. E.g., Leonard M. Fleck, Ph.D., Last Chance Therapies: Can A Just
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1. Original Forms of Originalism --
As thousands of pages of law reviews and books evince, if the
Constitution has a "fixed meaning," originalists are not of one mind on
what that "fixed meaning" is, nor, indeed, whether that "fixed meaning"
controls in all instances. In its simplest incarnation, an incarnation that is
out of favor with most purported originalists, Originalism actualizes what
then-President Thomas Jefferson warned against: the machinations of
"Crafty individuals ... who feel themselves something in the present
order of things, and fear to become nothing in any other. These persons
inculcate a sanctimonious reverence for the customs of their ancestors;
that whatsoever they did, must be done through all time; that reason is
a false guide and to advance under its counsel, in their physical, moral,
or political condition, is perilous innovation; that their duty is to remain
as their Creator made them, ignorance being safety, and knowledge full
of danger ... anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in
their present state, who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties
to maintain the ascendancy of habit over the duty of improving our
reason, and obeying its mandates.""
Promoting Jefferson's admonition is Originalism in its most rigid
form, Intentionalism or Original Intent Originalism ("010"), which accents
a "focus on original intent. The original intent of a constitutional provision
was the meaning that the provision's framers intended it to mean."462
Rather than discerning a paradigm for constitutional meaning, 010 seemed
to instruct that the solution to every discrete constitutional issue is that
which the Framers would personally have embraced. Professor Varol
nicely described 010,
and Caring Society Do Health Care Rationing When Life Itself Is at Stake?, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 255, 264 (2002) (explaining the process, Dr. Fleck opined,
"Shared understandings of health care justice articulated through a shared process of
rational democratic deliberation are needed, the details of which I sketch below. The virtue
of such shared understandings achieved through a shared deliberative process is that they
constrain morally objectionable arbitrariness by plan administrators, shift the power to make
rationing decisions to those directly affected by those decisions, and protect our liberal
commitments to value pluralism.").
461. Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 489, 493 (2004) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Second Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1805), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 518, 520-21 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984)).
462. Strang, supra note 338, at 2005.
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At its inception, originalism focused on original intention. Prominent
from the 1960s to the mid-I 980s, intentionalism sought to interpret the
Constitution by determining the subjective intentions and expectations
of its drafters. Intentionalism focuses on what the framers "intended --
or expected or hoped -- would be the consequence" of the language they
used in a specific constitutional provision. Intentionalism ... was one
of the interpretive presuppositions of the Constitution; the framers
expected that their intent would govern how their posterity interpreted
the Constitution.4 63
The infirmities of 010 are at once apparent and serious. As highly
regard scholar Cass Sunstein recently explained, "Whether fairly or
unfairly, many of the critics of originalism took it to be politically
motivated and result-oriented, notwithstanding its claim of neutrality.
Importantly, and in response to some serious objections, there was a shift
from a focus on 'original intent' to a focus on 'original meaning.""
Accordingly, despite 010's surface appeal, even the most "conservative"
or cautious theorists had to balk at uncritically applying to any given
constitutional dilemma the outcome preferred by the Framers (if, indeed,
such an outcome could be discerned from among this nation's founders
who where not often of one mind on any given matter and who, despite thei
vaunted precience, did not and could not speak on every likely and unlikely
issue arising from the newly ratified charter of government).
010, then, essentially gave way to Original Methods Originalism
("OMO"), which Professor Fleming encapsulated as "discovering and
applying the original meaning using the original methods that the founders
used and accepted as legitimate."46 5 Professor Varol similarly precised,
"Under that approach, the Constitution is interpreted using the
'interpretative rules that the enactors expected would be employed to
understand their words.' According to Profs. McGinnis and Rappaport,
463. Varol, supra note 332, at 1248-49 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115-16 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); other
citations omitted); see also, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 4 (2d ed. 1997), ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990); Vasan Kesavan
& Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1137 (2003).
464. See, Sunstein, supra note 338, at 1674.
465. James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. CoMP. L.
515, 522 (2004) [hereinafter "Fleming 1"] (discussing, JOHN 0. McGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 14-15, 81-99, 116-38 (2013)).
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some of the founders' interpretive rules and methods support the use of
original intent and others support the application of original meaning." 4 66
Therefore, whether or not it actually engenders good orjust outcomes, early
incarnations seemingly proposed that, "originalism is what interpretation
just is." 467
010 and OMO immediately suggest serious anomalies, particularly
involving constitutional provisions that use identical terms but were
ratified at different times. Specifically, the Constitution's guarantee of
"due process of law," which applies to the federal level via the Fifth
Amendment, ratified in 1791, did not consrain states and localities via the
Fourteenth Amendment, until ratified in 1868 shortly after the Civil War.
As commentators plausibly aver, during those intervening seventy-seven
years, specific meanings and applications of due process had changed.4 68
If indeed the basic meaning of "due process" had transformed between
1791 and 1868, the question arises: pursuant to 010 and OMO, does "due
process of law" under the Constitution only mean what it did in 1791, or
only what it did in 1868, or does it mean that regardless whether outcomes
will differ, under essentially identical facts, "due process" as applied to the
states can be different from due process applied at the federal level? 469 Not
surprisingly, the Judiciary holds, perhaps if only for convenience's sake,
that the meanings of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are identical.47 0 Similarly, even ardent strict originalists
466. Varol, supra note 332, at 1251 (quoting, John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 751-53 (2009)).
467. Fleming I, supra note 470, at 522.
468. E.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L. J. 408, 415-16 (2010) (arguing that, unlike the Reconstruction Congress that drafted
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment
did not understand "due process" to include "substantive due process," a concept, Williams
argues, that only developed in the years after ratification ofthe Bill of Rights but was widely
understood by the time of the Civil War). Professor Williams posited that,
By 1868, the background context against which the Due Process Clauses would
have been understood had changed dramatically. Interpretations of "due process"
by this date were informed by the extensive body of substantive due process
decisions issued by state and federal courts during the early decades of the
nineteenth century as well as by the rhetorical invocations of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause by both proslavery and abolitionist forces."
Id. at 512.
469. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization ofOriginalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 681-
82 (2012) [hereinafter "Fleming II"].
470. E.g., Welsh v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62 (2016); Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S.
161, 167 (2002).
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demur that, despite what history may teach, constitutional theory must
presume that "due process" as applied to the federal level means the same
thing when applied to state and municipal offices.4 71
Given 010's and OMO's inflexibility and almost unthinking
adherence to the Founders' "dead hands," as noted and not surprisingly,
"Few academic originalists maintain th[ese] position[s]," 4 72 feeling that
such an stubborn, indeed crabbed understanding of this Nation's charter
will not work. Professor Varol summed up the criticisms:
Four primary intellectual objections led to the demise of original-intent
originalism. First, the identification of a "single coherent shared or
representative intent' where the drafters are multiple in number
presented methodological problems (the "summing problem").
Second, the ascertainment of subjective original intent was difficult
also because the intention of the founders on a given constitutional
provision is often ambiguous. Third, critics of intentionalism argued
that the founders did not intend their personal intentions to bind future
generations. And fourth, critics also pointed to the undesired
consequences of being ruled by the dead hand of the past in a modem,
evolving society.473
Similarly, Jefferson Holt chastised,
Given that the Framers disagreed among themselves and at times
changed their own minds, it is not difficult to conclude that a collective
original intent is all but impossible to come by. Thus, the principal flaw
471. E.g., Fleming II, supra note 474, at 681-82 (discussing the originalist theories of
Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork). See Williams, supra note 476, at 504-05 (arguing that "it
is not clear why the understandings of the ratifying public in 1868 as to the meaning of "due
process of law" in the Fifth Amendment should be allowed to trump the understandings of
that phrase shared by members of the ratifying public at the time of the Fifth Amendment's
enactment in 1791. If the language of the two Due Process Clauses reflected some sort of
actual conflict such that the competing understandings of the two generations of ratifiers
could not be honored simultaneously, there would be a fairly strong argument that the
meaning of the later-enacted provision should control. But this is not the case. The
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, by its express terms, is limited to the actions
of state governments; while the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, though phrased in
general terms, has long been construed to apply only to the federal government.")
Deontological Originalism, of course, obviates this problem because the meaning of
"due process of law," as the Framers circa both 1791 and 1868 intended, comports with
deontological morality arising from unbiased moral reason and, thus, never changes.
472. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L. REv. 657, 662 (2009).
473. Varol, supra note 332, at 1249 (footnotes collecting sources omitted).
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of original intentionalism is that it requires a judicial imagination that
is as unreasonable as it is creative. For the method to work, the
interpreter must first establish what a particular Framer or group of
Framers intended the Constitution to be, then assume that no one
disagreed with that position, and finally picture that same Framer today
"at 300 years old, having lived the entire course of American history
with unchanged views."474
In addition to the general claim that, "it is nearly impossible to
ascertain a single collective intent of a large group of individuals, each of
whom may have had different intentions[,]"47 5 some critics argue that the
Framers, exercising a laudable sense of sardonicism, sought not "to clarify,
but rather to obfuscate in order to confuse the electorate," because they
"self-consciously believed that they had to hide what they were doing in
order to win ratification." 47 6  Justice William Brennan accented this
historical assertion as a reason to question any strict form of originalism,
"[T]he Framers did not agree about the meaning or application of specific
constitutional provisions and 'hid their differences in cloaks of generality,'
... [accordingly,] 'it is far from clear whose intention is relevant -- that of
the drafters, the congressional disputants, or the ratifiers in the states?""'
474. Jefferson A. Holt, Reading Our Written Constitution, 45 CUMB. L. REv. 487,509-10
(2014-2015) (quoting, FRANK B. CRoss, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 86 (2013)).
475. Colby & Smith, supra note 337, at 248 (citing, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 209-22 (1980) and H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,907 (1985)).
For instance, the important question whether the then-recently ratified Constitution allows
Congress to create a national bank, "suggests the Framers did not agree about the meaning
of the Constitution among themselves. Madison and Hamilton, to name only two, held
opposing views during the debate over the First Bank of the United States." Holt, supra
note 455, at 509 n. 125 (citing, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 89 (2011)); see also,
e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 16-17 (1995) (the framers were not of one mind
regarding church-state issues); but see, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Gardening at Night:
Religion and Choice, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 990 (1999) (review of and response to
STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995)) ("While Professor Smith argues that the framers did not
agree on any principle of religious liberty, I believe that the framers found some common
ground with respect to church-state issues.").
476. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation, 75
TEx. L. REV. 435, 445 (1996).
477. Ronald Turner, On Brown v. Board of Education and Discretionary Originalism,
2015 UTAH L. REV. 1143, 1152 (2015) (quoting JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Speech
to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE 58 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007)).
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Indeed, this explanation emanating from Realpolitik, the provable lack of
consensus among the Founders regarding precise issues, and Living
Constitutionalism's plausible claim that the Founders did not want their
descendants to be constrained by the specific policy and dogmatic
preferences, goes far toward explain why they did not produce detailed
suggested applications - a "users' manual." As it were - to influence
subsequent generations. 4 7 8
To answer these concerns, some theorists proposed consulting not the
Framers themselves, but the societies that would ratify the draft
constitution. "New Originalism," aka "original meaning originalism," aka
"original expected meaning originalism," ("OEMO") 479 aka "Originalism
2.0"480 offers:
With these objections gaining widespread acceptance, the focus of
originalism gradually shifted in the early 1990s from original intent to
original meaning ... New originalism seeks to discern, not the
subjective original intentions or expectations of the founders, but the
objective meaning that a reasonable observer would have assigned to
the constitutional provision when it was enacted. ... [T]he goal is to
ascertain the objective meaning of the text, which is the medium
through which the drafters conveyed their intentions to their
audience. 48 1
Given its different but related incarnations, OEMO apparently is also
known as, or certainly is comparable to, Original Public Meaning
Originalism ("OPMO"), which "inquire[s] into the 'conventional' meaning
of constitutional language 'in context' at the time of adoption and
ratification."4 82 As Professor Solum explained, "Public Meaning
478. Nelson, supra note 430, at 548 (quoting Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 181 n. 59
(Kansas 1999).)("[A]t least on its face, the Constitution gives interpreters only a few
scattered instructions, none of which includes 'a general directive as to interpretive
methodology."').
479. Varol, supra note 332, at 1250-51 (citing LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402 at
297-98).
480. Id. at 1249 (noting the various names of this form of Originalism).
481. Id. at 1249-50 (footnotes collecting sources omitted); Strang, supra note 338, at
2007-09.
482. Ryan C. Doerfier, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L. J. 979,
1027 (2017) (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (1ll. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008),
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1120244 [https://perma.cc/JV9H-QQ4E]).
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Originalists believe that the communicative content of the constitutional
text is fixed at the time of origin by the conventional semantic meaning of
the words and phrases in the context that was shared by the drafters,
ratifiers, and citizens." 483 Aside from the constitutional text itself, new
originalists consult the text and meaning of state constitutions, the
Federalist Papers, notes of state ratifying conventions, contemporary
dictionaries, newspapers and other "extraneous sources."4
Of course, one might lodge the same concerns against New
Originalism/OPMO/OEMO as are brought against 010 and OMO, that
ascertaining any truly reliable shared meaning is problematic as a matter of
language theory,485 as a matter of empiricism, as a matter of politics, 4 86 and
indeed because the proposed system of government was so new and
unfamiliar even if the theories predicating that system were widely
known.487
Moreover, Prof. Sunstein, among others, notes that OEMO and
OPMO aver, at least,
On a very thin view, [that] what governs is the original semantic
meaning, understood as the meaning of the words in the English
language at the time. Call this Semantic Originalism. If the words
"domestic violence" did not originally mean spousal abuse, then they
cannot mean spousal abuse today. If the words "equal protection"
originally had nothing to do with condoms, then they cannot now have
anything to do with condoms. If the English language changed
radically, so that "due" meant "awesome," "cruel" meant "wonderful,"
and "vested" meant "wearing a vest," the meaning of the Constitution
483. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REv. 453, 459 (2013).
484. Varol, supra note 332, at 1250.
485. As Madison accented during the ratification debates, "even superhuman drafters
could not have produced a perfectly precise document, since 'no language is so copious as
to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many
equivocally denoting different ideas."' Nelson, supra note 430, at 526 (quoting, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 37 (Madison), in THE FEDERALIST 231, 236 (Wesleyan 1961)).
486. E.g., Strang, supra note 338, at 2006; see also supra notes 106, 174-76 and
accompanying text.
487. Nelson, supra note 430, at 526 (citing Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane
(Sept 2, 1819), in 3 THE LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (J.B.
Lippincott 1865)).
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would not change, because the original semantic meaning is what
governs. 488
Most adherents to OMO, understandably, eschew such a "thin view"
in favor of what Sunstein characterized as:
a much thicker view[ in that] the original meaning is not limited to
semantic meaning. It captures what the relevant English speakers, at the
time, would have understood the words to mean in their context. The
much thicker view is that the original meaning goes beyond the original
semantic content of the constitutional text and includes an
understanding of the historical context, used to eliminate ambiguity.
Call this Historical Context Originalism, to which most contemporary
originalists subscribe. 48 9
Of course, the "thicker view" is fraught with peril, not the least of
which is how to handle legal meanings that may have changed from the
Constitution's original ratification date to the early post-Bellum period.49 0
But, while such critiques seem to be pertinent, even compelling, they
are irrelevant. If any of these forms of Originalism actually did reflect the
intent of the Framers, judges and commentators would have but two
choices. The first is, so long as the Constitution remains operational, courts
must enforce that intent regardless of outcomes and regardless of how
technically difficult, indeed questionable it may be to discern correct
resolutions of discrete constitutional issues. As the first portions of this
discussion of Originalism proved, the only legitimate interpretation of the
488. Sunstein, supra note 338, at 1675 (citing works of Prof. Jack Balkin, particularly
Living Originalism, supra note 402).
489. Id. at 1676. Prof. Sunstein explicated, "Suppose, for example, that "the freedom of
speech" did not include commercial advertising or libel and that "the equal protection of the
laws" had nothing to do with school segregation or sex discrimination. If so, originalists
would be inclined to say that the issue is at an end." Id.
490. See, supra notes 473-76 and accompanying text. Indeed, as we will see momentarily,
for that reason and because the outcome of OMO can be extraordinarily unpopular and
unpalatable, the majority of originalists sensibly retreat from the "thicker view." "We might
think that if the Equal Protection Clause was not originally understood to forbid racial
segregation or sex discrimination, then that is the end of the matter, ... But another view ...
now held by most originalists, is that originalism does not necessarily entail that
constitutional interpretation is settled by the originally expected applications, which are
evidence of original meaning but not decisive." Sunstein, supra note 338, at 1671 (footnote
omitted).
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Constitution is to follow the intent of the Framers.4 91 Accordingly, if the
first choice -- strict enforcement -- is unpalatable, the second choice is not
to ignore the intent of the Framers, but rather, to draft and ratify a new
constitution reflecting an original intent that courts can accept.492
2. Faint Hearted Originalism --
The truth of the above claim is demonstrated by some jurists' and
commentators' response to the broad, damning and hardheaded premise of
the foregoing original manifestations of Originalism that, based on the
known intent of the Framers, a substantial portion of highly significant
constitutional law rulings are wrong, something judges knew or should
have known when they rendered those decisions. As Professor Simon
briskly noted, "The originalist critique of constitutional law is not a modest
one, for it argues that almost all the constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court have been improper.'493
Rather than advocating either overturning such erroneous rulings or
replacing the Constitution with a charter conforming with such otherwise
infirm constitutional law, a conspicuous cadre of theorists, "attempt to
make peace with precedents that are not consistent with original meaning
as they conceive it."4 9 4 Famously, one fountainhead of Originalism, Justice
Antonin Scalia, somewhat humorously conceded to his dedication as
"faint-hearted4 95 because he could not bring himself to advocate reversal
491. See supra notes 400-49 and accompanying text. Nelson, supra note 430, at 525-29,
535 (noting that Madison, among others, believed the meaning of the Constitution would
and become "fixed," essentially becoming immutable.) Arguably, Madison's concept of a
"fixed" meaning harbors the same infirmities as do the just discussed modes ofOriginalism
unless, of course, Madison was alluding to meaning "fixed" by reference to immutable
moral precepts, an explication of Madison not reflected in Professor Nelson's or other
articles I have uncovered to date.
492. Bret Boyce, The Magic Mirror of "Original Meaning": Recent Approaches to the
Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. REv. 29, 39 (2013) (quoting, Thomas B. Colby, The
Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011)) (explaining that OPMO
and its ilk, "have rendered modern originalism so indeterminate as to sacrifice 'any pretense
of a power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree."').
493. Simon, supra note 63, at 1482 (footnote omitted).
494. Fleming I, supra note 470, at 522 (discussing, JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALIsM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 2, 154-96 (2013)).
495. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989)
("I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.").
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of all precedents that arguably espouse non-originalist reasoning.496
Indeed, journalist and attorney Jeffrey Toobin reported Scalia's brusque
retort to claims that he may be betraying his integrity by voting to uphold
decisions that he believes are wrong or otherwise contrary to judicial
competence: "I am an originalist, but I am not a nut." 497
Respecting the time-honored principle of stare decisis, 4 98 Scalia
justified such feints validating purportedly non-originalist decisions as
"pragmatic," necessitated by the reality that to preserve its legitimacy, the
Judiciary cannot simply reject important precedents followed, respected
and relied upon by the citizenry. Indeed, as the concept of stare decisis
avers, individuals would neither respect nor obey courts whose rulings are
or appear to be ad hoc, politically motivated, and, subject to change based
on the whims and preferences of whatever majority happens to sit in review
at any given time. Likewise, one of Originalism's earliest and most ardent
exponents, Hon. Robert Bork, noted that realistic judges must accept and
applyjudicial precedents expressing now accepted constitutional meanings
although defying the original understanding of either the Framers or their
greater society.499
Accordingly, as its integrity and legitimacy would otherwise be
jeopardized, the Judiciary will not, and ought not, adopt wholesale
revocations of precedents that have become essentially embedded in the
496. Id. at 861-64 (1989); see also Fleming 1, supra note 470, at 520 (quoting ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997)).
497. JEFFREY TOOBrN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
103 (2007) (Justice Scalia explaining the difference between his understanding of
Originalism and that of his Supreme Court colleague, Justice Clarence Thomas, who would
reverse purportedly erroneous precedents). Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future
of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 325, 340 (2009) (quoting Dep't of Revenue v.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); and citing Gonazales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); and, Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532
U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)) Prof. Greene offered that
Justice Scalia, "seems unsympathetic with Justice Thomas's apparent willingness to restore
the Commerce Clause to its neutered pre-New Deal state. Justice Scalia is also willing to
apply dormant commerce clause jurisprudence even though he regards it as 'an unjustified
judicial invention,' and he has swallowed hard and applied punitive damages doctrine that
he disagrees with.".
498. Scalia, supra note 500, at 861.
499. E.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).
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annals of constitutional law;5 ' thus, Originalism be damned.5 1  Faint-
hearted Originalism recalls Shakespeare's wisdom, "Thus conscious does
make cowards ... "502
Indeed, the gripping irony of the Scalia-Bork posture certainly has not
been lost on Originalism's detractors. If, as Justice Scalia and Judge Bork
asserted, "Faint-hearted" originalism is an unfortunate necessity to ensure
the legitimacy of the Judiciary, it likewise connotes the demise of original
forms of Originalism as a practical constitutional frameworks. Scalia
himself admitted that the seemingly widespread acceptance of faint-
heartedness in response to Living Constitutionalism,"o "accounts for the
fact that the sharp divergence between the two philosophies does not
produce an equivalently sharp divergence in judicial opinions."0'4 In that
light, Professor Greene explained why Originalism, then, may have scant
real-world effect on constitutional law: "For originalism of this sort to
continue to prosper it needs to feed continually on issues of first
impression, and those cases are hard to come by."os In light of this reality
along with the other numerous criticisms of unadulterated Originalism,
Professor Sanford Levinson caustically suggests that regardless whether it
is correct in whole or part, as a practical matter, "Originalism is less
important than it is sometimes cracked up to be."50 6 If the "faint hearted"
approach is correct, Originalism may have been rendered, "a tale ... full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing."50 7
500. ANTONIN SCALIA, RESPONSE, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 140 (Amy Guttman ed., Princeton U. Press 1997) (discussed in LIVING
ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 125).
501. Thomas A. Schweitzer, Justice Scalia, Originalism and Texualism, 33 TOURO L.
REV. 749, 762 n. 92 (2017) (quoting Randy E. Barnett, Scalia 's Infidelity: A Critique of
"Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 7, 12-13 (2006)) ("'Justice Scalia is
simply not an originalist' because 'he asserts a strong role for precedent, even where it is
inconsistent with the original meaning of the text.'. . . contrary to [Scalia's] professed
skepticism about the legitimacy ofjudicial review, this stance puts prior opinions of mere
judges above that of the Constitution.").
502. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc.1.
503. LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 402, at 116 ("Most originalists -- at least those
sufficiently mainstream to obtain jobs on the bench -- accept the modem constitutional
regime and find ways to live within it.").
504. Scalia, supra note 500, at 862.
505. Greene, supra note 502, at 340.
506. Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance ofOriginalism in the Actual Performance
ofLegal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 495,503 (1996).
507. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, NIACBETH act 5, sc. 5, 27-28 (explaining that unlike
Macbeth's assessment of "life," Originalism is not "told by ... idiot[s]."). .
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As the earlier discussion of Originalism's essential correctness
shows, 08 Levinson is wrong to assert that "Originalism is less important
than it is sometimes cracked up to be." To the contrary, constitutional
interpretation and application sans Originalism is illegitimate. Therefore,
it is not Originalism that is overblown; but rather, the simple actuality is
that "faint-hearted" originalism cannot legitimately inform constitutional
adjudication. If Originalism is correct because only Originalism renders
that charter meaningful by linking the Constitution's past to its present --
thus, as Professor BeVier opined, Originalism's utmost importance is that
it is the only legitimate understanding of American constitutional law
because all else is partisan politics" -- then the only specie of Originalism
that can fulfill Originalism's singular legitimate purpose is a specie that
rightfully and provably admits no exceptions whatsoever. Such is this
article's proposed Deontological Originalism, the only Originalism, this
writing avers, that can legitimize Originalism. Because faint-hearted
originalism is more exceptions than actually Originalism, it cannot "fit the
bill" -- it cannot be correct.s1 o
3. Moral Reading Originalism --
In response to the infirmities of strict originalist theory and the
duplicity of faint hearted forms, Professor McConnell, among others,
argues that few reputable theorists embrace an Originalism that, to the
extent it is discernable, habitually applies the Framers' preferred
resolutions of specific constitutional dilemmas:
The problem with this argument is that no reputable originalist, with
the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that the Framers'
"assumptions and expectations about the correct application" of their
508. See supra notes 400-49 and accompanying text
509. BeVier, supra note 383, at 287 (footnotes omitted) ("[Aln important function of
Originalism is to exemplify, to enforce, and to sustain the rule of law.").
510. Furthermore, as with OMO, 010 and the amalgams of New Originalism, Justice
Scalia's faint-hearted originalism lacks workable premises. Specifically, we have no
realiable, even if necessarily somewhat imprecise standards to determine which precedents
contrary to the Framers' apparent intent to accept and why is not clear. Logically,
originalists cannot accept a standard that validates precedents contrary to the apparent intent
of the Framers if the given originalists think such precedents reflect good policy. Such a
standard would be as apparently arbitrary as the "living constitutionalism" Originalism
arose to oppose, the standard "that every generation has the right to govern itself." DeBoer
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 418 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing the "living constitution").
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principles is controlling. Robert Bork, for example, wrote in 1986 that
his position "is not the notion that judges may apply a constitutional
provision only to circumstances specifically contemplated by the
Framers. In such a narrow form the philosophy is useless." ...
Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers' analysis of
particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could
have changed and made them wrong. ... [T]hey believe that "[w]e are
governed by what our lawmakers said -- by the principles they laid
down -- not by any information we might have about how they
themselves would have interpreted those principles or applied them in
concrete cases."' '
McConnell's observations rightly recognize that the Framers' intent
warrants an overarching or paradigmatic approach to meaning and
interpretation which avoids adopting without thought or critique the precise
resolutions of discrete constitutional issues the Framers or the greater social
order apparently would have preferred, assuming such are discernable
empirically with any reasonable degree of reliability. This has led to a
broad swath of originalism that might be labeled: Moral Reading
Originalism ("MRO"), into which my proposed Deontological Originalism
arguably falls. MRO extolls what original forms of Originalism eschew:
that the Framers intentionally and knowingly incorporated into the
Constitution's text explicitly moral duties of Government. As Professor
Fleming correctly concluded,
Originalism, old and new, makes a virtue of claiming to exile moral and
political theory from the province of constitutional interpretation. That
is neither possible nor desirable, nor is it appropriate in interpreting our
Constitution, which establishes a scheme of abstract aspirational
principles and ends, together with a general framework of structures
and powers, rather than a code of detailed historical rules. Interpreting
our Constitution with fidelity requires judgments of moral and political
511. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" ofthe Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1269, 1284 (1997) (citing DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 14 (quoting, Robert H. Bork, The
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826
(1986))).
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theory about how those principles, frameworks, and structures are best
understood. 5 12
Perhaps the most highly regarded of the moral originalists is Ronald
Dworkin who encapsulated MIRO as, "we all -judges, lawyers, citizens
- interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they
invoke moral principles about political decency and justice"5 13 Similarly,
Professor Fleming stated,
By "moral reading" and "philosophic approach," I refer to conceptions
of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles
-- not codifying concrete historical rules or practices -- and of
interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments
about how they are best understood -- not merely historical research to
discover relatively specific original meanings. 514
That is because the Constitution's text, both literally and in spirit, is
imbued with specific moral principles requiring contemporary
interpretations to be meaningful in contemporary society. 1 s Therefore,
whether they admit it or not, American judges cannot help but understand
512. Fleming 1, supra note 470, at 533.
513. DwORKIN, supra note 12, at 2-4.
514. Fleming I, supra note 470, at 516-17 ("1 reject all forms of originalism, old or new,
concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin has called a
'moral reading' of the Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a
'philosophic approach' to constitutional interpretation."). I must disagree with Professor
Fleming because, as proved earlier, see supra notes 400-49 and accompanying text, as with
any constitutional framework, a moral reading must be "originalist" in that it comports with
what the Framers intended. Otherwise, it fails to link our present-day applications with the
original understanding, thus rendering our Constitution groundless, subject to changing
meanings based on the whims of decisionmakers.
515. Jacob Nebel, Does Dworkin's Moral Reading Rest On a Mistake?, J. JuRis 25, 25
(2013) (discussing, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 2-13). Not surprisingly, Dworkin
accents the Bill of Rights and the due process and equal protection clauses as archetypal
examples of constitutional morality. DwORKIN, supra note 12, at 2-3, 7-8 (explain that "the
First Amendment, for example, recognizes a moral principle - that it is wrong for
government to censor or control what individual citizens say or publish-and incorporates
it into American law. So when some novel or controversial constitutional issue arises -
about whether, for instance, the First Amendment permits laws against pornography -
people who form an opinion must decide how an abstract moral principle is best understood.
They must decide whether the true ground of the moral principle that condemns censorship,
in the form in which this principle has been incorporated into American law, extends to the
case of pornography.").
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the Constitution's commands to be the moral imperatives that require moral
reasoning to solve the moral dilemmas those commands engender."'
While the basic premise of MRO is correct, along with the bulk of
commentators and jurists,5 17 most moral readers erroneously reject the idea
that there are deontologically correct moral answers, averring, rather, that,
"Given the range of legitimate disagreement about the requirements of
political morality, the 'correct' or 'authoritative' interpretation will often
depend on the interpreter."' Perhaps straddling a middle position, the late
Ronald Dworkin, arguably MRO's most highly respected promoter,
believed that there are correct moral answers to moral dilemmas;5 1 9 but,
such answers derive from empirical reviews of Americanism under the
Constitution, a process Dworkin called "constitutional integrity. "520 The
moral meaning must come from the Constitution itself and be consistent
with the fabric of interpretations of earlier courts as well as with American
history and values.5 21 This means, "the moral reading [asks judges] to find
the best conception of constitutional moral principles ... that fits the broad
story of America's historical record."52 2 Consequently, a moral reading of
516. Id. at 2-4; Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-17 (1986) (explaining that due to
politics "it would indeed be revolutionary for ajudge openly to recognize the moral reading,
or to admit that it is his or her strategy of constitutional interpretation, and even scholars
and judges who come close to recognizing it shrink back, and try to find other, usually
metaphorical, descriptions of their own practice." ) This hypocrisy is based on jurists'
erroneous belief that to admit to such an obviously actual and true practice would
simultaneously be to admit that law is nothing more than judges inflicting their personal,
selfish moral precepts in the guise of unbiased interpretations of law.
517. See supra notes 83-123 and accompanying text.
518. Simon, supra note 63, at 1487.
519. Ara Lovitt, Constitutional Confusion? Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution. by Ronald Dworkin., 50 STAN. L. REv. 565, 570 n. 35 (1998) (citing,
RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 119-145 (1985) (arguing against what Dworkin
calls the "no-right-answer thesis")) ("[E]ven though Professor Dworkin acknowledges that
arguments over morality are uncertain, he does not believe it follows that there are no right
answers to hard moral questions. Quite to the contrary, one of Dworkin's most famous
jurisprudential and philosophical claims is that there really are right answers to hard
cases.").
520. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 10.
521. Id. at 10-11. As Dworkin explicated, judicial decisions must be principled, not
based on politics and compromises. To assure this, rulings must be both vertically and
horizontally sound. Regarding the former, "a judge who claims a particular right of liberty
as fundamental must show that his claim is consistent with the bulk of precedent, and with
the main structures of our constitutional arrangement." Additionally, "integrity holds
horizontally: ajudge who adopts a principle must give full weight to that principle in other
cases he decides or endorses."
522. Id. at 11.
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the Constitution concerns not only the Framers' general understanding of
applicable morality, but as well past legal and political understandings that
may not fully comport with the Framers' beliefs.523 In that way, even if a
judge believes her deeply and earnestly held principles are moral minima,
she cannot inflict those as the meaning of due process and equal
protection.52 4
Regarding the morality of the Constitution itself, Professor Dworkin
opined,
I believe that the principles set out in the Bill of Rights [which include
the Reconstruction Amendments], taken together, commit the United
States to the following political and legal ideals: government must treat
all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political
status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with equal
concern; and it must respect whatever individual freedoms are
523. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, for instance, intended to make as highest
law a forceful principle of equality while, at the same time, the enacting Congress endorsed
racially segregated public schools in the District of Columbia over which Congress
exercises legal authority. Interpreters must discern that highest level of meaning, therein
the principle of equality. (But, there must be limiting principles lest the highest meaning is
so abstruse that it allows almost any subordinate, more specific application, thus allowing
judges to substitute their personal morality.) DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 8-10. See also,
e.g., Gregory Bassham, Freedom's Politics: A Review Essay of Ronald Dworkin's
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading ofthe American Constitution, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1235, 1244 (1997) (book review) (citing, inter alia, Dworkin, supra note 12, at 72-73) ("So,
for example, even if historical investigation were to show conclusively that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses were originally understood only to guarantee
lawful procedures, constitutional history, Dworkin claims, has long excluded that as an
eligible interpretation of the clauses.".)
524. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at II ("The moral reading asks [judges] to find the best
conception of constitutional moral principles -- the best understanding of what equal moral
status for men and women really requires ... that fits the broad story of America's historical
record. It does not ask them to follow the whisperings of their own consciences or the
traditions of their own class or sect if these cannot be seen as embedded in that record.").
Dorf, supra note 46, at 138 (emphasis added) ("Judges may not read their own convictions
into the Constitution. They may not read the abstract moral clauses as expressing any
particular moral judgment, no matter how much that judgment appeals to them, unless they
find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole, and
also with the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by otherjudges. They must
regard themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who together elaborate
a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see that what they contribute
fits with the rest."). See also Bassham, supra note 528, at 1245.
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indispensable to those ends, including but not limited to the more
specifically designated in the document, ... 525
As we see, then, Dworkin's MIRO accepts the reality of correct moral
answers to discrete constitutional questions. In fact, Professor Fleming has
accented that he and Dworkin are not "postmodernists," meaning, they are
not skeptical regarding the existence of "moral reality, right answers, best
interpretations, and all things Dworkonian ... "526 Professor Dorf
understands Dworkin to, "believe[] that finding the interpretation that best
hangs together with everything we take to be true about the law means
finding a truth that really is out there. [Some call this] so much
metaphysical nonsense.",527  Arguably, Dworkin basically admits that
morality is extra-human - that moral truth "really it out there," meaning,
not inherently within us but discoverable through reason.52 8 Still, Professor
Dworkin did not address at the meta-theoretical level, immutable, unbiased
deontological morality, so far as I can tell from his elucidations in his
pivotal works, Freedom's Law and Law's Empire. Indeed, his constant
references to the American experience and "America's historical record"
imply that morality is more a matter of experience and sensible preferences,
not abstract principles discerned from impartial reason, informed by but
ultimately unmoored from politics and unconcerned with whether the
resulting outcomes are good or bad. For instance, regarding the Bill of
Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments, Dworkin stated, "Taken
together, these principles define a political ideal: they construct the
constitutional skeleton of a society of citizens both equal and free ...
[protected by] broad and abstract principles of political morality, which
together encompass, in exceptionally abstract form, all the dimensions of
political morality that in our political culture can ground an individual
constitutional right." 52 9
525. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 7-8 (clarifying that the Bill of Rights includes the
Reconstruction Amendments is found at 72).
526. Fleming 11, supra note 474, at 677 (discussing how Jack Balkin's concept of "living
originalism" is in large measure identical to Dworkin's moral reading principles.).
527. Dorf, supra note 46, at 138.
528. Patrick Neal, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 162-170 (1997) ("noting
that both Rawls and Dworkin propounded weaker version of deontology in later works")
(quote from, Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality and Identity Hierarchy, 3 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY
349, 422 n. 108 (2008)).
529. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 72, 78.
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While his phrasing is, to me at least, pleasingly grandiose and stirring,
I do not see deontological morality premising Dworkin's morality of the
American spirit,53 0 nor framing his assertions that, as earlier quoted, the
Constitution accords all persons "equal moral and political status ... [and]
equal concern [by enforcing] whatever individual freedoms are
indispensable to those ends";5 31 and therein lies the abiding infirmity that
Deontological Originalism cures. My quarrel is not necessarily with his
proposed answers to those constitutional dilemmas to which Dworkin put
his incisive mind.5 32 Rather, what is incurably problematic is his lack of a
deontological framework to assess what he considers to be the applicable
American culture cum experience with which to judge whether any
challenged official action promotes or offends "a society of citizens both
equal and free."5 33 In that significant regard, as edifying and compelling
as his analyses of liberty issues may be, Professor Dworkin's MRO is
incomplete and, if deontological principles would compel changes in his
discrete issue resolutions of particular matters, his MRO is incorrect.
4. Virtue Ethics Originalism --
One offshoot of MRO is found in Lee J. Strang's embrace of "virtue
ethics" which he bases on Elizabeth's Anscombe's article on that topic. 53 4
Simply put, virtue ethics falls under the general category of "practical
philosophy," that is, moral theory "guiding human action," as opposed to
"theoretical" or "speculative" philosophy that seeks to discern "truth about
reality."53 5  Because, "virtue ethics eschews rules in favor of elastic
530. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 521, at 35 (criticizing as implausible natural rights theory
that holds immoral laws are per se illegitimate); cf, McConnell, supra note 516, at 1271-
76 (noting that Dworkin's quest for "right answers" might be at odds with his definition of
"integrity").
531. DWORKrN, supra note 12, at 7-8.
532. Id. at chs. 1-6 (discussing, inter alia, abortion, "right to die," and free speech
matters).
533. Id. at 72.
534. Strang, supra note 338, at 2014 (discussing, G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral
Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1, 3-6, 9, 13-16 (1958)).
535. Id. at 2016 (footnotes omitted)(arguing that there is an impasse between
Consequentialism (arguing that morality is humanly created, based on what generate the
best outcome in any given scenario) and Deontology (arguing that morality is a priori,
transcendent and based on principles discerned from reason dictating the right moral answer
to any particular dilemma)). Strang is right that many theorists stubbornly cling to
Consequentialism; however, there is no actual impasse in that Deontology is correct,
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concepts like character and virtue," 53 6 Professor Strang is focusing on one
aspect of practical philosophy and virtually no meta-theoretical
philosophy.53 7 Indeed, Strang admits that virtue ethics lacks a foundation
-- a metatheory -- such as the natural law principles 53 8 to make its real-
world guidance more understandable.5 39
Absent a defining metatheory, virtue ethics attempts to identify what
attributes constitute good and decent human character. 540 "[V]irtue is ...
something that makes its possessor good; a virtuous person is a morally
good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and reacts well, rightly, as
she should -- she gets things right."541  Thus, the thrust of "virtue" is
acquiring the "habit" of a personal "disposition of character" that "makes
its possessor good; a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or
admirable person who acts and reacts well, rightly, as she should -- she gets
Consequentialism is not. See infra note _. Nonetheless, Strang's use of value ethics is a
useful interlude in this debate.
536. Strang, supra note 338, at 2028.
537. Id. at 2017.
538. Id. at 2023-24, 2027
As Strang noted,
Natural law is the body of norms that identifies which actions are, and which are
not, conducive to human flourishing. Natural law norms are natural because they
are tied to human nature: they identify which actions are right and wrong by
reference to a being with human characteristics. Natural law precepts are tied to
human nature via the goods that natural law norms direct humans to instantiate.
Primary among the characteristics of humans is both a rational and animal nature.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1-11, Q. 90, art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (quoted in id. at 2040).
We now can intuit what Bayer, supra note 23, Part 11, Section 5, will prove:
a Kantian rather than Aquinan approach better describes Natural Law because the
moral precepts derived therefrom are based on, to use the Founder's apt phrasing,
"Nature and Nature's God," not "human nature" or "human characteristics."
Therefore, if Strang would choose St. Thomas' paradigm, he would construct an
inapt deontological base for his understanding of Virtue Ethics.
539. Strang, supra note 338, at 2023, 2029 ("[A] frequent criticism lodged against virtue
ethics is that its purported lack of normative rules disables it from offering sufficient ethical
guidance. ... [Still,] virtue theorists, while acknowledging the fuzziness of some of virtue
ethics' concepts, have argued that virtue ethics also prescribes rules of conduct.").
540. Id. at 2018 (discussing, Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999)) ("In virtue
ethics, the fundamental issue is not action: it is character. Virtue theorists argue that the
focus of ethical inquiry should be the instantiation and exercise of virtue, not an algorithm
of right action.").
541. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics 13 (1999).
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things right." 542 Desired "virtues include: theoretical wisdom,543 practical
wisdom, 5" justice-as-lawfulness, 5 45  temperance, 54 and fortitude."5 4 7
Virtue ethics maximizes "human flourishing," but only in a rational fashion
because only humans among all animals, have the capacity for complex
and thorough reasoning. The virtues of a good judge - likely applicable to
all human endeavors to a greater or lesser extent - help guide persons to
rationally maximizing their human flourishing, meaning acting excellently
in a world of others while pursuing happiness.5 48
Of course, such praiseworthy attributes as virtue ethics stresses are not
inimical to Originalism. 5 49 In particular, because judges have a duty to
abide by originalist tenets, Strang urges that virtue ethics can help judges
decide how to handle nonoriginalist precedents, "and therefore
nonoriginalist precedent will not erode the original meaning's pride-of-
place." 5 o From this, Professor Strang concludes, "Accepting the continued
542. Id.
543. Strang, supra note 338, at 2019 ("Theoretical wisdom" is "the intellectual
firepower" to understand and to apply the abstract ideas of law such as "cases, statutes,
regulations, legal principles, and legal practices that are pertinent to the case before the
judge.") (footnote omitted).
544. Id. at 2020 ("Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables its possessor to
perform two tasks well: first, identify those goods that are valuable and therefore worth
pursuing; and second, perceive the means most conducive to pursuing those identified
goods. Practical wisdom, in the context of judging, is primarily concerned with the second
task. Practical wisdom provides the capacity to articulate legal doctrine that mediates legal
meaning and the facts presented in cases.")
545. Id. at 2021 ("Justice-as-lawfulness is the virtue of giving one's society's laws their
due." Strang is unclear about what this means, but, it seems it is the ability of the judge to
act like a judge even when the judge dislikes having to enforce a given outcome.").
546. Id. at 2022 ("A temperate judge will hold in check his sensual appetites [such as
resisting bribes]. ... Courage is the firmness of mind that enables one to react appropriately
to danger, and a courageousjudge will rule according to the law even in the face of potential
harm to his reputation, career, or even family and life.").
547. Id at 2019 (citations omitted).
548. Id at 2022-23.
549. Id at 2027 ("For example, fortitude, in the context of judging, bears on whether or
not ajudge has the courage to articulate the Constitution's original meaning, not whether or
to what extent the Constitution's meaning was fixed at the point of ratification.")(footnote
omitted).
550. Id. at 2030, 2034 (Specifically, "a judge must utilize three factors to decide whether
to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent: (1) the extent of the precedent's deviation from the
Constitution's original meaning; (2) the harm to Rule of Law values caused by overruling
the precedent; and (3) the extent to which the precedent creates a just social ordering.
However, this opens originalism to the second nonoriginalist criticism: that originalism
gives judges too much discretion. Virtue ethics enables originalism to adequately address
this critique.").
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viability of some nonoriginalist precedent will not, therefore, undermine
originalism, and originalism can more easily fit this facet of our legal
practice.""s' That conclusion, of course, is encouraging but quixotic. The
very premise of Originalism, as earlier argued, is that only by keeping faith
with original intent can present applications of constitutional provisions be
legitimate.5 52 Despite Strang's optimism, it is unclear how virtue ethics
salvages Originalism if Virtue Ethics Originalism does not require strict
originalist comportment.
Perhaps Virtue Ethics does this much: integrity prevents judges from
using "faint hearted" principles as a ruse to issue any constitutional edict
they like.' But, as we will see, under Deontological Originalism, the
proper originalist framework, any incorrect constitutional decision is per
se immoral. As there can be no justification for the perpetuation of
immoral standards and conduct, the very idea that virtue ethics can justify
the continuation of anti-originalist precedents is fatally flawed.554
Indeed, virtue ethics has excited much interesting legal
commentary."' Nonetheless, as stressed above and as Professor Strang
551. Id. at 2030.
552. See supra Sections 4-E, F.
553. See supra notes 498-515 and accompanying text.
554. Strang, supra note 338, at 2032 ("The aim of every political constitution is, or ought
to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue
to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual
precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust")
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison))
Doubtless, virtue ethics are useful, particularly for choosing among moral options -
- "guns" of what type and quantity as opposed to "butter" of what type and quantity -- which
is the function of most elected and appointed officials in the executive and legislative
branches. However, as explained infra at Bayer, supra note 23, Part 1l, Sections 2-3, the
Founders' overarching concern both at the outset of the American Revolution, and at the
original drafting of the Constitution, and at its pivotal amending in 1868, was to assure that
the new government would always enforce and preserve the natural rights arising from
natural law that inures to each human being. Such is the theme repeated in The Federalists,
in other writings and carried over in the enactment history of the post-Bellum amendments.
As such, Madison's seeming emphasis on virtue ethics in his phrasing, "The aim of every
political constitution is, or ought to be, first, ... " does not place virtue ethics above the
deontology that defined and continues to define the Revolution and the meaning of the
Constitution.
555. E.g., Justice Jeff Brown, "A Scout Is Trustworthy": Applying Virtue Ethics to
Lawyer Professionalism, 3 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICs 2 (2013);
Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding Lawyer: Human
Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N.D. L. REV. 19 (2011); Heidi L. Feldman, Prudence,
Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI. KENT L. REv. 1431
(2000).
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forthrightly admitted, virtue ethics lacks a metatheory explaining whether
the characteristics it embraces are the product of human imagining or the
natural order of things over which human beings have no control. Absent
a determination on this issue, we cannot be sure what purported virtues
truly belong in the catalog of virtue ethics and whether they can change
based on new circumstance, human whim or both.556
5. Liberal Originalism --
Of all the forms arguably falling under the heading of Moral Reading
Originalism, one rather close to the Deontological Originalism urged here
is Liberal Originalism. As Lisa Parshall encapsulated, "The reconciliation
of original meaning with changing circumstances is exemplified by the
doctrine of 'liberal originalism', which seeks to apply the enduring values
of individual liberty and limited government expressed in the Declaration
of Independence to contemporary constitutional questions."557
Liberal Originalism rightly begins by noting that because so many of
its terms are vague and otherwise not self-defining, "constitutional
interpretation simply must have some reference beyond the plain text in
order to make any sense of the document."' The most logical source is
the Declaration of Independence because it, "is a timeless principle, framed
in the Constitution, ... applicable to changing circumstances, depending
not on an organic national history, but instead on assent to principle." 5 59
Hence, unlike "leftist" concepts of a "living constitution," liberal
originalism is based on "unchanging principles underlying the
Constitution" set forth in its text but informed -- given depth and meaning
-- by the principles of the Declaration.5 60 In this way, liberal originalism is
556. Logically, the very idea of virtue ethics implies Deontology over Consequentialism
because surely that which is virtuous and, thus, endemic of proper human character are not
mere political bagatelles, subject to change. The implication favoring Deontology,
however, is not proof; therefore, Originalism needs to be predicated on one of the two
possible bases of morality, of which, this article argues, Deontology is the correct choice.
557. Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C.
CENT. L. REv. 25, 30 (2007).
558. Sandefur, supra note 466, at 497.
559. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted) ("The Declaration is adaptable to new
circumstances.").
560. Id. at 508-09; see also Scott D. Gerber, Liberal Originalism: The Declaration of
Independence and Constitutional Interpretation, 63 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
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faithful to the Framers and to the Constitution by avoiding "subjectivism
on a large scale."56 1
Liberal originalists rightly recognize, as they must, the Enlightenment
origins of the Declaration and the Constitution.562 But, as useful and adept
as it is, works such as Sandefur's do not address how those principles have
been taken to important depths by Immanuel Kant who is not mentioned in
Sandefur's work and who, even more than Locke, understood that forming
legitimate government is not simply convenient, nor simply important to
secure rights, but predominately a moral imperative in and of itself.5 63
Granted, much, but certainly not all, of what Kant explicated with depth
and significance can be found in Lockean moral theory. As one scholar
stated, "Locke was a proto-Kantian." M
Still, for whatever reasons which certainly did not include a lack of
intellectual capacity, Locke declined to develop a full -- a "robust enough
moral theory ... Locke only mentioned that all of us must abide by the law
of nature, independently of positive or civil law. Locke did not develop an
ethical position and in places explicitly endorsed a hedonistic view of
values."'65
Accordingly, building on his predecessors, "Immanuel Kant
developed the best-known deontological theory."566 Kant brought the
concept of personal and governmental morality to greater heights and fully
detail than did his forebears, particularly through the Categorical
561. Sandefur, supra note 466, at 509.
562. Id. at 516 ("[Tlhe Lockean theory underlying the Declaration saw man as essentially
rational, and from that rationality, it devised the notion of inalienable rights.") In particular,
and not surprisingly, liberal originalism recognizes that the Founders were greatly
influenced not only by John Locke, but also by other leading Enlightenment thinkers and
their highly-regarded predecessors of which Aristotle looms large. The Founders saw and
adapted the intersection of these philosophers' ideas.
563. Gerber, supra note 565, at 5 (discussing, Scort D. GERBER, To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1995)) (predicating his interpretation of the Constitution on "the Lockean political
philosophy of the Declaration of Independence.").
564. Short, supra note 266, at 25 (explaining that like Kant, Locke believed human beings
are imbued with an innate dignity that requires them to be treated not as objects but as
persons worthy of regard. Accordingly, consistent with what Kant later would argue,
individuals, alone or collectively, cannot impugn their own dignity through, for instance,
suicide or by, "agree[ing] voluntarily to a tyrannical/autocratic government.").
565. Tibor R. Machan, Considerations of the Libertarian Alternative, 2 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 103, 108 (1979) (citing, J. LOCKE, 11 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 2 (1706)).
566. Kuklin, supra note 39, at 497.
2017] 157
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Imperatives and proof that forming governments is a moral requisite to
formalizing individual interactions, particularly regarding claims
demanding specific performance or restitution from broken promises. 67
Indeed, despite appeals to Locke, there seems to be scant formal moral
theory underlying Liberal Originalism. True, Professor Sandefur discusses
several important moral dilemmas addressed by the constitution such as
"Sexual Freedom and Public Morality,"5 68 but he declines to provide a set
of moral precepts to enliven Liberal Originalism aside from averring in a
distressingly conclusory manner that the principles of the Declaration
seemingly speak for themselves.5 69 For instance, Sandefur discusses the
right of homosexual conduct as follows:
567. Rakesh K. Anand, Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, and the Cultural Study of the
Lawyer, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. 737, 757 (2008) (footnote omitted) (observing that
"Genealogically speaking, Kant lies at the foundation of liberalism's moral theory (which is
itself the foundation of liberal politics). The liberal moral discourse of personhood, common
morality, and associated terms begins with Kant's critical ethics, and his ideas of autonomy,
individual moral worth, purposiveness, and related concepts. If we examine Kant's ethical
philosophy, we see that Kant organized his ethical thinking around the conviction that a
fundamental value lies in the universalizability of a rule.")
I note in passing that Anand argues that Kant never proves that universal rules
actually exist or that the universality of Kant's rules rightly define deontological precepts.
I strongly disagree on both claims. This writing's Section 2, particularly the discussion of
value monism, explains the inevitability of universal rules.
As for Anand's second critique, Kant's Categorical Imperatives, discussed in
Section 3, premised on the innate dignity of Humankind explains why and when personal
desire must give way to the moral regard of others. Anand asks, among other questions,
"Why, for example, shouldn't individual desire -- or at least the actions of an unsubordinated
will -- trump a universal obligation?" Thereafter simply concluding without more that,
"There is, of course, no reason why they shouldn't, which is why any argument for the pure
objectivity of Kant's critical ethics does not stand. Neither, then, does an argument for the
objectivity of a moral framework rooted in it." Id.
However, I do agree with Anand that the state of nature is a moral environment in
which to exist. But, the justification for the state of nature, as the previous discussion shows,
is based solely on the selfish predilections of each actor coupled with each actor's fortuitous
ability to take whatever she wants, from whomever she wants, whenever she wants,
wherever she may be. Kant recognized that moral justification requires unmooring a
claimed moral precept from subjective desires. I am satisfied with Kant's proof that a social
order based on what popularly is called "the law of the jungle" cannot arise from unbiased
reason. Even though we understand why a person might wish to run the risk of being one
of the few "kings" of such a "jungle," no rational person using unbiased reason could
rationally will a system where persons may be enslaved, killed at will for no cause other
than the gratification of others' wishes, robbed of their goods, tortured for the pleasure of
others, or otherwise treated merely as "means."
568. Sandefur, supra note 466, at 522-32.
569. Lee J. Strang, Originalism, The Declaration ofIndependence, and The Constitution:
A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, Ill PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 436 (2006)
158 [Vol. 43:1
PART I- ORIGINALISMAND DEONTOLOGY
The Declaration secures the concept of personal autonomy in the phrase
"the pursuit of happiness." As all people are entitled to this right,
nobody, and no government, may deprive another of it; one person's
right to swing his fist ends where another's nose begins. The
Declaration protects the right of people to seek their own happiness,
even in ways that others find distasteful, so long as they respect each
others' right to do so. In Thomas Jefferson's words, "the legitimate
powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others."s70
Sandefur's analysis is conclusory because, while I agree with his
upshot on sexual freedom, he lacks a paradigmatic set of principles to prove
that homosexual conduct does not actually cause harm and, in particular,
that general distaste and approbation are insufficient bases to regulate
conduct. Even presuming the correctness of the proposition that to
maximize the right to pursue happiness, "the legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others,"5 71 how does
Sandefur know that Jefferson is right? How does he know that mere
"distaste" is an insufficient harm to justify governmental regulation,
perhaps prohibition, of the distasteful conduct, especially if opponents'
distaste is deep and widespread while proponents' fondness is mild and
sparse? I think Sandefur is correct, but his Liberal Originalism does not
prove it.
More urgently, with the example of homosexuality as prelude,
Sandefur draws his bold but brash and patently incorrect supposition that,
(quoting, SCOTr D. GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 58-59, 169, and generally
referencing 64-195 (1995)) ("Gerber does not, however, delineate how a judge 'appl[ies]
the fundamental [Lockean] moral and political principles on which this nation is based to
issues of present-day concern.' Instead, he reviews different provisions of the Constitution
and suggests the correct interpretation of the law in those areas 'in light of the Declaration.
... [For example, rieferring back to his 'liberal' originalist methodology, Gerber summarily
claims that the Equal Protection Clause 'was intended to embody the broad principles of
equality and natural rights articulated in the Declaration.").
See also Gerber, supra note 537 ([M]y approach to constitutional interpretation is
grounded in political theory, rather than history. Admittedly, mine is a theory that identifies
the relevant political theory by appealing to history, but I do not use history in the same
narrow sense that a conservative originalist such as Professor Strang would prefer.").
570. Sandefur, supra note 466, at 526 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of
Virginia, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 285 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984)).
571. Id. at 526.
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There are many forms of human flourishing, but there is no single best
form of human flourishing period. Rather, there is only the best form
of human flourishing for an individual.... Since there are no a priori,
universal rules that dictate the proper weighting of the goods and
virtues of human flourishing, a proper weighting is only achieved by
individuals having practical insight at the time of action. They need to
discover the proper balance for themselves.57 2
The above quote is a perfect expression of everything this article's
earlier discussion of Deontology disproved. Sandefur is wholly mistaken.
True, within the bounds of moral conduct "there is no single best form of
human flourishing," that is, individuals are free to pursue their own
happiness, but, as we now know, only in a moral fashion. Individuals may
not pursue happiness by treating either others or themselves merely as
means and not as ends in themselves. Thus, to rephrase properly
Sandefur's text,
There is [only one] single best form of human flourishing period.
[Tlhere are a priori, universal rules that dictate the proper weighting of
the goods and virtues of human flourishing, ... [and the very purpose
of Society is to assure that] a proper weighting is only achieved by
individuals having [not merely] practical insight [as to their wants and
desires] at the time of action [but as well practical reason to discern if
their goals and means are moral]. They need to discover the proper
balance for themselves [but society, through criminal and civil laws,
will assure that "the proper balance" for them is not immoral.] 73
I choose to presume that if pushed, Sandefur would have to agree.
6. Enlightened Originalism --
As noted in the Introduction, 7 ' Professor Ian P. Farrell very recently
published what he denotes as a, "novel and unique theory of constitutional
interpretation ... [that he] call[s] ... 'enlightened originalism."' 5 75 Farrell
572. Id. at 529-30, (emphasis added) (quoting, DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN, Why Individual
Rights?, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS RECONSIDERED: ARE THE TRUTHS OF THE U.S.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE LASTING?l 13, 119-26 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 2001)).
573. Sandefur, supra note 466, at 529-30 (emphasis mine, Sandefur's emphasis
removed).
574. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
575. Farrell, supra note 20, at 571.
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premises "enlightened originalism" on some important but hardly "nove
and unique" ideas. I agree completely with Farrell's assertions that there
are immutable principles of morality -- thus correct moral answers to any
moral dilemma -- that are discerned from reason rather than humanly
created.57 6  Farrell again is correct that moral truths have been
commemorated in the Declaration of Independence as principles of
legitimate governance57 7  and thereafter "incorporated" into the
Constitution as this Nation's highest and controlling law.578 And, again,
Farrell is on solid ground by concluding that moral truths "are not fixed by
what the framers or ratifiers believed the answers to be,"579 Based on his
principles, Farrell aptly argues that Obergefell v. Hodges was rightly
decided.' So far, Farrell is apt but not really "novel and unique."
Indeed, Enlightened Originalism might have obviated the need for this
article's Deontological Originalism if Professor Farrell had substantiated
his copious correct but unproven points. However, as he candidly declared,
Farrell is not now inclined to prove his claims:
I shall not present a comprehensive argumentfor the truth ofthe Moral
Right Answer Thesis in this Article. Much has been written on both
sides about this issue; the literature is sophisticated, complex, and
insightful. Many moral philosophers of note support the Moral Right
Answer Thesis, and people generally treat questions of morality as
having objectively true answers. ... The fact that most people's
intuitions are that morality is objective, and the fact that we generally
employ moral language in a manner that presumes the objectivity of
morality, places the burden of persuasion on those who deny that
morality is objective. ... I will proceed on the basis that there are, in
576. Id. at 571, 577-88 ("there are right answers to questions of morality. There is a 'true'
meaning of, say, equality -- a 'fact of the matter' about equality -- that is independent of
what the majority of competent users of the language believe at any given time.")
577. Id. at 601 (footnote omitted) ("The Declaration's description of equality as a self-
evident truth reinforces my claim that the Founders considered moral equality to be a matter
of objective truth. Since equality is self-evident, by definition it needs no justification; it
goes without saying. We can think of the Declaration, then, as installing the concept of
equality as an axiom of the American politico-legal system.").
578. Id. at 594-98.
579. Id. at 599, 618 (explaining that "I agree with [Ronald] Dworkin that there are right
answers to moral questions, and therefore that there are right answers to legal questions that
turn on moral concepts.").
580. Id at 619-30 ("1 suggest Obergefell is a powerful example of enlightened
originalism in practice.").
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fact, unique answers to questions of morality which are not fixed by
what people believe those answers to be.s58
As a threshold point, Farrell certainly does not substantiate his
reckless and illogical claim: "The fact that most people's intuitions are that
morality is objective, ... places the burden of persuasion on those who deny
that morality is objective."582 Consensus alone surely is no basis to assume
that the particular consensus at issue is empirically correct. 83 If that were
so, criminal defendants would bear the burden of proof to show that they
are not guilty because they are being prosecuted by "the State." This would
infer that the people of that State, which surely outnumber the given
defendant and her supporters, are convinced of that defendant's guilt. 
It may be true that in many instances a "challenger" does carry the
responsibility to prove the bonafides of the particular challenge.'8 And
herein, because Farrell describes his Enlightened Originalism as a, "novel
and unique theory of constitutional interpretation,"5 86 he must assume that
responsibility because, by his own admission, his theory enjoys no
consensus support. 8' Thus, Farrell's refusal to prove his claims is
hypocritical as well as methodologically improper and simply
disappointing.
Accordingly, although providing some correct and useful approaches,
Professor Farrell: (1) does not define morality; (2) nor provide and prove
the specific deontological moral framework he claims defines moral truth;
581. Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added) (promising that he will explicate many of his
assertions in future writings.)
582. Id. at 589 (asserting that the consensus is predicated on "intuition," not an informed
basis, and it ought not merit any substantial weight, especially given the importance of the
subject matter to the meaning of morality.).
583. Hon. Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DuKE L. J. 1445, 1467
(1997) ("Of course, consensus alone would not insulate a rule that was facially
unreasonable, or that lacked substantial evidence to support a key factual predicate, but it
might weigh in to counter an allegation of arbitrariness in a close case.").
584. An equally unconstitutional and untoward procedure would be to hold some sort of
pre-trial public polling to determine whether there is a popular consensus about a given
defendant's probable guilt or innocence as the basis to determine which party, the defendant
or the State, assumes the burden of proof.
585. For instance, few would quarrel with the moral bonafides of the familiar rule that a
plaintiff in a civil action assumes the burden of at least production, if not persuasion that
the given defendant committed the unlawful act set forth in the plaintiff's formal complaint.
586. Farrell, supra note 20, at 571.
587. E.g., Wim Raven, The Biography of Muhammad: The Issue ofthe Sources, 15 J. OF
L. & RELIGION 627, 631 (2000-2001) (book review) (Authors' "scholarly duty [is] to show
how they came to their results.").
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(3) nor explain why, if morality is the basis, one should spend any time
addressing Originalism at all -- why be originalist; (4) nor describe and
prove the correctness of the Declaration of Independence's moral
framework; (5) nor explicate the inextricable link between the Declaration
and the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, 1787-91; (6) nor verify
that, by enacting and championing the ratification of the post-Bellum
Amendments, the Reconstruction Congress likewise embraced the moral
deontology of the Declaration as the overarching legal basis of the
Constitution; (7) nor present an historical and analytical recounting of the
substantive due process that he uses to support his discussion of "marriage
equality."
I respectfully aver that all of the above and more are needed to
substantiate the philosophy, which both Professor Farrell and I support
intensely and staunchly. I believe my writing goes far to proving what
needs to be proved."'
CONCLUSION --
Part I of this article proves that morality is deontological, and that
Kantian moral theory best explains the mechanics of deontological
morality. In addition, Part I elucidates why, to be valid, any theory of
constitutional law must be originalist. Accordingly, this Part has presented
in the abstract, Deontological Originalism. The forthcoming Part II,
Deontological Constitutionalism and the Ascendency of Kantian Due
Process, will prove that both the original Founders (the drafters of the
Declaration of Independence and the original Constitution) and the
Reconstruction Congress (which drafted, inter alia, the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments) embraced Deontological Originalism by
enforcing through the Constitution as America's supreme law, the Natural
Law principles of the Declaration.
Additionally, Part II recounts the development of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence, which at present, actually espouses
two distinct and incompatible constitutional frameworks. The first, known
as the "deeply rooted traditions" approach, holds that governmental actions
588. Therefore, it bears repeating that such detailed proof validates the length of this
writing. Professor Farrell filled roughly fifty law review pages to present his largely
unsupported theory. Filling the numerous gaps requires detailed analysis which, of
necessity, means an unusually long article.
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comport with "due process of law" if, as an empirical matter, they advance
popular traditions and customs. This standard purports not to substitute the
personal partialities of judges for the wisdom of the American people. In
so doing, the courts eschew making moral judgments regarding the
governmental actions under review.
The second substantive due process standard avers that governmental
action violates "due process of law" if it offends innate "human dignity."
This "human dignity" paradigm seems steeped in Kantian morality
although it declines to acknowledge formally either its Kantian source or
any other Enlightenment origin. Despite its lack of attribution, I will argue
that the "human dignity" approach comports with Deontological
Originalism, as intended by the Founders and the Reconstruction Congress.
Accordingly, that paradigm is correct and the "deeply rooted traditions"
framework should be abandoned.58 9
589. In that regard, I was considering entitling Part II either Deontological Originalism -
- The Deontologists Strike Back or Deontological Originalism -- Revenge of the Framers.
However, I decided my dedicated and hard-working editors would not be amused.
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